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ABSTRACT

This collection of conference papers addresses selected philosophical and educational questions being raised by the contemporary teaching community. Papers and presenters are: "Moving toward an Educator's Zero" (Conrad P. Pritscher); "Metaguessing" (David E. Denton); "Teaching and the Role of the Resisting Intellectual" (Henry A. Giroux); "Teachers as Resisting Intellectuals: Cultural Marxism in Educational Theory" (Richard La Brecque); "Notes toward a Conception of Multicultural Education" (Timothy Reagan); "Young Children's Knowing and the Western Rationality Paradigm" (David Kennedy); "Are Dick & Jane Different Moral Beings? An Inquiry into Sex-Specific Morality and Some Educational Implications" (Patrick Socoski); "Comparing Faculty: The Concept of 'Peer' in Higher Education" (Rodney P. Riegle); "Can Teachers Motivate Students?" (Clark Robenstine); "Moral Imagination and Peace Education" (Marguerite K. Rivage-Seul); and "Pro Bono Publico": Educational Reform and the Historical Actor(s) (Richard A. Brosio). Minutes of the business meeting and the financial statement are also included. (JH)

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INTRODUCTION

Richard A. Quante
Miami University

Richard Bernstein recently wrote:

A community or a polis is not something that can be made or engineered by some form of techne or by the administration of society. . . . The coming into being of a type of public life that can strengthen solidarity, public freedom, a willingness to talk and to listen, mutual debate, and a commitment to rational persuasion presupposes the incipient forms of such communal life.

But what, then, is to be done in a situation in which there is a breakdown of such communities, and where the very conditions of social life have the consequences of furthering such a breakdown? More poignantly, what is to be done when we realize how much of humanity has been systematically excluded and prevented from participating in such dialogical communities?¹

Several variations of the themes raised in the Bernstein quotation can be found in the following essays. Although there are strong disagreements about the implications of these ideas, there is close to unanimous critique of the technocratic rationality which seems to permeate the education literature. Philosophers, it will surprise no one, reject the belief that the study of education can be reduced to the instrumentalities of technocratic logic. But of what form should that knowledge take and in whose interest should it serve and in which way are those interests best served, philosophers disagree.

In his presidential address, Conrad Pritscher turns the idea of instrumental knowledge on its head. In his search for an educator's equivalent to the mathematician's zero (something to represent that which is missing, something to make possible the "quantum leap"), Pritscher seeks a tool "which helps one shift constants." His unorthodox techniques lead us through an exploration which takes seriously that orthodox Socratic idea that we "learn" as we "unlearn." In his response, David Denton complains that while Pritscher's concern may be admirable his argument is less so. Denton claims that "unlearning" must have form or tradition or something, if we are to "learn" anything at all.

Henry Giroux, in an invited address, critiques the technical rationality, and its political interest, which results in the failure of schools to develop "the very capacity for conceptual thought itself" and, therefore, the preconditions of democracy. He argues that by stripping teachers of their role in intellectual labor, teachers are separated from the central aspect of pedagogy. Giroux concludes that for schools to work in the emancipatory interest, teachers must be seen, not only as intellectuals, but as "resisting intellectuals." Only in this struggle for praxis can schooling find its democratic purpose. In his response to Giroux, La Brecque raises questions related to the feasibility, ethics, and conceptualization of Giroux's ideas and rejects the belief that schools can be used for social change. Readers might find that the two positions offered by Giroux and La Brecque agree on the first point raised by

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Bernstein. That is, both argue that knowledge, ethics, and political society can not be separated from culture or the historical moment. They seem to disagree in response to Bernstein's final question. Giroux sees room for human agency within the interstices of social structure, while La Brecque finds those structures inherently contradictory to the emancipatory impulse.

Three other essays seem to address this debate. David Kennedy wishes to link liberalism and radicalism together with the "ideal of rationality" and suggests that this ideal attempts to separate people from themselves leading to neither emancipation nor survival. While Kennedy writes from a similar perspective as La Brecque, Marguerite Rivage-Seul seems to join Giroux. She agrees that the technical rationality leads to the rationality of oppression (particularly war) and Rivage-Seul suggests that the "moral imagination" in peace education needs to be reconceived or it, too, will not get "beyond the confines of unimaginative calculative thought." Her reconceptualization calls for the inclusion of critical thinking as a central element of moral imagination. In the same tradition, Richard Brodie finds the narrow technical rationality of educational theory and practice as the kingpin to a system "which is beneficial to the few, instead of *pro bono publico*." He calls for a radical pedagogy which supports a "massive struggle against hegemony" through a tradition which gives voice to people as actors in their historical moment.

Although not as obviously tied to the speculative nature of the above debate, two other essays attempt to clarify issues of community. Timothy Reagan calls for the articulation of a theoretical basis for educational reform centering on the clarification and interrelatedness of "social culture," cultural pluralism, and multicultural education. Patrick Socolski argues that Nunner-Winkler's corrective to Carol Gilligan's work makes possible a nonsexist rather than sex-specific approach to moral education. While analytic in form, both essays are informed by an underlying concern with the issues of equity and, ultimately, community in a diverse democratic society.

Two other essays address more directly schooling activities. Rodney Riegle turns his analysis to the peer review process of university faculty. His essay shows, through its complexity, why there is so much confusion in promotion, tenure, and salary evaluation. He suggests his analysis provides some minimum steps toward regularizing the process. Finally, Clark Rubenstein analyses the concepts of "motivation" and "to motivate." He concludes that the verb form implies an essentially external phenomenon, while the noun form implies an internal phenomenon and, therefore, is the more valuable form for teachers.

In reading these explorations in philosophical studies of education, one can gather the importance of the issues being addressed. A friend once asked me, "Why is it that philosophers seem to be more interested in internal logic than truth?" Although these two ideas are not obviously in opposition, the result of much of modern philosophy can not but lead to the acknowledgement of the dialectic within which "rationality" and "truth" engage each other. When we participate in the games of abstract gymnastics which fail to find their place in concrete life, we are in danger of falling into this trap. When we forget that the activity of philosophy of education has ultimately to do with the lives of people, we may be logical, but we become separated from truth. Read these essays

carefully and understand the seriousness with which their authors address our world and recognize that while engaged in this dialogue, we help constitute our community. Since I started with a quotation from Bernstein, let me end with another.

At a time when the threat of total annihilation no longer seems to be an abstract possibility but the most imminent and real potentiality, it becomes all the more imperative to try again and again to foster and nurture those forms of communal life in which dialogue, conversation, phronesis, practical discourse, and judgment are concretely embodied in our everyday practices.²

Notes

1. Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia, Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1983), p. 226.
2. Ibid., p. 229.

MOVING TOWARD AN EDUCATOR'S ZERO

Conrad P. Pritscher
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Introduction

Physicists tell us that the behavior of subatomic particles does not allow them to predict the behavior of atoms. The behavior of atoms does not allow physicists or biologists to accurately predict the behavior of cells. The behavior of cells does not allow for the accurate prediction of human behavior. However, one form of human behavior, i.e., "successful teaching," according to certain groups of educators, can be predicted by the competencies that a teacher exhibits. How those groups of educators account for their predictions of "successful teaching" will not be dealt with in detail. Their basic strategies are to offer plausible criteria, gain agreement regarding those criteria and then do enough testing to determine whether or not those criteria are met. These groups of educators seldomly include artistic teaching in their agreed upon definitions of "successful teaching." Those same groups tend to avoid areas of discourse that are not accurately measurable.

They probably omit the idea of artistic teaching because artistic teaching, like subatomic particles, atoms and cells, is not predictable by competencies that are concomitant with it.

Certain groups want high predictability and are willing to pay the price of excessive rigidity and the black/white nature of what they deal with. Other groups want high predictability but are unwilling to pay the price of rigidity. These later groups deal more in the grey areas and as a result, they often lack clarity. Black and white are more clear and distinct than are similar shades of grey.

What I have to say deals with a rather grey area. It is from the grey areas that the black and white areas eventually emerge. At times it is useful to shade the whites and brighten the blacks so that newer and perhaps better ideas may emerge. This is one of those times.

About Zeroes

The introduction of zero into western thought by Leonardo Pisano in 1202 permitted mathematicians to tackle and solve problems that were previously unsolvable.¹ Educators today are groping for solutions to numerous educational problems. A fertile area for further investigation relates to formulating the roots of these problems. Educators today often feel a need for conceptual tools and processes that will allow them to do in their work of educating what the use of zero does for mathematicians. Zero (the notation for a missing position) permitted mathematicians to take a quantum leap. Many educators would want to take this leap if it were possible.

This paper explores a direction from which this leap may be taken. The direction relates to a tool that, like zero, denotes nothing by itself but when used in relation to other conceptual tools can function to augment the process of educating.

This paper will further explore some possible parameters of that educator's equivalent of the mathematician's zero. These parameters are highly polymorphous. There is the possibility that such a concept, process, thing or event is now and forever nonexistent. At first glance, the idea of an educator's zero is not a logical impossibility. The terms "mathematicians" and "educators" are used instead of the terms "mathematics" and "education" to include the human, translogical elements inherent in the use of such a tool. These translogical elements include a conceptualizer as well as what is being conceptualized.

Polymorphicity and An Educator's Zero

Bertrand Russell says that modern education seldom has had great effect because so seldom have educators had great hope.² Russell expressed his belief with language. "The use of language," according to Ortony,³ "is essentially creative activity as is its comprehension." Creative activity is highly polymorphous because the whole that is generated is more than the sum of the parts that comprise it.

Arthur Koestler explored the idea that the creative act is a synthesizing of something new from previously known phenomena. Koestler⁴ held that the creative act is essentially the same for scientists, inventors and artists. Teachers are, among other descriptors, part scientist, part inventor and part artist. The synthesizing that teachers do is high-level thinking.

Dennis Senchuk⁵ states that the essence of teaching is the polymorphous concept of thinking. Teaching is very complex activity. Margaret Grote⁶ believed that the teaching act, in order to be illuminated, needed to be compared to an equally complex act so she compared teaching to sexing in a way that permitted us to see teaching in a broader context.

Learning, teaching and sexing are highly polymorphous, and I might add, personal activities. Precise concepts they are not. I think many of us will agree with Dennis Senchuk when he says that "precise concept" is not a precise concept. "Precise concept" is somewhat polymorphous.

We are surrounded by polymorphicity. As Marjorie Greene⁷ has concluded, every fact, at rock bottom, is a judgment of fact. She reminds us that there can be no description without prescription. I suggest that polymorphicity connects more basically with the prescriptive element of any description. The deliberations of the Vienna Circle attempted to bury the prescriptive element of description but they did it with prescription. Their agreements to further objectify their works is rooted in their subjectivity. They prescribed objectivity. At the heart of their attempts to be less polymorphous was their own polymorphicity.

I will repeat. We are surrounded by polymorphicity. I take the position that we too frequently use precision in our statements as a tranquilizer to delude ourselves into thinking that we know what we are talking about. I use "know" as it relates to knowledge which exists in an uneasy rivalry with belief. The scientist types don't want to see the distinction between scientist and poet threatened, yet we may need to be aware of what is blurry before clarity will emerge. I say this because I have noted very little evidence in contemporary criticism of most kinds, that polymorphicity is acknowledged or respected.

An assumption held by some listeners at the beginning of a lecture is that there is some hope for hearing something that they didn't know. This implies that there is some expectation that learning may occur. Learning in this sense implies learning "something." This something is usually an idea or set of ideas. Some listeners (for instance those involved in dialogue with Plato) learned that they knew less during their dialogue. This kind of learning that moves one to know less may be simply dismissed as an unlearning of "something" that wasn't so. An unlearning is not a learning since the "un" has a function. When an idea is clear it is not at the same time for the same person unclear. If an unlearning is not a learning, what is it? Is it simply a lack, a void or an absence as an uncola implies the absence of cola?

Coming to know that one doesn't know implies a learning to know that one doesn't know. Can an unlearning be "something" as in the sentence "Some listeners expect to learn something." In order for our students to become wise, according to Plato, they must come to know that they don't know. Perhaps we as educators need the educator's equivalent to the mathematician's zero to help some unlearning occur.

I will attempt to move around this educator's equivalent of the mathematician's zero (hereinafter X) by making a distinction between what is clear and what is fuzzy. I will, however, label what is clear a "clear fuzzy" and I will label what is fuzzy a "fuzzy fuzzy."

Clear Fuzzies and Fuzzy Fuzzies

Education is a clear fuzzy. Although educators have questions about what they are doing when they educate, they, as a rule, believe they know what they are doing during the act of educating. Time is another clear fuzzy in that we all know what time is, yet when we are asked to define time, we have great difficulty in doing so. The notion of quality could also be included here. We all know what quality is yet we have difficulty in defining it.

A fuzzy fuzzy (this X) is something I will use to help explain a clear fuzzy (education), but we know very little about that something. For instance, I would like to illuminate the clear fuzzy of what is worthy of the name "education." To do this I am looking for an educator's equivalent of the mathematician's zero. The notion of what that educator's equivalent might be moves me to sniff around the idea that this X might be that which nudges clear fuzzies into the fuzzy fuzzy category. I say that because I'm positing that we mainly wonder about fuzzy fuzzies. Clear fuzzies seem to be sufficiently clear so that we don't frequently wonder about them. If we don't wonder, we probably will not involve ourselves in the process of expanding conceptions and not involve ourselves in extracting the full meaning from each experience.

This educator's equivalent of the mathematician's zero may then be, among other things, that which helps us become curious. If it were of the form that permitted degrees of having it, it may also include that which productively intensifies curiosity.

Since we are usually only curious about those matters that we desire to know more about, it may be useful to shift our focus to the space between what we know and what is yet to be known. I am suggesting that

the major present focus of an educator's attention is on what is known. What is known is frequently clear unless we are wondering about it. We usually don't wonder about ideas that are clear. Clear fuzzies are often thought to be clear and precise ideas unless we stop to ponder them. Clear fuzzies have degrees too. We can have questions about the functioning and uses of our ears, for instance, but we infrequently have that kind of question unless we are audiologists or their like.

Educators more frequently have questions about what to do in their classrooms tomorrow but as they define education as, for instance, "the continuous reconstruction of experience," they are often mildly satisfied. Such a definition is capable of infinite refinement and elaboration. "Continuous," is largely unbounded, as is "reconstruction" and "experience," yet when we are in the process of defining, we are doing a binding activity. We are, in a sense, attempting to bind the unbounded.

Metawonder

Belief can inhibit wonder when belief, or any of its facets, is held to be certain, i.e. held unquestioningly. When I ask my students, "Who knows what gravity is?" most of them indicate that they know. In a sense, many of them do know but few know that they know very little about gravity. The same may be said for time, education, learning, knowing, believing and other ideas shrouded in polymorphicity. My students are relatively certain about those matters. They believe they know what they are talking about when they use those terms and they usually don't wonder about them. I expect that what holds for the majority of my undergraduate students holds true for the majority of students in grades three through sixteen.

Knowing gives us a reasonable certainty. Knowing reduces polymorphicity. When context is highly limited, knowing can provide us with even greater certainty and less polymorphicity. Yet there is a growing concern to expand contexts. Contexts expanded indefinitely become very highly polymorphous as this X is highly polymorphous. Such an X could assist us in coming to know that we don't know. To Plato and other educators, the awareness of one's own not knowing can literally do wonders.

When Kurt Godel wondered whether one could prove that one couldn't prove "something" he was not bound by the current constants of his day. When Werner Heisenberg elucidated his indeterminacy/uncertainty principle he was not bound by the constants of earlier physics. I know very little about an astronomer named Hubble. I mention him here because I have heard that some astronomers are now finding flaws in Hubble's constant which is a formula that assists astronomers to calculate distances by measuring the "red shift." As a result of some new evidence that points to flaws in Hubble's constant, the universe may not be expanding after all.

I mention Hubble because there seems to be some shifting of belief about some fundamental concerns in astronomy as Godel and Heisenberg provided ideas that assisted mathematicians and physicists to shift their beliefs about math and physics. Evidence continues to mount that we need some shifts in beliefs of educators. The evidence leads me to conclude that we need more openness to experience. This openness to experience is stifled by perceptual filters that are fogged with beliefs about the impossibility of certain experience. Can we experience

nothing? Can we be aware of nothingness? Is the absence of something capable of being experienced? Can we possibly have the educator's equivalent to the mathematician's zero? Is there a need for a constant on which to continue building the roots of the process of education? Constants may be likened to invariant ideas that can be relied on until evidence indicates that we are better off without them. Can we possibly have a constant that tells us to more vigorously question our constants?

The field of mathematics is often considered a closed system as opposed to an open system that educators deal with. Trying to find an educator's equivalent of the mathematician's zero is doomed, some may say, because of this difference between open and closed systems. Mathematical discoveries over the years have demonstrated that some openness exists even in mathematics. A totally closed mathematics would imply that mathematics is simply one big tautology. Is Einsteinian geometry more true than Euclidian? One simply works better for certain space than the other. The different spaces that each geometry is concerned with also relates to changes in time. Absolute time in Euclidian space and Newtonian physics has gradually shifted to time as a constant in Einsteinian space.

Perhaps the first matter that the possible I may do for educators is to help shift constants. This may be very difficult to do in that some constants prevent others from emerging. If we temporarily forget all constants we would probably be asking too much of ourselves. We can, however, wonder about and question some constants, especially those we have strong feeling for, i.e. the ones we are certain or almost certain about. Such wondering and questioning would permit us to deal with more paradox and ambiguity. As we as educators deal with more paradox and ambiguity, so will our students. As a result, we may all wonder more and become more self-directing. I am positing that a feeling of wonder precedes construction and without construction there is no self-direction.

When we perceive a short vertical line on a blackboard, we often conceive the idea of the number 1. A short horizontal line becomes a minus sign. Signs are everywhere. Some signs prevent us from seeing other signs. What signs that we now hold prevent us from conceiving the X in relation to John Dewey's idea of education as the continuous reconstruction of experience? Some metaphors that we use prevent us from seeing other aspects of reality because some metaphors allow us to see aspects of reality that they themselves help to constitute. What are some of these metaphors? What contexts inhibit decontextualizing so that recontextualizing can occur? What constructs prevent reconstructing?

If we look at reconstructing, there seems to be an element of deconstructing that emerges shortly before a reconstructing. Perhaps this I functions more vigorously in the deconstructing phase of the reconstructing process. I say reconstructing instead of reconstruction to treat it as a present activity. More on this later.

My own guess about my guessing about the I is that this I facilitates guessing. The word "guessing" as it is used here can include regular guessing or metaguessing as when we have hunches about hunches. The guessing that I speak of is a necessary step in the processes of

hypothesis formation. Some ideas useful in the hypothesis testing stage can hinder the formation stage. If we have an excessive need to know in advance what the results of a test will be, we may prevent ourselves from forming a hypothesis that is very difficult, or at first and second glances, impossible to test. Current canons of scientific investigation prevent us from guessing about our own guessing. We usually don't look at whether or not the verifiability principle can be falsified and as a result we do very little guessing (or wondering) about it. I don't wish to imply that all guessing is always productive. We might guess about our guessing about our guessing and that may be 1) unproductive of useful thought and action, 2) highly boring and 3) deleterious to our mental health. Guessing about our guessing may not be. John Dewey said:

We always live at the time we live and not at some other time, and only by extracting at each present time the full meaning of each present experience are we prepared for doing the same thing in the future. This is the only preparation which in the long run amounts to anything.⁸

I suggest that the "extracting. . . the full meaning" may include a "knowing" as we ordinarily use the word, and a simultaneous "not knowing." This "not knowing" element keeps the wonder and guessing going. The "knowing" alone inhibits it as our knowing of clear fusties often prevents us from wondering about them. The not knowing element of "extracting the full meaning of each present experience" fosters the use of clear fusties in the exploration of fuzzy fusties. That process is the relating of what we know to that which is unknown. We won't find the relations unless we look. We won't look where we "know" nothing can be seen. Looking at the nothing is what the "not knowing" element of "extracting the full meaning" is for. Getting our students to look at polymorphous events and processes includes some looking at nothing. We can synthesize when we do. Before a synthesis there is a void, an absence, a lack. Without this void, absence, lack, i.e. the experience of nothingness, there is no synthesis. Awareness of the present experience is the only experience that results in synthesizing.

Syntheses can be both meaningful and truthful. Dewey chose to use the term 'meaningful' in that truth can be relative as a truth in Euclidian geometry can be a falsehood in Einsteinian geometry but meaning can only be had in the present and it can only be had by a person who may or may not share the meaning with other persons. Truth is generally held to be timeless even though one always remembers it in the present. We don't guess that $2 + 2 = 4$ will be true tomorrow. We know it will. As a result of that knowing, we inhibit wonder regarding the conditions and events under which it may not be true. The continuous reconstruction of experience is a continuous reconstructing which can only go on in the present. The destructing element of reconstructing can also only go on in the present. Dewey was implying that synthesizing can only happen in the present.

Seeing Ourselves See

"Knowing" as the term is ordinarily used, does not fit the previously quoted Deweyan dicta as well as the term 'awareness.' Awareness subsumes knowing in that it can be posited that one can be aware without "knowing" (one can be aware of confusion) yet one can't "know" without being aware

(except in some unconscious sense that I wish not to deal with here). Where "knowing" can prevent other "knowing," awareness facilitates other awareness. "Knowing" can prevent some awareness in that "knowing" that $2 + 2 = 4$ prevents the awareness that synergic coalescences can produce a $2 + 2 = 5$ when contexts are expanded. Awareness expands contexts. "Knowing" can at times prevent expanding contexts. With different contexts, what we know changes and if it changes too much, we don't know as we once knew. That may be an element of experiencing nothingness (a strong candidate for the X).

As Dave Denten has mentioned, "That which we are looking for is that which is looking." That holds whether we are looking to make "precise concept" a more precise concept or whether we are looking for the educator's equivalent of the mathematician's zero. We are involved in the problem of seeing our own eyeballs. When we are aware of this, we can see our own seeing. We know ourselves in relation to other people, events and/or processes. When we seek to know events, processes and/or people, we are simultaneously seeking to better know ourselves.

Nel Noddings and Paul Shore view intuition as an experience-enabling function in that it precedes and makes possible the experience from which knowledge is constructed.⁹ They also believe that intuition as a source of truth has been discarded by modern philosophers. I have been indirectly contending that the educator's zero may assist philosophers of education in re-carding (recontextualising) intuition as a resource in extracting full meaning from present experience.

Since most of us would rather avoid looking that may or may not result in a seeing, I suggest that the X can be narrowed to primarily function at the stage of the intuitive process that precedes the first clear intuition. Noddings and Shore describe this stage as a looking as though one is in a darkened room or at a great distance.¹⁰ In this stage there is no certainty as there is in subsequent stages of the intuitive process. Noddings and Shore argue that intuitions form when there is subjective certainty and objective uncertainty. I have been writing about an uncertain X whose function may be to allow ourselves to live with higher degrees of uncertainty. Paradoxically, we can eventually be more certain when we live with higher degrees of uncertainty because of the increased receptivity which permits us to be more aware of what we are experiencing as we are experiencing it.

If intuition is an experience enabling function that is the ground from which knowledge is constructed, the X could be viewed as that which enables one to begin or continue intuiting. For instance, unaware avoidance of certain experience can be disabling. We want to provide conditions whereby our students can be enabled. They can be enabled by fostering awareness of their indecisiveness, and their agony which helps generate unaware avoidance. If they, with their teacher's assistance, notice that they are agonizing themselves by deciding not to decide, then they have the opportunity to refrain from agonizing themselves through aware decisions instead of continually "practicing" habitual, unconscious self-defeating behaviors.

Sensing the concrete world is essential to a build-up of awareness and knowledge. An excessive need to know in advance what will happen before it happens is a major way of avoiding experience. Unaware

avoidance of some experience lead us at times to have experience only in our minds. This prevents us from making contact with the real world of things and people. Once again, any experience can only be had in the present.

Right now we can remember the past and right now we can anticipate the future. We cannot have awareness at any other time. Our students too often are unaware that these are present remembrances and present anticipations. It is this excessive need for present certainty that results in our use of precision in our statements as a tranquiliser to delude ourselves into thinking that we know what we are talking about when we use terms such as education, democracy, learning, motivation, science, poetry, etc. It has been wisely said that it is better not to know than to know wrongly. The X can be that which sparks the insight that it is frequently wise to know tentatively and receptively.

Knowledge of what will happen before it happens is, at times, very useful. Knowledge is power in the sense that we can control ourselves and more of our environment with knowledge. But an excessive need to know what will happen before it happens can greatly reduce receptivity to what is happening. Awareness of what is happening is reduced when receptivity is reduced. If we are not aware of what is happening as it is happening, most of our knowledge is useless for we cannot control what we are unaware of. We cannot extract any meaning from an experience that we do not have. If we are unaware of what is happening, we are not having an experience.

The notion of the "bullshit stops here" may in the light recent writings be profitable to be changed to "Let's be aware that it may be bullshit to have an excessive need to avoid bullshit." Allowing ourselves to experience bullshit in an aware way is a part of the receptivity that is needed to generate the ground for productive knowing. Some of the most productive knowing may come from allowing ourselves to know trivia; not only trivia about the world of sense experience but also trivia about ourselves via just allowing ourselves to wallow, at times, in our own experience of ourselves. Such wallowing allows experience to continue. If we prematurely cut-off experience, i.e., prematurely conclude what, how and why something is the way it is (bullshit), we at times abort the extracting the full meaning from a present experience. When we so abort, we may no longer be involved in the continuous reconstruction of experience. Paradoxically, allowing trivia to emerge into awareness is not a trivial matter. I am suggesting that we experience the bullshit more fully to see what emerges.

Herbert Kliebard¹¹ reminds us that the root meaning of theory (from the Greek "theorein") is "to contemplate" but originally it meant looking at or seeing. Before we can see we must look. If there is a strong positive correlation between noticing well and intelligence, I suggest there is a strong positive correlation between looking and intelligence for looking is a precondition to noticing.

Theories arise as a result of looking. Robert Zajonc holds that all categorizing comes from emotions. Categorizing is the first step in theory building. Emotions (interest for example) semi point us to where to look. We won't know where to look if we are unaware of our emotions. Our emotions are the roots of our theories as Denton has concluded.

Let us look leisurely in other places attempting to, at times, relate what may now seem to be unrelatable. Let us also look in other times. We always look in the present but we usually look at something past. To conceive of something we must limit it, i.e., finish it, stop it, define it. It then becomes something that happened. Looking, as I have used the term, includes looking at what is happening as it is happening. Our knowing will then be less certain and as a result we can be more receptive to present experience. This increased receptivity can allow us to permit present experience to continue so we may, as Dewey urges, "extract at each present time the full meaning of each present experience."

I have been talking about looking. Noticing what is happening in and around ourselves comes from the receptive looking that I have been talking about. This receptive looking may be likened to what may be termed zeroing. The zero in mathematics is a notation for a missing position. Something is missing in our schools. Let's look without value rigidities, fixed gestalts and fogged concepts. Let's not necessarily look for "something." Let's just look so that we can more fully see what is.

Let us take some calculated leaps. I believe we have been too careful in our calculating and as a result, educators' leaps have been very tiny steps. The steps are tiny because we don't know in advance what will happen before it happens. The purpose of experimenting is to determine whether or not our hypotheses hold. Let us, more frequently than is now the case, test what in earlier days was thought to be untestable. Let us do some hypothesizing about our hypothesizing, some testing of our testing, some attempting to falsify our present processes of falsifying, some attempting, within expanded contexts, to look at other ways of verifying. We can verify some events that seem to be largely meaningless and there can be some meaningful experiences that do not need verifying. Looking, i.e., noticing what is going on as it is going on without prematurely halting experience to conceptualize it, can be a way to extracting the full meaning from each present experience. This may be what the zero (or zeroing) is all about. For example, what is your present experience and what meaning does your present experience have with regards to the context of this paper? What is your present zero? Some of you might be experiencing something like the following: "This is all bullshit. Why am I sitting here listening to this nonsense?" That person's awareness of his present experience allows him to be aware that he is not receiving anything. Such awareness can then lead that person to be aware of what he wants to know if he doesn't prematurely stop the experience so as to be more certain of it. It might be said that allowing microsecond, highly polymorphous awareneses to fleet by in a nonsensical fashion for a while can be a necessary step in the developing of focused thoughtful action. Such a focusing implies an integration of ideas and feelings. The microsecond, nonsensical awareneses may be analogous to minizeroes from which macrozeroes are formed. These zeroes may be what is between our feelings and our notions, between our Dionysian sides and our Apollonian sides.

Balance between conceptualizing and being aware of what is going on in ourselves, between ourselves and between ourselves and our environment is what most of us want. It seems to me that educators have been imbalanced toward excessive conceptualizing and perhaps more accurately, toward the lower levels of the process of conceptualizing. To correct the imbalance, I suggest that we pay more attention to our total functioning

rather than only our cognitive side.

A balanced state may be signified by a zero. When we receptively look without forcing anything into our minds, we are involved in the process of zeroing. We can know more about this process than we can tell as per Michael Polanyi's example that we can know when one has a puzzled expression yet we cannot describe or explain in detail the facial configurations that comprise the puzzlement.

Since writing this paper, I have heard Eugene Gendlin speak. He is the author of an excellent book entitled Focusing.¹² In his talk and in his book he writes about, among other matters, the idea of "a felt sense." Arriving at this "felt sense" and what follows from it is what zeroing is involved with. This idea relates to Albert Camus' and Dave Denton's ideas in Dave Denton's Educational Theory article entitled "A Feeling/Notion Epistemological Paradigm." Briefly stated, Camus and Denton have said that as a result of our sensing, we get a feeling of a lack of at-one-ment with what we are experiencing. Our rational side takes over and manipulates symbols to create notions that lower the feelings of dissonance that are conjointly experienced with the feeling of a lack of at-one-ment. To paraphrase Denton, the notions are constructs that seem to take on a life of their own. As a result, Western man has waged war and killed people because the constructs have become more real than the constructors. The zero and the process of zeroing can help us avoid making constructs more real than constructors.

Before we can make sensitive, specific distinctions that may be useful in everyday living and classroom practice, it is necessary to make gross distinctions that may later be refined. Gross distinctions are at times too general to be of practical use. This paper attempts to point to some possibilities of what an educator's equivalent of the mathematician's zero relates to. This paper has phrased this X in sixteen different ways, thirteen of which are saying a similar idea. As I briefly rephrase these sixteen points, please note the common bond shared by thirteen of them. This list is not hierarchical. These are given as they appear in the paper.

An educator's zero relates to:

1. that which assists one in coming to know that one doesn't know.
2. that which nudges clear fuzzies into the category of fuzzy fuzzies.
3. that which helps one become curious.
4. that which functions as a constant on which the roots of the process of education may continue to be illuminated.
5. that which helps one shift constants (that which helps one vary invariants).
6. that which functions primarily in the deconstructing phase of the reconstructing process.

7. that which facilitates the forming of hypotheses (that which helps one guess well).
8. that which helps one experience a lack or "nothingness."
9. that which may assist philosophers of education in re-carding (recontextualising) intuition as a resource in extracting full meaning from present experience.
10. that which functions at a stage of the intuitive process that precedes the first clear intuition (looking as though one is in a darkened room or at a great distance - the beginning of intuition and the beginning of knowledge).
11. that which allows one to live with higher degrees of uncertainty.
12. that which sparks the insight that it is frequently wise to know tentatively and receptively.
13. that which helps us receptively and leisurely "look" even though we might not "see."
14. that which helps us be aware of what is going on in and around one as it is going on in and around one.
15. that which is signified by a balanced state.
16. that which helps one avoid making constructs more real than constructors.

I would like to make a final closing comment about this X as it relates to what Gendlin calls "clearing a space." In order to clear a space that permits greater receptivity to experience, humor can be effectively used. Humor provides a temporary mental and physical restructuring. To assist us to be receptive to further discussion of these matters, I will offer what I find to be a humorous story entitled "What Not to Call Your Dog."

Everybody who has a dog calls him "Rover" or "Boy." I call mine "SEX." Now "Sex" has been very embarrassing to me. When I went to City Hall to renew his dog license, I told the clerk I would like to have a license for "Sex." He said, "I'd like to have one too." . . . Then I said, "But this is a dog." He said that he didn't care what she looked like. Then I said, "You don't understand. I've had 'Sex' since I was nine years old." He said that I must have been quite a kid. When I got married and went on my honeymoon, I took the dog with me. I told the hotel clerk that I wanted a room for "Sex" and my wife and me, but a special room for "Sex." He said that every room in the place was for sex. I said, "You don't understand. 'Sex' keeps me awake at night." The clerk said, "Me too." One day I entered "Sex" in a contest, but before competition began the dog ran away. Another contestant asked me why I was just standing there looking around. I told him I had planned to have "Sex" in the contest. He told me that I should have sold my own tickets. "But you don't understand," I said. "I had hoped to have 'Sex' on TV." He called me a show-off. When my

wife and I separated we went to court to fight for custody of the dog. I said, "Your honor, I had 'Sex' before I was married." He said, "Me too." Last night "Sex" ran off again. I spent hours looking for him. A cop came over to me and asked, "What are you doing in the alley at four o'clock in the morning?" I said, "I'm looking for 'Sex.'" My case comes up Friday.

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Notes

1. Carl Boyer, A History of Mathematics (New York: John Wiley, 1968). ("The earliest undoubted occurrence of a zero in India is an inscription dated 876.")
2. I found this quote in some personal notes for which I have no source.
3. Andrew Ortony, Metaphor and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 2.
4. Dana T. Elruou, "Koestler on Creativity," Review of BBC film, Educational Studies 11, 3 (Fall 1980): 253.
5. Dennis Senchuk, "Polymorphous Concept," Educational Theory 34, 2 (Spring 1984): 192.
6. Margaret Grote, "Teaching and the Sex Act," Educational Theory 21, 2 (Spring 1971): 187-192.
7. Marjorie Greene, The Knower and the Known (New York: Basic Books, 1966).
8. John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York: Macmillan Company, 1938), p. 49.
9. Nel Noddings and Paul J. Shore, Awakening the Inner Eye -- Intuition in Education (New York: Teachers College Press, 1984), p. 49.
10. Ibid., p. 88.
11. Herbert M. Kliebard, "Curriculum Theory as Metaphor," Theory Into Practice 21, 1 (Winter 1982): 13.
12. Eugene T. Gendlin, Focusing (New York: Bantam Books, 1981), p. 64.

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METAGUESSING:

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The Office of President of The Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society carries with it very few perquisites. The President doesn't even get a free membership. But there is one, richly rewarding perquisite that is worth fighting for. Each year, the President gets to stand before the Society and say any damn thing he or she wants to. And there is nothing the Program Committee can do about it. Look about you, and you will see several of us who have exercised this prerogative in the past. Today, operating in this tradition, President Conrad Pritscher has stood before us and has said any damn thing he wanted to.

He has spoken to us of seroes, of polymorphicity, of two kinds of fuzzies, of metawonder and seeing, of bullshit and his dog. In so doing, he has satisfied a formal requirement of the occasion. To put the point another way, we elect one of our number as President; then, we formalize the conditions under which we live through the consequences of that doing. Among those conditions is also the call for a formal response. In one sense, I am not satisfying that requirement, that is, I am being somewhat formal. But in the sense of responding to the form of the President's Address, I am not being so successful, for I find little philosophic form in it.

Oh, I think I understand his concern. I may even share his concern. If I have read him properly, our President wishes to push back the clutter of accumulated concepts which block creative and bold hypotheses, which prevent our seeing our own being, and which provide us with a false sense of certainty, the illusion of freedom from ambiguity. If this is, in fact, his concern, he is working within a rather broad tradition, one which encompasses a variety of epistemological views. With respect to his concern, Conrad Pritscher is in good company. I am not so cordial, however, when it comes to his articulation of that concern.

In writing for us about his concern, he has prepared a text, which, as I said, satisfies a formal requirement of the occasion. While there is no formal argument in the text, there are some "claims" which can be quickly noted. Polymorphicity, which surrounds this occasion and the text, is an ignored though necessary good; knowing reduces it. Wonder is also an ignored but necessary good; belief inhibits it. The unbounded is likewise ignored; defining binds it. In a technical sense, these are not claims at all, for they seem to function more as Heideggerian "Holes of possibility" than as concepts. Perhaps they function more like psychological states. In either case, they appear to be important to Pritscher. Although he gives us neither argument nor definition, nor even clear metaphoric parallel, I think he is attempting to get us to focus on the pre-conceptual grounds of knowledge. He may not like that characterization, for he probably wants to include these grounds "in" his understanding of knowledge. He leaves us to speculate, however, for he doesn't make the point clear, and, throughout, he shifts back and forth between the words knowledge and awareness. I call these words rather than concepts or terms, for, without some frame of reference, one can't tell how these are supposed to function for him.

To get more specific, listen again to this sentence:

"Knowing" can prevent some awareness in that "knowing" that $2 + 2 = 4$ prevents the awareness that synergic coalescences can produce a $2 + 2 = 5$ when contexts are expanded.

Now, I think he means that there are moments when four people can produce more energy than is possible when the four are summed individually. Ordinary experience confirms this. But Pritscher wants some greater meaning. What can it be? If he is speaking mathematically, he is speaking nonsense, for $2 + 2 = 5$ only with a change in the numerical base, not through the expansion of contexts. If he wishes to make a generalisation about group phenomena, he is certainly not speaking about music where, for example, a choir of twenty-four is not 24 times louder than a soloist. My point is that, whether I examine individual sentences or try to interpret the whole, his use of language is not to be found in any easily identifiable discursive space. And, without that identification, the question regarding appropriate criteria for judging his work remains unanswered.

Apparently, words such as polymorphicity, wonder, and the unbounded are introduced to assist in our understanding of the significance he sees in the notion of zero. But, his treatment of that notion does not help us locate his discursive space, either. This zero is also called an X, and, to clarify what that means, he speaks of clear fuzzies and fuzzy fuzzies. If I take the text at its surface value and attempt to analyze the meaning of the educator's zero, his X, I may be walking into the satirist's trap. For if our President is satirizing presidential addresses and if I take the surface seriously, I will have become the biggest sucker in the room. On the other hand, if it should be the case that he is not the brilliant satirist and that his intent does coincide with the surface of the text, then I must conclude that our President has made himself terribly vulnerable to attack. But, then, making oneself vulnerable can be the first shrewd move in a bit of philosophical judo.

You can see that I still have not located his discursive space, and his own comment on language is not helpful. He begins the section on polymorphicity by saying that Russell says that modern education seldom has had great effect because so seldom have educators had great hope. Then, Pritscher's apparent point: "Russell expressed his belief with language." I gather that what we are to note is not that Russell made some sort of causal claim or rhetorical criticism, but that Russell expressed himself with language. Since Russell isn't mentioned again, I am left to imagine that, if Russell had not expressed himself with language, Pritscher could not have gotten on with his paper. The satirical point may be in opening a section on polymorphicity with a nod to Bertrand Russell. But who knows? Our President doesn't tarry, ponder, clarify, or develop; no, he rushes on to Ortony, to Koestler, to Senchuk, to Grote, and to Greene -- all on that same page. With each reference, he cites a proof text, a bit of scripture, jumps to his punchline, and moves on. You won't catch this President sleeping in a conceptual net!

But more. He speaks of the parameters of an equivalent of zero, makes a distinction between belief and knowledge -- then speaks of those who believe they know, and he does a thorough job of confusing looking with seeing. He proclaims the value of wallowing, suggests that there

are seroes with degrees, and sets forth a new philosophic method. His method is not to analyse, or criticise, or describe, or construct. No, he says he is moved to sniff around. Now, I haven't located his discursive space, but I have found his method.

When I sniff around his treatment of X, I may be warmed by his fuzzies, but my understanding is not sharpened at all. He tells me that X in mathematics is a notation for a missing position. While that raises my eyebrows, I choose to go on to his educator's X. I'm told that it is equivalent to X in mathematics; then, that it is a parameter of an equivalent; then, I'm told that X is highly polymorphous, which is defined as "contexts expanded indefinitely." Further, I'm told that X is a functional stage, a type of awareness, and a ground for the beginning and continuing of intuiting. (Parenthetically, these are my summary statements. In the third version of his paper, the one we have heard today, he provides 16 of his own summary statements. That list, however, merely adds to the confusion, for all he claims is that an educator's zero relates to each of the 16 statements. How it may be related is not mentioned. The confusion is compounded.) What we are given, I think or I guess or I metaguess, is a notion of an expanding zero which undergirds and encompasses everything. The implications of that notion are significant but not in the direction that Conrad Pritscher may want. Pritscher is moving toward either a religious cosmology or nihilism. Which, I cannot tell, for neither the origin nor teleology of this zero which undergirds and encompasses everything has been made clear. But this is, of course, guesswork or metaguesswork, for Pritscher's sniffing is ahistorical, cut off from his tradition. He might say that sniffing, by definition, has to be in the present. I would say that, if he were doing his sniffing in the company of Roland Barthes, we would have some clue as to his use of zero, or, if he related his zero to Sartre's nothingness, we would have a clearer understanding of his point. As it is, religious cosmology or nihilism remain my guesses.

Have I found his discursive space? I think I'll take a flier and say that I have. In the language of the nineteenth century, a Hegel might speak of the restlessness of Conrad's consciousness; in this century, a Camus might speak of his rebelling to overcome that horrible divorce, and an Auden might speak of Conrad Pritscher's "wild prayer of longing." Anyone of these could have provided him the language and examples for articulating his concern. And this leads me to my greatest puzzlement: what he has ignored.

There is a bibliography and a tradition for Pritscher to work from, to identify with, a tradition which has emphasized and struggled with the pre and non-conceptual grounds of knowledge. But he ignores that tradition. He does include Polanyi and Whitehead in his Selected Bibliography, but that is all. Must our President assume the awesome burden of reinventing the wheel? Or, dare I say, starting again from zero? Where is Kierkegaard on the subjective grounds of knowledge? Or Husserl on intentionality? Or Merleau-Ponty on perception? Or Strauss on the lived-body? Where is Jaspers on the comprehensive? Or Heidegger on meditative thinking? Where is Berdyaev on freedom? Or Marcel on mystery? Or Tillich on courage? Or Cassirer on myth? Mr. President, you are not alone. Your concern merges with a well-defined intellectual, and Western, and non-psychological tradition.

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But now I am lecturing Conrad, when all of this time his discursive space may have been that of the examination. He may have been giving a test today to see if we can tolerate our own ambiguous sercos. I still do not know.

I do know that he is to be commended for reminding us of the many ambiguities within which we work and strive for some measure of clarity, and for urging us to consider again the pre and non-conceptual grounds of knowledge. And, I wish to note that throughout the twists and turns of his paper, he is delightfully quotable. Example: "Let's be aware that it may be bullshit to have an excessive need to avoid bullshit." That alone is worth the price of admission.

TEACHING AND THE ROLE OF THE RESISTING INTELLECTUAL

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There is a strange paradox that haunts the discourse regarding the crisis facing public education in the United States.¹ On the one hand, this crisis is characterized as a failure of the schools to prepare students adequately for the ever changing demands of a sophisticated technological economy; or it is described by less vocal critics as the growing failure of schools to prepare students to think critically and creatively with regard to developing the sophisticated literacy skills necessary to make informed and effective choices about the worlds of work, politics, culture, personal relationships, and the economy. Underlying both sets of criticisms is the notion that schools have failed to take the issues of excellence and creativity seriously and in doing so have undermined the economic and academic possibilities that could be conferred upon both students and the larger society.

On the other hand, educational reformers have responded to the crises in public education by primarily offering solutions that either ignore the role of teachers in preparing learners to be active and critical citizens or they suggest reforms that ignore the intelligence, judgment, and experience that teachers might bring to bear on such issues. In this case, the call for excellence and improved student creativity has been accompanied by policy suggestions that further erode the power teachers have over the conditions of their work while simultaneously proposing that administrators and teachers look outside of their schools for improvements and needed reforms. The result is that many of the educational reforms appear to reduce teachers to the status of low-level employees or civil servants whose main function seems to be to implement reforms decided by experts in the upper levels of state and educational bureaucracies. Furthermore, such reforms embrace technological solutions that undermine the historical and cultural specificity of school life and further weaken the possibilities for school administrators and teachers to work with local parents and groups in improving schools from the vantage point of concrete educational needs and interests. Underlying the paradox at work in the discourse of school reform is a dual failure. First, there is the growing public failure to recognize the central role that teachers must play in any viable attempt to revitalize the public schools. Secondly, there is the failure to recognize that the ideological and political interests underlying the dominant thrusts in school reform are at odds with the traditional role of organizing public education around the need to educate students for the maintenance and defense of the traditions and principles necessary for a democratic society.

I want to argue that part of the growing crisis in public education centers around the declining competence of students and others to effectively interrogate and communicate ideational content. In other words, what is in jeopardy is not merely the ability of students to be creative, but the very capacity for conceptual thought itself. Moreover, since democratic social, cultural, and political forms depend on a self motivated and autonomous public, the precondition for which is critical thinking, the crisis at hand may be the very existence of democracy itself.

My main point will be that the crisis in critical learning has in large part to do with the developing trend toward the disempowerment of teachers at all levels of education. This involves not only a growing loss of power among teachers around the basic conditions of their work, but also a changing perception of their role as reflective practitioners. In effect, I will argue that teacher work is being increasingly situated within a technical and social division of labor that either reduces teachers to the dictates of experts removed from the context of the classroom or serves to widen the political gap between those who control the schools and those who actually deal with curricula and students on a day-to-day basis. In the first instance, teachers are relegated to instrumental tasks that require little or no space for oppositional discourse and social practices. Pedagogy, in this case, is reduced to the implementation of taxonomies that subordinate knowledge to forms of methodological reification, while theories of teaching are increasingly technicized and standardised in the interest of efficiency and the management and control of discrete forms of knowledge.²

Teachers are not simply being proletarianised, the changing nature of their roles and function signifies the disappearance of a form of intellectual labor central to the nature of critical pedagogy itself. Moreover, the tendency to reduce teachers to either high level clerks implementing the orders of others within the school bureaucracy or to the status of specialized technicians is part of a much larger problem within western societies, a problem marked by the increasing division of intellectual and social labor and the increasing trend towards the oppressive management and administration of everyday life. The current tendency to reformulate the status and nature of teacher work is evident in a number of historical and sociological tendencies that need to be mentioned briefly before I argue for an alternative view of how teacher work should be viewed, and what the implications might be for a critical theory of schooling.

Toward a Proletarianisation of Teacher Work

Historically, the relationship between the role of educators and the larger society has been mediated by the image of the school teacher as a dedicated public servant reproducing the dominant culture in the interest of the common good, and the university community as a body of social scientists who in their capacity as experts "were to educate the masses and provide direction for moral and social progress."³ With the advent of the twentieth century, the administration and organisation of public schools were increasingly brought under the influence of the instrumental ideologies of corporate business interests; moreover, the growing professionalisation of academics and their respective disciplines resulted in a redefinition of the theoretical nature of the social sciences. Increasingly, university social scientists shifted from the terrain of social reform to the role of expert as policy advisor. Within this context, the relationship between knowledge and power took on a new dimension as the development of social science became closely linked to supporting the ideological and social practices of business society. In charting the rise and success of the academic social sciences, Silva and Slaughter ably document how the emerging professional associations of the developing social sciences between 1865 and 1910 in the United States lent their skills and knowledge to the economic and social

problems faced by the rising corporate liberal interests. In commenting on the rise of the American Economic Association, they provide an insight into the general political direction in which the professional associations and the social sciences in general were moving:

As economists were more routinely called to expert service and initiated in the politics of power, they refined their notion of constituency. Although using the rhetoric of objective science and the public welfare, their clientele was the Progressive wing of corporate capital and other professionals. . . . Claiming to be impartial and scientific arbiters of social questions, they used the ideology of expertise in the interests of social control and developed pragmatic, technical mechanisms to consolidate and finance -- colonial fiscal policy, federal industrial relations commissions, and the income tax. Thus, social science experts became advocates for the existing order, hegemonic intellectuals serving the emerging national corporate elite.⁴

As the theoretical tenets of the natural sciences began to provide the model for dominant academic discourse and inquiry in the social sciences, the move toward the reduction of critical thought and reason to its merely technical dimensions marked the ascendancy for its models of inquiry and pedagogy. Within this positivistically oriented discourse, research techniques became increasingly freed from value judgments, useful knowledge was measured next to its managerial capabilities, and science became synonymous with the search for transhistorical laws and the requirement that theory explain rather than constitute or determine the object under analysis.⁵

It is important to stress that the primacy of technical and economic rationality did more than devalue the importance of moral and religious reason in every day life; it also strengthened relations of dependency and powerlessness for ever widening groups of people through the social practices of an industrial ideology and psychology that reached far into the culture industry and other spheres of public life.⁶ Underlying this technical rationality and its accompanying rationalization of reason and nature was a call for the separation of conception from execution, the standardization of knowledge in the interest of managing and controlling it, and the devaluation of critical intellectual work for the primacy of practical considerations. The history of this emerging technocratic rationality in both the schools and in public life has been repeated many times, and it need not be reinvented here, but its effects have taken on a special significance in the 1980's and can be seen in a number of areas.⁷

One area in which the dominance of technocratic rationality is manifest is the training of prospective teachers. As Kliebard,⁸ Zeichner,⁹ and others¹⁰ have pointed out, teacher education programs in the United States have long been dominated by their behavioristic orientation towards issues of mastery and methodological refinement as the basis for developing teacher competence. The normative and political implications of this approach are made clear by Zeichner.

Underlying this orientation to teacher education is a metaphor of 'production', a view of teaching as an 'applied

science' and a view of the teacher as primarily an 'executor' of the laws and principles of effective teaching. Prospective teachers may or may not proceed through the curriculum at their own pace and may participate in varied or standardized learning activities, but that which they are to master is limited in scope (e.g., to a body of professional content knowledge and teaching skills) and is fully determined in advance by others often on the basis of research on teacher effectiveness. The prospective teacher is viewed primarily as a passive recipient of this professional knowledge and plays little part in determining the substance and direction of his or her preparation program.¹¹

Within this model of education, teachers are viewed less as creative and imaginative thinkers who can transcend the ideology of methods and means in order to critically evaluate the purpose of educational discourse and practice than as obedient civil servants dutifully carrying out the dictates of others. All too often teacher-education programs lose sight of the need to educate students to be teacher-scholars by developing educational courses that focus on the immediacy of school problems and substitute the discourse of management and efficiency for a critical analysis of the underlying conditions that structure school life. Instead of helping students to think about who they are and what they should do in classrooms, what their responsibility might be in interrogating the means and ends of specific school policy, students are often trained to share techniques on how to control student discipline, teach a given subject effectively, organize a day's activities as efficiently and orderly as possible. The emphasis is on finding out what works! The form of technical rationality that underlies this type of educational training is not confined to undergraduate programs; its logic exercises a strong influence on graduate programs as well, programs that are often intended to promote what is often euphemistically called "educational leadership." For instance, it was noted in a recent study of doctoral programs in education that:

Research in education is preoccupied with techniques, rather than with the inquiry into the nature and course of events, with 'how to' rather than 'what,' with form rather than substance. . . . Too often students in education. . . have difficulty even finding serious questions worth addressing.¹²

If prospective teachers are often trained to be specialized technicians, future school administrators are trained in the image of the social science expert. Richard Bates¹³ and William Foster,¹⁴ for instance, have pointed out that much of the training for school administrators, principals and superintendents is narrowly technical, concerned primarily with producing a marriage between organization theory and the principles of "sound" business management. Inherent in such training is the notion that complex language systems, management controls, and systems of accountability are beyond the grasp of either teachers or the average layperson. The technocratic consciousness embodied in this view is not only at odds with the notion of decentralized control and the principles of participatory democracy, it also presents a ahistorical and depoliticized view of school governance and policy. Schools are not seen as sites of struggle over different orders of representation, or as

sites that embody particular configurations of power that shape and structure activities of classroom life. On the contrary, schools become reduced to the sterile logic of flow charts, a growing separation between teachers and administrators, and an increasing tendency toward bureaucratisation. The overriding message here is that the logic of technocratic rationality serves to remove teachers from participating in a critical way in the production and evaluation of school curricula. For example, the form that school knowledge takes and the pedagogy used to legitimate it become subordinated to the principles of efficiency, hierarchy and control. One consequence is that decisions and questions over what counts as knowledge, what is worth teaching, how one judges the purpose and nature of instruction, how one views the role of school in society and what the latter implies for understanding how specific social and cultural interests shape all levels of school life is removed from the collective influence of teachers themselves. The relationship between the bureaucratisation of schools and the specific structuring of knowledge is illuminated in the following:

The major demands placed upon the structures of knowledge by bureaucratised schools are: that the knowledge be divided into components or relatively discrete components; that the units of knowledge be ordered in sequence; that the knowledge be communicable from one person to another using conventional media of communication; that success in acquisition of part, if not most of the knowledge is recordable in quantifiable form; that the knowledge be objectified in the sense of having an existence independent of its human origins; that the knowledge is stratified into various levels of status or prestige; that knowledge based upon concrete experience be treated as low status, but that knowledge expressed in abstract and generalised principles be regarded as having high status.¹⁵

The increasing tendency to reduce teacher autonomy in the development and planning of curricula is also evident in the production of prepackaged curriculum materials that contribute to a form of deskilling among teachers. For instance, Apple¹⁶ has pointed to elementary school science curricula packages whose underlying rationality oriented teachers to simply carrying out predetermined content and instructional procedures. Similarly, the principles at work in this rationality are also found in many school textbooks and, what I call, management pedagogies. In many school textbooks knowledge is broken down into discrete parts, standardized for easier management and consumption, and published with the intent of being marketed for large general student audiences.¹⁷ Furthermore, there is a growing adoption by schools of forms of pedagogy that routinize and standardize classroom instruction. This is evident in the proliferation of instructional based curricula and management schemes, competency based learning systems, and similar approaches such as mastery learning. These are basically management pedagogies because the central question regarding learning is reduced to the problem of management, i.e., "how to allocate resources (teachers, students, and materials) to produce the maximum number of certified. . . students within a designated time."¹⁸

The principles underlying management pedagogies are at odds with the notion that teachers should be actively involved in producing

curricula materials suited to the cultural and social contexts in which they teach. Questions regarding cultural specificity, teacher judgment, and how student experiences and histories relate to the learning process itself are ignored. One could go even further and say that the issues embodied in such questions represent a mode of teacher autonomy and control that are a positive hindrance to those school administrators that believe that excellence is a quality to be displayed primarily in higher reading, math, and college board scores. This becomes more obvious in light of the major assumption underlying management pedagogy: that the behavior of teachers needs to be controlled and made consistent and predictable across different schools and student populations. The payoff for school systems is not merely the testing of more manageable forms of pedagogy, this type of school policy also makes for good public relations in that school administrators can provide technical solutions to the complex social, political and economic problems that plague their schools while simultaneously invoking the tenets of accountability as an indicator of success. In other words, if the problem can be measured it can be solved. The following statement by some Chicago school administrators enmeshed of management pedagogy points to the ideology behind the growing proletarianisation and deskilling of teacher work:

Providing materials that were centrally developed and successfully field tested would: 1) reduce greatly the time needed to prepare and organize materials; 2) require little inservice time; 3) be economical for schools in Chicago and elsewhere to implement; 4) standardise the definition, sequencing, and quality of instruction necessary for mastery of each objective; 5) reduce greatly the time needed for developing lesson plans; and 6) be easy for substitutes to use.¹⁹

Underlying this approach to educational reform is a mode of technocratic rationality that restricts curricula and student diversity and simultaneously refuses to address seriously the issue of how to deal pedagogically with less privileged learners. In the first instance, the narrowing of curricula choices to a back-to-basics format, and the introduction of lock-step, time on task pedagogies operates from the pedagogically erroneous assumption that all students can learn from the same materials, pedagogies, and modes of evaluation. The notion that students come from different histories, embody different experiences, linguistic practices, cultures, and talents is ignored. Similarly, the current drive among school reformers to deny a high school diploma to students who don't pass a comprehensive graduating exam, or to deny entrance to undergraduate and graduate schools to students who don't measure up to the call for higher scores on any one of a number of tests represents a technological solution to a highly charged political and social problem. The central issue that needs to be interrogated is how public schools and institutions of higher education might be systematically failing certain groups of students, or how they might re-evaluate the nature and structure of their own approaches to teaching and learning so as to take seriously their obligation to educate all students to be productive citizens. K. Patricia Cross sums the problem up well in her comment:

Clearly, we cannot afford to 'improve' educational institutions at the expense of society. But it is distressing to see how many well-meaning but short-sighted legislators

and educators are taking advantage of the current mandates for excellence by supporting proposals that can have the effect of eliminating from local high schools and colleges the very students who need them most. Some years ago, a wag said of Admiral Hyman Rickover's elitist recommendations for education, 'Save the best; shoot the rest.' Selection is the easy route to quality -- but it is a swinging-pendulum solution that fails to address the underlying problems of curriculum, instruction, and teacher training.²⁰

Rethinking the Nature of the Intellectual

What I have tried to do in the previous section is point to the various ideological and material forces at work in the United States that currently undermine the role and conditions of work necessary for teachers to assume the posture of thoughtful, critical educational leaders. In what follows, I want to argue that one way to rethink and restructure the nature of teacher work is to view teachers as intellectuals. The category of intellectual is helpful in a number of ways. First, it provides a theoretical basis for examining teacher work as a form of intellectual labor; secondly, it clarifies the ideological and material conditions necessary for intellectual work; thirdly, it helps to illuminate the various modes of intelligibility, ideologies, and interests that are produced and legitimated by teacher work.

By viewing teachers as intellectuals, we can illuminate and recover the rather general notion that all human activity involves some form of thinking. That is, no activity, regardless of how routinized it might become, is abstracted from the functioning of the mind in some capacity. This is a crucial issue because by arguing that the use of the mind is a general part of all human activity, we dignify the human capacity for integrating thinking and practice, and in doing so highlight the core of what it means to view teachers as reflective practitioners. Within this discourse, teachers can be seen not merely as

performers professionally equipped to realize effectively any goals that may be set for them, but rather (they should) be viewed as free men and women with a special dedication to the values of the intellect and the enhancement of the critical powers of the young.²¹

Furthermore, viewing teachers as intellectuals provides a strong critique of those ideologies that legitimate social practices that separate conceptualization, planning, and designing from the processes of implementation and execution. It is important to stress that teachers must take active responsibility for raising serious questions about what they teach, how they are to teach it, and what the larger goals are for which they are striving. This means that they must take a responsible role in shaping the purposes and conditions of schooling. Such a task is impossible within a division of labor where teachers have little influence over the ideological and economic conditions of their work. There is also a growing political and ideological tendency as expressed in the current debates on educational reform to remove teachers and students from their histories and cultural experiences in the name of pedagogical approaches that will make schooling more instrumental.

What this generally means is that teachers and students alike are "situated" within curricula approaches and instructional management schemes that reduce their roles to either implementing or receiving the goals and objectives of publishers, outside experts, and others far removed from the specificities of daily classroom life. This issue becomes all the more important when seen as part of the growing objectification of human life in general. The concept of teacher as intellectual provides the theoretical posture to fight against this type of ideological and pedagogical imposition.

Moreover, the concept of intellectual provides the theoretical groundwork for interrogating the specific ideological and economic conditions under which intellectuals as a social group need to work in order to function as critical, thinking, creative human beings. This last point takes on a normative and political dimension and seems especially relevant for teachers. For if we believe that the role of teaching cannot be reduced to merely training in the practical skills, but involves, instead, the education of a class of intellectuals vital to the development of a democratic society then the category of intellectual becomes a way of linking the purpose of teacher education, public schooling, and in-service training to the very principles necessary for the development of a democratic order and society.

Neither teacher training institutions nor the public schools themselves have seriously viewed themselves historically as important sites for educating teachers as intellectuals. In part, this has been due to the pervasiveness of a growing technocratic rationality that separates theory from practice and contributes to the development of modes of pedagogy that ignore teacher creativity and insight; it is also due to the predominance of theories and forms of school leadership and organization that give teachers little control over the nature of their work. The latter not only shape the structure and experiences of what teachers do in schools, but also the way in which they are prepared in teacher training institutions. What is generally the overriding in most teacher education programs is the emphasis on having prospective educators master pedagogical techniques that generally eschew questions of purpose and the discourse of critique and possibility.

I have argued that by viewing teachers as intellectuals we can begin to rethink and reform those historical traditions and conditions that have prevented schools and teachers from assuming their full potential as active, reflective scholars and practitioners. But I want to both qualify this point and extend it further. I believe that it is imperative not only to view teachers as intellectuals, but also to contextualize in political and normative terms the concrete social functions that teachers perform. In this way, we can be more specific about the different relationships that teachers have to both their work and to the society in which such work takes place. I want to develop this position in a more detailed way below.

Any attempt to reformulate the role of teachers as intellectuals has to also include the broader issue of how to view educational theory in general. It is imperative to view educational theory as a form of social theory. I say imperative, because if seen as a form of social theory, the discourse of educational theory can be understood and interrogated as representing forms of knowledge and social practice

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that legitimate and reproduce particular forms of social life. Educational theory in this case is not viewed as merely the application of objective scientific principles to the concrete study of schooling and learning. Instead, it is seen as an eminently political discourse that emerges from and characterises an expression of struggle over what forms of authority, orders of representation, forms of moral regulation, and versions of the past and future should be legitimated, passed on, and debated within specific pedagogical sites. All forms of educational theory and discourse represent a form of ideology that has an intimate relation to questions of power. This is evident in the way such discourses arise out of and structure the distinctions between high and low status knowledge, legitimate cultural forms that reproduce specific class, racial, and patriarchal interests, and help to sustain specific organisational patterns and classroom social relations.

Educational theory should also be seen as having a deep commitment to developing schools as sites that prepare students to participate in and struggle to develop democratic public spheres. This means that the value of educational theory and practice should be linked to providing the conditions for teachers and students to understand schools as public spheres dedicated to forms of self and social empowerment. It also means defining teacher work against the imperative to develop knowledge and skills that provide students with the tools they will need to be leaders rather than simply managers or skilled civil servants. Similarly, it means fighting against those ideological and material practices that reproduce privileges for the few and social and economic inequality for the many.

By politicising the notion of schooling and revealing the ideological nature of educational theory and practice, it becomes possible to be more specific in defining the meaning of the category of the intellectual and to interrogate the political and pedagogical function of the intellectual as a social category. There are two related but separate points by which to venture a definition of the intellectual. The more general definition is rooted in a quality of mind that is characterized as having a creative, critical and contemplative relationship to the world of ideas. Richard Hofstadter epitomises this position in his distinction between the meaning of intellect and the meaning of intelligence. Intelligence, for him, is

an excellence of mind that is employed within a fairly narrow, immediate predictable range; it is a manipulative, adjustive, infallingly practical quality. . . . Intellect, on the other hand is the critical, creative, and contemplative side of mind. Whereas intelligence seeks to grasp, manipulate, reorder, adjust, intellect examines, ponders, wonders, theorizes, criticizes, imagines.²²

Paul Piccone provides a similar distinction but places it within a larger social context.

. . . unless one fudges the definition of intellectuals in terms of purely formal and statistical educational criteria, it is fairly clear that what modern society produces is an army of alienated, privatized, and uncultured experts who

are knowledgeable only within very narrowly defined areas. This technical intelligentsia, rather than intellectuals in the traditional sense of thinkers concerned with the totality, is growing by leaps and bounds to run the increasingly complex bureaucratic and industrial apparatus. Its rationality, however, is only instrumental in character, and thus suitable mainly to perform partial tasks rather than tackling substantial questions of social organization and political direction.²³

Herb Kohl is more specific and provides a definition of the intellectual that relates it directly to teachers. He writes:

An intellectual is someone who knows about his or her field, has a wide breadth of knowledge about other aspects of the world, who uses experience to develop theory and questions theory on the basis of further experience. An intellectual is also someone who has the courage to question authority and who refuses to act counter to his or her own experience and judgment.²⁴

In my view all of these positions make distinctions that are important but fall into the problem of suggesting that intellectual inquiry is either the repository of specific groups of people or that the quality of intellectual inquiry is only operative within specific social functions. This is not meant to suggest that the question of what qualities of mind constitute intellectual inquiry is not an important one. These positions are informative in that they suggest that intellectual inquiry is characterized by someone who has a breadth of knowledge about the world, who views ideas in more than instrumental terms, and who harbors a spirit of inquiry that is critical and oppositional, one that is true to its own impulses and judgments. But a distinction has to be made in this case between those characteristics of intellectual inquiry as they exist in various degrees and proportions among different individuals and the social function of intellectual work itself. In his attempt to turn the issue of the nature and role of the intellectual into a political question, Antonio Gramsci provides a more helpful theoretical elaboration on this issue. For Gramsci, all men and women are intellectuals, but not all of them function in society as intellectuals. Gramsci is worth quoting at length on this issue.

When one distinguishes between intellectuals and non-intellectuals, one is referring in reality only to the immediate social function of the professional category of the intellectuals, that is, one has in mind the direction in which their specific professional activity is weighted, whether towards intellectual elaboration or towards muscular-nervous effort. This means that, although one can speak of intellectuals, one cannot speak of non-intellectuals, because non-intellectuals do not exist. But even the relationship between efforts of intellectual-cerebral elaboration and muscular-nervous effort is not always the same, so that there are varying degrees of specific intellectual activity. There is no human activity from which every form of intellectual participation can be

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excluded: homo faber cannot be separated from homo sapiens. Each man (sic), finally, outside his professional activity, carries on some form of intellectual activity, that is, he is a 'philosopher', an artist, a man of taste, he participates in a particular conception of the world, has a conscious line of moral conduct, and therefore contributes to sustain a conception of the world or to modify it, that is, to bring into being new modes of thought.²⁵

For Gramsci, all people are intellectuals in that they think, mediate, and adhere to a specific view of the world. The point here, as mentioned previously, is that varying degrees of critical and common sense thought is endemic to what it means to be human. The significance of this insight is that it gives pedagogical activity an inherently political quality. For instance, Gramsci's view of political activity was deeply rooted in the task of raising the quality of thought of the working class. At the same time, by arguing that all people do not function in their social capacity as intellectuals, Gramsci provides the theoretical groundwork for analysing the political role of those intellectuals who had to be considered in terms of the organisational and directive functions they performed in a given society.

In the broadest sense, Gramsci attempts to locate the political and social function of intellectuals through his analyses of the role of conservative and radical organic intellectuals. For Gramsci, conservative organic intellectuals provide the dominant class with forms of moral and intellectual leadership. As agents of the status quo, such intellectuals identify with the dominant relations of power and become the propagators of its ideologies and values. This group represents a stratum of intellectuals that gives ruling classes a homogeneity and awareness of their economic, political, and social functions. In the advanced industrial countries organic intellectuals can be found in all strata of society and include specialists in industrial organisations, professors in universities, journalists in the culture industry, and various levels of executives in middle management positions.

Radical intellectuals also attempt to provide the moral and intellectual leadership of a specific class, in this case, the working class. More specifically, radical organic intellectuals provide the pedagogical and political skills that are necessary to raise political awareness in the working class in order to help the members of that class to develop leadership skills and to engage in collective struggle.²⁶

Gramsci's categories are helpful in that they illuminate the political nature of intellectual work within specific social functions. Moreover, Gramsci's analysis helps to shatter the myth that the nature of intellectual work is determined by one's class location. On the contrary, there is no immediate correspondence between class location and consciousness; but there is a correspondence between the social function of one's intellectual work and the particular relationship it has to modifying, challenging, or reproducing the dominant society. In other words, it is the political nature of intellectual work that is the issue at hand. In my mind, this is a major theoretical advance over the ongoing debate among Marxists and others as to whether intellectuals constitute a specific class or culture.²⁷ Furthermore, by politicising the nature of intellectual work, Gramsci strongly challenges dominant

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theoretical traditions that have decontextualised the role that intellectuals play in education and the larger society. In other words, he criticises those theorists who decontextualise the intellectual by suggesting that he or she exist independently of issues of class, culture, power, and politics. Inherent in such a view is the notion that the intellectual is obligated to engage in a value free discourse, one that necessitates that he or she refuse to make a commitment to specific views of the world, refuse to take sides on different issues, or refuse to link knowledge with the fundamental principles of emancipation. Such a view reinforces the idea that intellectuals are free floating and detached in the sense that they perform a type of labor that is objective and apolitical.

Similarly, Gramsci's notion that intellectuals represent a social category and not a class raises interesting questions as to how educators might be viewed at different levels of schooling in terms of their politics, the nature of their discourse, and the pedagogical functions they perform. But Gramsci's terms need to be expanded in order to grasp the changing nature and social function of intellectuals in their capacities as educators. The categories around which I want to analyze the social function of educators as intellectuals are: a) resisting intellectuals, b) critical intellectuals, c) accommodating intellectuals, and d) hegemonic intellectuals. It is imperative to note that these are somewhat exaggerated, ideal-typical categories whose purpose is to bring into bold relief the cluster of integrated elements that point to the interests and tendencies to which they point. Needless to say, there are teachers who move in and out and between these categories and defy being placed in any one of them; moreover, it is conceivable that teachers under different circumstances may opt out of one tendency and move into another category. Finally, these categories are irreducible to any one specific political doctrine. They point to forms of ideology and social practice that could be taken up by any number of diverse political positions or world views.

Resisting Intellectuals

Resisting intellectuals is a category that suggests that teachers as intellectuals can emerge from and work with any number of groups, other than and including the working class, that advance emancipatory traditions and cultures within and outside of alternative public spheres.²⁸ Utilising the language of critique, resisting intellectuals employ the discourse of self-criticism so as to make the foundations for a critical pedagogy explicit while simultaneously illuminating the relevance of the latter for both students and the larger society. Central to the category of resisting intellectuals is the task of making the pedagogical more political and the political more pedagogical. Making the pedagogical more political means inserting education directly into the political sphere by arguing that schooling represents both a struggle for meaning and a struggle over power relations. Thus schooling becomes a central terrain where power and politics operate out of a dialectical relationship between individuals and groups who function within specific historical conditions and structural constraints as well as within cultural forms and ideologies that are the basis for contradictions and struggles. Within this view of schooling, critical reflection and action become part of a fundamental social project to help students develop a deep and abiding faith in the struggle to overcome injustices and to humanize themselves. Knowledge and power

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are inextricably linked in this case to the presupposition that to choose life, so as to make it possible, is to understand the preconditions necessary to struggle for it.

In the second instance, making the political more pedagogical means utilising forms of pedagogy: that treat students as critical agents, problematises knowledge, utilises dialogue, and makes knowledge meaningful so as to make it critical in order to make it emancipatory. In part, this suggests that resisting intellectuals take seriously the need to give students an active voice in their learning experiences. It means developing a critical vernacular that is attentive to problems experienced at the level of everyday life, particularly as these are related to pedagogical experiences connected to classroom practice. As such, the starting point pedagogically for such intellectuals is not with the isolated student but with collective actors in their various cultural, class, racial, historical, and gendered settings, along with the particularity of their diverse problems, hopes, and dreams. It is at this point that the language of critique unites with the language of possibility. That is, resisting intellectuals must take seriously the need to come to grips with those ideological and material aspects of the dominant society that attempt to separate the issues of power and knowledge, which means working to create the ideological and material conditions in both schools and the larger society that give students the opportunity to become agents of civic courage, that is, citizens who have the knowledge and courage to stake seriously the need to make despair unconvincing and hope practical. In short, the language of critique unites with the language of possibility when it points to the conditions necessary for new forms of culture, alternative social practices, new modes of communication and a practical vision for the future.

Critical Intellectuals

Critical intellectuals are ideologically oppositional but do not see themselves as connected either to a specific social formation or as performing a general social function that is expressively political in nature. Their protests constitute a critical function, which they see as part of their professional status or obligation as intellectuals. In most cases, the posture of critical intellectuals is self-consciously apolitical, and their relationship to the rest of society is best defined as free-floating.²⁹ As individuals they are critical of inequality and injustice, but they refuse to move beyond their isolated posture to the terrain of collective solidarity and struggle. Often this retreat from politics is justified on the basis of arguments that posit the impossibility of politics for reasons as ideologically diverse as the claim that we live in a totally administered society, or that history is in the hands of a technology out of control, or the simple refusal to believe that human agency has any effect on history.

Accommodating Intellectuals

Accommodating intellectuals generally stand firm within an ideological posture and set of material practices that supports the dominant society and its ruling groups. Such intellectuals are generally not aware of this process in that they do not define themselves as self-conscious agents of the status quo, even though their politics further the interests of the dominant classes. This category of intellectuals

also define themselves in terms that suggest they are free-floating, removed from the vagaries of class conflicts and partisan politics. But in spite of such rationalizations, they function primarily to produce and mediate uncritically ideas and social practices that serve to reproduce the status quo. These are the intellectuals who decry politics while simultaneously refusing to take risks. Another more subtle variation is the intellectual who disdains politics by proclaiming professionalism as a value system, one which often entails the spurious concept of scientific objectivity.

Hegemonic Intellectuals

Hegemonic intellectuals do more than surrender to forms of academic and political incorporation, or hide behind spurious claims to objectivism; they self-consciously define themselves through the forms of moral and intellectual leadership they provide for dominant groups and classes. This stratum of intellectuals provides various factions of the dominant classes with a homogeneity and awareness of their economic, political, and ethical functions. The interests that define the conditions as well as the nature of their work are tied to the preservation of the existing order. Such intellectuals are to be found on the consulting lists of major foundations, on the faculties of major universities as managers of the culture industry, and, in spirit, at least, in teaching positions at various levels of schooling.

For fear of these categories appearing to be too rigid, it is important to stress more specifically that the teachers who occupy them cannot be viewed merely from the perspective of the ideological interests they represent. For instance, as Erik Olin Wright has pointed out, the positions that teachers hold must also be analyzed in terms of the objective antagonisms they experience as intellectuals who occupy contradictory class locations.³⁰ That is, like workers they have to sell their labor power and have no control over the educational apparatus as a whole. On the other hand, unlike workers they do have some control over the nature of their labor process, i.e., what to teach, how to teach, what kind of research to do, etc. Needless to say, the relative autonomy that teachers have at different levels of schooling differs, with those in higher education having the most autonomy. Moreover, regardless of the ideological interests such teachers represent there is always the possibility for real tensions and antagonisms between the lack of control they have over the goals and purposes of schooling and the relative autonomy they enjoy. For example, in a time of economic crisis, teachers have been laid off, given increased course loads, denied tenure, and forced to implement administratively dictated pedagogies. It is within these tensions and objective contradictions that the possibilities exist for shifting alliances and movement among teachers from one category to the next.

The Discourse and Role of Educators As Resisting Intellectuals

In order to fight for schools as democratic spheres, it is imperative to understand the contradictory roles that resisting intellectuals occupy within the various levels of schooling. In the most immediate sense, the notion of resisting intellectual makes visible the paradoxical position that radical educators face in the public schools and in the universities. On the one hand, such intellectuals earn a living within

institutions that play a fundamental role in producing the dominant culture. On the other hand, they define their political terrain by providing students with forms of oppositional discourse and critical social practices whose interests are at odds with the overall hegemonic role of the schools and the society it supports. The paradox is not easy to resolve, and often represents a struggle against being incorporated by the university or school system through its efforts to reward those educators willing to either remove critical scholarship from their teaching or to remove it from any relation to concrete political movements. At the university level, there is enormous pressure, on the other hand, for radical educators to peddle their academic wares merely as viable commodities for academic journals and conferences.

Rather than surrender to this form of academic and political incorporation, it is essential to define the role of the resisting intellectual in a way that points to forms of counter-hegemonic practice that can both avoid and challenge such incorporation. One essential starting point is for resisting intellectuals to form alliances among themselves, struggle to win over critical intellectuals when possible, and to join and work with oppositional social movements outside of the schools.

In the first instance, teachers and academics who function as resisting intellectuals can collectively organize in order to engage in projects designed to understand the critical role that educators play at all levels of schooling in producing and legitimating existing social relations. This might take the form educators establishing social projects in which they critically interrogate existing school curricula, the hidden curricula, policy formation at the local and state levels, the form and content of school texts, and the working conditions under which teachers operate. Not only would such projects provide a theoretical and political service by critically engaging the nature of school life, it would also give radical and critical educators the opportunity to begin to communicate to each other about their common concerns. Moreover, such alliances provide the possibility for university and public school people to redefine the traditional theory-practice relationship within the context of their alliances with each other. That is, in order to overcome the social division of labor between theoretical production and practical knowledge (read as theory and practice), particularly as it defines the university-public school relationship, resisting intellectuals from these different spheres can forge alliances around common social and political projects in which they share their theoretical concerns and practical talents. The point here is that we recognize that these different educational sites give rise to various forms of theoretical production, and that such sites cannot be seen as respectively representative for the development of theory and practice.

Such projects also have value not only because they promote political unity and are necessary to fight against accommodating and hegemonic intellectuals, but also because they open the possibility for resisting intellectuals to develop and work with movements outside of the limiting contours of the academic disciplines, symposiums, and reward systems that have become the traditional referents for intellectual activity. In effect, I am arguing that teachers as resisting intellectuals need to

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become a movement marked by an active involvement in oppositional public spheres in which the primacy of the political is asserted anew. Resisting intellectuals can join with any number of social groups engaged in emancipatory struggle. By linking up with ecology, feminist, peace and neighborhood groups, resisting intellectuals can bring their skills and talents to bear on vital forms of resistance at the local level, e.g., local based efforts against toxic waste dumping, nuclear power, consumer fraud, racial and sexual discrimination, etc. Within this context, the political becomes pedagogical. Intellectuals learn from and with others engaged in similar political struggles.

Such alliances are absolutely necessary if teachers, particularly within the public schools, are to be able to bring outside force to bear on fighting for ideological and material conditions within the schools that will allow them to function as intellectuals. That is, conditions that will allow them to reflect, read, share their work with others, produce curriculum materials, publish their achievements for teachers and others outside of their local schools, etc. At the present time, teachers labor in the public schools under organizational constraints and ideological conditions that leave them little room for collective work and critical pursuits. Their teaching hours are too long, they are generally isolated in cellular structures and have few opportunities to teach with others, and they have little say over the selection, organization, and distribution of teaching materials. Moreover, they operate under class loads and numerous non-curricular tasks such as bus duty, cafeteria duty, and playground duty that needlessly constrain their time and teaching abilities. Their salaries in the United States are a matter of scandal that is only now being fully recognized by the American public. Intellectual work needs to be supported by practical conditions buttressed by concomitant democratic ideologies. If teachers are to fight for conditions that support joint teaching, collective writing and research, and democratic planning, they will also have to struggle simultaneously against the ingrained values of competition, individualism, patriarchy, racism, and ageism that permeate all levels of schooling.

It is within conditions marked by popular control over bureaucratization that new spaces will open for creative and reflective discourse and action. Such a discourse will be able to relate language and power, take popular experience seriously as part of the learning process, combat mystification, and help students to reorder the raw experiences of their lives through the perspectives opened up by history, philosophy, sociology, and other related disciplines. The discourse of the resisting intellectual takes the issues of community and liberation seriously and in doing so gives new meaning to the pedagogical and political necessity of creating the conditions for emancipatory forms of self and social empowerment among both educators and students. It is a struggle worth waging.

Notes

1. The discourse of crisis in public education has been dealt with in a series of reports and books, including the following: The National Commission on Excellence, A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform (Washington, D.C., 1983); Task Force on Education for Economic Growth, Action for Excellence: A Comprehensive Plan to Improve Our Nation's Schools (Denver: Education Commission of the States, 1983); The College Entrance Examination Board, Academic Preparation for College (New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1983); Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Federal Elementary and Secondary Education Policy, Making the Grade (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1983); Carnegie Corporation of New York, Education and Economic Progress: Toward a National Educational Policy (New York: Carnegie Corp., 1983); John Goodlad, A Place Called School: Promise for the Future (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984); Ernest L. Boyer, High School: A Report on American Secondary Education (New York: Harper & Row, 1983). One of the few recently published books on education that takes the role of teachers seriously is: Theodore Sizer, Horace's Compromise: The Dilemma of the High School (Boston, Ma.: Houghton Mifflin, 1984). For a critical analysis of these reports and the ideologies behind them, see Stanley Aronowitz and Henry Giroux, Education Under Siege (South Hadley, Mass.: Bergin and Garvey, in press).
2. An example of this trend in the teaching reading through a mastery learning approach can be found in Patrick Shannon, "Mastery Learning in Reading and the Control of Teachers and Students," Language Arts 61(5) (September, 1984), pp. 484-93.
3. Thomas S. Ponkewitz, Paradigm and Ideology in Educational Research (Philadelphia and London: The Falmer Press, 1984), p. 108.
4. E. T. Sliva and S. Slaughter, "Prometheus/bound: Knowledge, Power, and the Transformation of American Social Science, 1865-1920," Unpublished Manuscript, University of Toronto, 1981, Chapter 5, p. 2.
5. For a general critique of positivism, see Max Horkheimer, Critique of Instrumental Reason (New York: Seabury Press, 1974); see also Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), especially chapter 7. For a specific critique of the legacy of positivist thought and its influence on educational theory and practice see Henry Giroux, Ideology, Culture and the Process of Schooling (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984).
6. Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).
7. See Joel Spring, Education and the Rise of the Corporate State (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972); David Tyack, The One Best System (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974); Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, The Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972).
8. Herbert Kleibard, "The Question of Teacher Education," in D. McCarty (ed.) New Perspectives on Teacher Education (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973).

9. Kenneth M. Zeichner, "Alternative Paradigms on Teacher Education," Journal of Teacher Education 34 (3) (May-June, 1983), pp. 3-9.
10. Henry A. Giroux, Ideology, Culture and the Process of Schooling, op. cit.
11. Zeichner, op. cit., p. 4.
12. Karen J. Winkler, "Research Focus of Education Doctorate is Too Ill-Defined, Officials Say," The Chronicle of Higher Education 29:11 (November 7, 1984), p. 11.
13. Richard Bates, "Bureaucracy, Professionalism and Knowledge: Structures of Authority and Structures of Control," Educational Research and Perspectives 7(2) (1980), pp. 66-76.
14. William S. Foster, "The Changing Administrator: Developing Managerial Praxis," Educational Theory 30 (1) (Winter 1980), pp. 11-23.
15. Andrew Wake, "School Knowledge and the Structure of Bureaucracy," Paper presented at the conference of the Sociological Association of Australia and New Zealand, Canberra, July 1979, p. 16.
16. Michael Apple, Education and Power (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1982).
17. Michael Apple, "The Political Economy of Text Publishing," Educational Theory (in press).
18. Patrick Shannon, op. cit., p. 488.
19. M. Katims and B. F. Jones, "Chicago Mastery Learning Reading: Mastery Learning Instruction and Assessment in Inner City Schools," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Reading Association, New Orleans, 1981, p. 7.
20. K. Patricia Cross, "The Rising Tide of School Reform Reports," Phi Delta Kappan, 66:3 (November 1984), p. 171.
21. Israel Scheffler, "University Scholarship and the Education of Teachers," Teachers College Record, 70:1 (1968), p. 11.
22. Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York: Random House, 1963).
23. Paul Piccone, "Symposium on the Role of the Intellectual in the 1980's," Telos No. 50 (Winter 1981-1982), 116.
24. Herbert Kohn, "Examining Closely What We Do," Learning (August 1983), p. 29.
25. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Q. Hoare and G. Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971).

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26. Ibid.
27. For an overview of this debate, see Carl Boggs, "Marxism and the Role of Intellectuals," New Political Science 1:(2/3) 1979, pp. 7-23.
28. Gramsci, op. cit.; Paulo Freire, The Politics of Education (South Hadley, Mass.: Bergin and Garvey Publishers, 1984).
29. The concept of the free-floating intellectual as used here is similar to that expressed by Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harvest Book, 1936).
30. Erik Olin Wright, "Intellectuals and the Working Class," The Insurgent Sociologist, 8:1 (Winter 1978), pp. 5-18.

TEACHERS AS RESISTING INTELLECTUALS: CULTURAL
MARXISM IN EDUCATIONAL THEORY

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This response to Henry Giroux's paper, "Teaching and the Role of the Resisting Intellectual," will attempt to steer a middle course between recent accolades and biting criticisms of his theory as to what ought to be the aims and purposes of education, the focus of the curriculum, and the role of the teacher, all concerns of the educational theorist. In one analysis of Giroux's Theory and Resistance in Education: A Pedagogy for the Oppression, which is a detailed explication of the thesis and themes he develops in his paper this evening, the reviewer strongly endorses Giroux's position, and, one might say, celebrates it.¹ Another recent analysis, contrarily, is somewhat abrasive in its treatment of Theory and Resistance in Education and linked Professor Giroux into a donnybrook with his critics.² I am led in the direction I am taking tonight in this critique of Giroux's paper because I think that both reviews of Giroux's vision of the teacher and the relation of schools to the social order need to be complemented by an analytical approach that is sympathetic in intent although possesses what I hope is a healthy skepticism regarding Giroux's educational theory. Thus, after identifying Giroux's basic concern and his vision as to how teachers can meet that concern, I am going to identify theoretical and, especially, practical problems of Giroux's educational theory, focusing on his prescription as to the role of the teacher in learning and schooling. Finally, I will suggest an alternative role for teachers committed to fundamental social change in society. The specific questions to be addressed are: 1) What is Giroux's basic concern? 2) What is his conception as to what ought to be the role of the teacher in the learning process? 3) What are some theoretical and practical difficulties in implementing such a role? In that regard, does such a role meet the criterion of viability? And, will the development of such a role invariably lead Giroux into ethical dilemmas in the training of teachers? 4) What might be recommended to Giroux about what ought to be the relation of teaching to social action given the reservations regarding his educational theory raised by the previous questions?

Giroux's basic concern is that American society is characterized by enduring injustices. The majority of the population is taken advantage of by a minority of Americans who retain privileges resulting from exploitation and oppression. Giroux is hell-bent on changing this situation.

A strategic barrier, for Giroux, to developing a just society, is to be found in the content of what is taught in schools. Much of what passes for knowledge in schools is knowledge generated by the interests of the more powerful, sub-collectivities in society. To borrow language from Berger and Luckman, society is a social construction and the adult world attempts to socialize the young and the immature to believe that the "contingent is the inevitable." That is, the way society is organized to meet needs is the only or best way for doing so. Schools function to maintain such a fiction.

Giroux seeks to confront the use of schools for this system mainte-

nance purpose. Giroux's strategy for turning schools into system-changing institutions is to develop teachers as resistant intellectuals who, by definition, will challenge "forms of knowledge and social practice that legitimate and reproduce particular forms of life." In place of a traditional, essentialist, and status-quo oriented curriculum, a critical or radical pedagogy will be installed which is intended to turn schools into an instrument of social change.

Such is Giroux's project. It is one that places him squarely in the social reconstructionist tradition in educational theory. As a person who still gets a goose pimple or two when rereading Counts' Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order, I find myself drawn to this view of what ought to be the relation of schools to the social order. But, dressing the emperor in new clothes or giving him a new way of talking about old things that never did come into existence is not likely to change the nature and function of state institutions. What we have in Giroux's educational theory is old wine in new bottles. His social reconstructionist outlook is appealing as a theory in the sense of a vision of the way things might or ought to be. But a direct translation of that theory into practice is fraught with difficulties.

The first difficulty is Giroux's conception of the teacher as an intellectual. Giroux begs the question in his discussion of the teacher as intellectual. He argues that an intellectual must be both critical and oppositional. I see no reason why an intellectual must be both. One way in which some persons who are considered to be intellectuals function is to be critical for the sake of being so. There is no serious oppositional intent in their criticisms. H. L. Menckes comes to mind. As much of a critic as he was of American mores he had a love affair with this country and did not entertain a belief in the efficacy of opposition. That would have put him in the camp of many of those he criticized. An intellectual can be critical without being oppositional and that may be the heart of what it is to be an intellectual.

To justify his call for teachers to be Resisting Intellectuals, Giroux reports that Gramsci said that "all men and women are intellectuals." It is not clear, though, whether Gramsci's intent here is description, prescription, or disguised prescription. Giroux adds that Gramsci felt that "all people are intellectuals in that they think, mediate and adhere to a specific view of the world." This claim, though, doesn't help us to sort out the meaning of what it is to be an intellectual as Gramsci's conception doesn't provide any logical bases for inclusion or exclusion. "Intellectual," in such a global use, doesn't enable us to employ the term in any precise, categorical way. If everyone is an intellectual then why bother to use the term. We could, if we adopted Giroux's educational theory, simply refer to "resistant human beings." This point may seem academic, but I don't think one turns teachers into intellectuals simply by saying everyone is one.

The teacher as Resistant Intellectual poses additional problems, as well. Giroux's concept of the teacher as Resistant Intellectual is reminiscent of Herbert Gintis' notion of a "new working class," which differed with the "old working class," in that the "new working class" with its educational advancement, Gintis believed, would be less tolerant of repressive institutional structures. How many teachers have we encountered in our graduate classes who have been intolerant of repres-

give institutional structures? How many are disposed to be Resistant Intellectuals in Giroux's sense of that term? Do we not find, for example, the vast majority of educators buying into the notion that there is a cognitive achievement crisis in education and it is threatening to disable American industry?

Daniel Bell has said of Gintis' notion of a new working class that it is a normative term disguising itself as an analytic one. Gintis, argues Bell, is engaging in wish-fulfillment when he speaks of the emergence of a new working class. What Gintis is doing, says Bell, is actually prescribing the way working class people ought to behave; he is not describing how they typically behave, in fact.³ Giroux in his notion of the teacher as intellectual, I believe, is doing essentially the same thing.

Teachers, argues Giroux, cannot exercise the role of Resistant Intellectual, given their present working conditions. If teachers had more control over their time and conditions of work they would be able to fulfill the role of teacher as Resistant Intellectual. Giroux, then, views schools as a site for struggling for what Andre Gores has called non-reformist reforms, i.e., those that transfer operating control from managers to workers. Yet, if teachers had considerably more control over their working conditions -- to include how they use their time, more hours for preparation, freedom from teaching imposed curricula -- then wouldn't they be more apt to assume a less oppositional posture to society given their lived experience of non-oppressive working conditions? Thus, Giroux's call for empowering teachers may result more in not Resistant but Accommodating, Critical, and/or Hegemonic Intellectuals.

The school is also an instrument of the state. And if the most powerful groups in society play a dominant role in shaping the policies of the state, then won't they likely pass policies that will ensure that schools continue to be relevant to the central values of the culture?

These considerations suggest that attempting to use the schools for counter-hegemonic purposes is a snare and a delusion. No state, capitalist, communist, or otherwise, is likely to condone the use of one of its ideological apparatuses for promotion of revolutionary aims. It would appear, then, that what Giroux is proposing as an educational theory does not meet the criterion of viability. Given that the great majority of teachers may not be intellectuals to begin with, and that even if they were, it is not likely that they would become or function long as Resistant Intellectuals, Giroux's educational theory does not appear to be practicable.

Besides the issue of feasibility, ethical considerations abound in Giroux's notion of teachers as Resistant Intellectuals. Giroux believes that teachers are becoming increasingly proletarianized, illustrated, for example, he says, by their having to utilize prepackaged curriculum materials. Believing that teachers should be viewed as "creative and imaginative thinkers" Giroux calls for greater autonomy for teachers. If autonomy means intellectual independence and entails behaviors such as thinking and choosing for oneself, then autonomy may become a two-edged sword for Giroux. Autonomous teachers may reject Giroux's prescription as to how they ought to exercise their role -- and they may

do it on no unreasonable grounds.

In his paper, Giroux argues that "schools as democratic public spheres" equates with "radical social theory." If, though, "schools as democratic public spheres" means teachers (or teachers and students) deciding upon aims and content of learning then the result could be jarring to Giroux. Democracy among teachers doesn't entail their opting for radical social theory. Giroux may have himself in an ethical bind and find himself in a situation similar to that of Froebel. Froebel, in his concept of pantheism, assumed that children were self-creating beings and that given conditions for autonomy and choice they would act pantheistically. Presumably they often didn't do so and when they didn't Froebel forced them to manifest their presumed pantheistic nature. Giroux's teacher as Resistant Intellectual is also, he says, a Gramscian organic intellectual who will organize the workers for social struggle. If teachers choose not to conventionalize their teaching role this way, then, unless he is a pure spirit, Giroux may be tempted to employ coercion and manipulation in order to turn teachers into Resistant Intellectuals. Ethically, then, Giroux may be faced with existential choices that must be confronted in any vanguard strategy for social change.

As a way of leading into a final and positive note regarding Giroux's quest for a strategy of promoting a more equitable and rational society I want to discuss what I see as a fundamental philosophical flaw in Giroux's educational theory. In explicating the "category of the intellectual," Giroux cites Richard Hofstadter's distinction between the meaning of intellect and the meaning of intelligence. Hofstadter is quoted as saying that intelligence is "an excellence of mind that is employed within a fairly narrow, immediate predictable range; it is a manipulative, adjunctive, unfailingly practical quality. . . . Intellect, on the other hand, is the critical, creative, and contemplative side of mind. Whereas intelligence seeks to grasp, manipulate, reorder, adjust, intellect examines, ponders, wonders, theorizes, criticizes, imagines." Giroux cites Hofstadter's distinction between intelligence and intellect for the purpose of supporting the idea of teachers who exercise intellect rather than intelligence. Such, for Giroux, is essential to being a Resistant Intellectual. But, aren't Giroux's Resistant Intellectuals approaching ideas in a very manipulative way, grasping, reordering, and adjusting them for the instrumental purpose of transforming an unjust social order? Resistant Intellectuals aren't examining, pondering, theorizing, criticizing, and imagining ideas for intrinsic reasons. Ideas, for Giroux, are plans of action, weapons in the social struggles of a society. Education becomes instrumental to purposes outside of it. Schooling becomes a site for using people for one's own preferred social theory.

If that social theory, i.e., conception of the principle features of the good society, runs counter to prevailing notions of such, then peddling a counter-hegemonic social theory is not likely a viable enterprise. Given the ideal of autonomous persons and the chances that they will resist concerted efforts to influence their values Giroux's project may run into ethical dilemmas. Perhaps schools should not be viewed as sites to shore up the status-quo or to challenge its very foundations.

What is to be done? A far more viable and far less ethically

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problematic function for schools is to treat ideas intellectually as Hofstadter defines that set of operations. Rather than Resistant Intellectuals we should be grateful for just more teachers as intellectuals. Instead of using schools for counter-hegemonic purposes, teachers as intellectuals would discuss and analyse any and all proposals, helping students to situate, interpret, and evaluate them.

Plato, somewhere, speaks of the three types of persons attending athletic events. One, the contestants, the players; two, the hawkers selling wares; three, the spectators watching and examining the whole spectacle. Giroux would have teachers be hawkers, selling pre-conceived notions of desired societal patterns, using manipulative intelligence to pursue their ideological ends. Perhaps a more suitable role -- and not just for prudential reasons -- is for teachers to be spectators, using a non-manipulative intellect to take everything in, to discern the tragic and comedic aspects of the human condition, and to view these outcomes reverentially as worthwhile ends in themselves. May there not be a type of courage in this manner of living and teaching?

Taking a more disinterested attitude toward conflicting ideas in society than that involved in the teacher as Resistant Intellectual does not rule out involvement by teachers in social change efforts. Giroux suggests as much when he encourages Resistant Intellectual teachers to link up with social action groups in the community, such as ecology and feminist organisations. This is not only sensible for Resistant Intellectual teachers, but represents a needed rejection of the underlying Cultural Marxism in Giroux's social change strategy.

Giroux's Cultural Marxism is exemplified in his notion of the teacher as Resistant Intellectual. Such teachers will "transcend the ideology of methods and means (as well as content) in order to critically evaluate the purpose of educational discourse and practice," says Giroux. Underlying this critical role is the assumption of Frankfurt and Gramscian oriented, left-wing intellectuals that if the ideas that function as ideological support for the powers-that-be can be discredited in the minds of the working classes then a chief roadblock to social transformation can be removed. Teachers as Resistant Intellectuals exercise "civic courage" when they take on this task of unveiling and demolishing ideological claptrap.

The problem with this approach to social change is that it involves wrenching persons out of their cultural conditioning, one which has provided them with a systematic set of meanings for everyday life activities. Resistance to the Resistant Intellectuals' cultural invasion may likely ensue in order to preserve some sense of personal identity. Cultures can't function and individuals are stopped in their tracks and made helpless if they are forced to question the most basic cultural presuppositions of their existence. This is another reason why Giroux's Cultural Marxist educational theory is not only not viable but ethically questionable as well.

Cultural Marxism, which focuses upon the idea system of a culture, rather than the structural base of society, as a means for social change, represents a response to the perceived failure of the European working class to be the instrument for structural social change. The working class, it was hoped, through direct revolutionary action, would transform

the social relations of capitalism. They didn't, and the belief emerged among Western Marxists that the path to radical social change was through cultural analysis and exposure of the relationships among ideology, knowledge, and power. Cultural Marxists in education, such as Giroux, have mounted an educational theory that includes a conception of the role of the teacher as Resistant Intellectual that is a logical extension of the belief in transforming society by changing ideas held by people about society.

This response has argued against that social change strategy. Giroux's call for Resistant Intellectuals to join forces with ecology, feminist, and other social action groups returns him, in practice if not in theory, to a Structural Marxist position. That is, instead of discrediting ideas, dismantle institutions. This has the merit of enduing schools with a more noble role than that of being an ideological weapon on behalf of one group or another in society. It also represents a rejection of Cultural and Structural Marxist groups who share the belief that schools can be used as an instrument of revolutionary social change. And, it leaves room for the kind of direct, collaborative action among radical teachers and other social reform groups in society that may make it difficult to distinguish operationally between Giroux's "civic courage" and his adversarial critics' endorsement of "class struggle." I'd buy that.

Notes

1. Roger Simon, Review of Henry Giroux's Theory and Resistance in Education: A Pedagogy for the Opposition (So. Hadley, MA: Bergin and Garvey Publishers, 1985), in Educational Theory, Volume 34, Number 4 (Fall, 1984).
2. Charles Reitz and Don T. Martin, Review of Theory and Resistance in Education, in Educational Studies, Volume 15, Number 2 (Summer, 1984).
3. Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 153.

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NOTES TOWARD A CONCEPTION OF MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION

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This paper is concerned with a number of related conceptual problems posed by the relatively recent development of educational programs identified as "multicultural" in the United States. The questions to be addressed here fall into four major thematic groups: the nature of social culture, the process by which social culture interacts and interfaces with other aspects of a society, some of the theoretical models of cultural pluralism (CP) and the problems presented by these models, and last, a brief discussion of some of the issues entailed in implementing "multicultural education" in practice.

I.

The first question with which we will be concerned is that of what would, in theory, constitute a social culture. To begin, it is necessary to distinguish between the social culture and the haste culture of a given society. The social culture is non-exclusive (at least insofar as members of the society are concerned), while the haste culture is more exclusive in that it is accessible and (perhaps more important) intelligible primarily to the society's elite(s).¹ It is, therefore, not at all reasonable to argue that the latter is either reducible to or synonymous with the former. The social culture of a society is much broader and considerably more inclusive of the everyday life-experiences of the individuals of which the society is composed than is the society's haste culture.² The notion of social culture which is being proposed here is not unlike that offered by Edward B. Tylor, an early figure in the field of cultural anthropology, who, in the late nineteenth century wrote:

Culture. . . is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.³

More to the point, at least for our purposes here, is that social culture is constituted not only by those things mentioned by Tylor (knowledge, belief, art, morality, custom, etc.), but by the perceptions of these things as well.

Although the articulation of a precise definition of the concept of social culture is far too great a task to be undertaken here, it is nonetheless both possible and desirable to begin to delineate some of the necessary elements of which such a concept would be composed. One of the more visible of these elements is that of language (or dialect). While language boundaries cannot of course be presumed to be identical with cultural boundaries, and vice versa, we can establish language as a relatively reliable guide to culture differentiation. That is, it is not, generally speaking, unreasonable for us to expect that a single social culture will be distinguished by a single language or group of languages (with internal subcultures being marked, at least in part, by language or dialect differentiations).⁴ Further, the exclusive use of a single language will play a role in the process of reducing cultural differences between distinctive social cultures. This has proven to be the case, for instance, with respect to the assimilation of diverse

immigrant groups in the United States, especially during the period of the New Immigration. It should be noted, though, that where a dominant group seeks to impose its language on a minority group which is unwilling to assimilate, this imposition may well result in the maintenance (or even intensification) of cultural differences, as has been the case both with French in Belgium and with English in Quebec.

Another significant feature of a social culture is that the members of the society must share a common identity grounded in a common history. The community itself, and especially its social culture, must be perceived as the result of a distinctive historical development. This awareness of historicity can be initiated either from within the group or from without, but must ultimately be recognized both by the society itself and by those groups external to it with which the society is in contact.

A further element which should be kept in mind in any discussion of social culture is that of the role played by social class in the development of social culture. There are, broadly speaking, two basically incompatible positions which might be argued with respect to this issue. On the one hand, one could assert that each social class in a society will develop its own, distinctive social culture, which will, in turn, serve both to perpetuate social class division and to make visible social class conflict. This position, which is that taken by most orthodox Marxists, will result in the development of an essentially conflict-based perspective on cultural diversity. Such a position will generally tend, for this reason, to be supportive of and amenable to the goal of a culturally (and, in fact, linguistically) homogeneous community. For example, in the U.S.S.R., although nationalism has been encouraged among some (though certainly not all) ethnic/national groups since the Revolution, this has been within a more general context which emphasizes "proletarian internationalism." As Stalin noted, the principle of self-determination "ought to be understood as the right of self-determination not of the bourgeoisie but of the toiling masses of a given nation. The principle of self-determination ought to be used as a means in the struggle for socialism and it ought to be subordinated to the principles of socialism."⁵

On the other hand, it might be argued that while a class-based social order will develop some social class-specific cultural characteristics, it will also produce a more general social culture which will be manifested across social class lines, and which will, at least potentially, serve to unify the society (i.e., will reduce the tensions of class conflict). This position is far more compatible with a consensus, rather than a conflict, theory of social order.⁶

Both of these perspectives on the role played by social class in the development of social culture have serious pedagogical and socio-political implications. While it is not my intention to reject the former position outright, it will not be considered further here, since it presupposes a social end (cultural homogeneity) which is diametrically opposed to that upon which the remainder of this paper is predicated.

Having established some guidelines with which to begin to conceptualize the notion of social culture, it is now possible to examine its interaction with some of the other major facets of human society. This

examination will serve to put social culture in a more applied (and applicable) context by addressing the question of the roles played by ideology, by political economy, and by major social institutions (both formal and informal) in the process of developing and maintaining a social culture.

Every human society possesses an ideology which provides both explanations for and justifications of the social and political reality experienced by the members of the society. The ideology of a society is manifested in a variety of areas: the political and economic order of the society as a whole. In short, the ideology provides a "consciousness" which determines both how the world is perceived and understood, and what the parameters of legitimate social understanding (in a broad sense) are for that society.⁷

The dominant ideology of a society is relevant to the problem of social culture in two ways. First, as a consequence of the wide range of areas touched by ideology, there will be considerable overlap between ideology and social culture. There will necessarily be a great deal of mutual support and interdependence -- indeed, in many cases the ideology of the society may well be more accurately described as simply a component of the social culture. This is the case, for example, with respect to the meritocratic ideal in contemporary Anglo-American society, which can be seen as both a component of the dominant ideological paradigm and a major feature of the dominant social culture.

The second way in which the dominant ideology of a society is relevant to the issue of social culture is in the relationship between the society as a whole and subgroups within the society which have established distinctive social cultures apart from that of the mainstream. The ideology will be a significant factor in determining the extent to which the society will tolerate such diversity. It is also important to note that a society may be tolerant of certain sorts of diversity, and intolerant of others. The degree of tolerance can, of course, be expected to vary from one ethnic group to another, as well as across social class lines. Those groups of which the society is intolerant will generally be "marked," by physical appearance, language, dialect, or other apparent signs of variation from the mainstream culture.⁸

A society's social culture will reflect its political economy in much the same way as will its ideology.⁹ Political economy encompasses the society's socio-political structure (both articulated and unarticulated), its economic system and structure, and its demographic characteristics. Further, within the general rubric of political economy can be included shifts and changes in those categories. An illustration of the impact of political economy on social culture is found in the significance acquired by the passage of time during the Industrial Revolution. As the mode of production shifted, significant features of the "social culture" reflected this shift, and individuals became increasingly "time-conscious."¹⁰

A variety of social institutions interact with social culture as well, providing and receiving both theoretical and practical support. Although social culture is clearly visible in formal social institutions (such as governmental agencies, police, schools, and religious institutions), it is also present, to at least as great an extent, in informal

social institutions such as the family.¹¹ Indeed, while all social institutions are concerned with maintaining the social culture, it is primarily the task of the family to pass it on transgenerationally. Once the family has instilled the fundamentals of the social culture in the child, other institutions (especially religious and educational ones) serve to reinforce and expand on the lessons. This works relatively smoothly, of course, only so long as the social culture of the family is also that of the dominant society. When this is not the case, it becomes necessary for the tension created by the interaction of competing social cultures to be mediated by other social institutions, in order to ensure at least a behavioral consensus. Some of the approaches which have been proposed to deal with this tension from a culturally pluralistic standpoint will be examined in the next section of this paper.

II.

The earliest theoretical model of what might be termed CP in the United States emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century, as it became increasingly necessary to alleviate the strains placed on Anglo-American society by the vast numbers of new immigrants.¹² This model, called the "confederation of nationalities" theory,¹³ argued that different ethnic groups ought to be allowed a maximal degree of independence, and that necessary social unity could best be achieved through the interaction of relatively autonomous ethnic communities. The "confederation of nationalities" theory was justified by the belief that each ethnic group passes on certain cultural and behavioral patterns from generation to generation which are most suitable to the "innate character and needs" of its members. Such a position, as Isaac Berkson has noted,¹⁴ is fundamentally a racist one, and certainly not the sort of foundation upon which a defensible model of multicultural education could be based.

In recent years, relativism has become an increasingly popular perspective in all sorts of intellectual endeavors, and cultural relativism has had its share of this popularity. Such a position, despite its initial viability, presents a number of both practical and conceptual problems with which we need to grapple here.¹⁵

Following Kunis' account,¹⁶ it is possible for us to distinguish three sorts of cultural relativism. The first, elementary cultural relativism, argues that each ethnic or cultural group should be judged in terms of its own value system. As William Graham Sumner expressed it, "In the folkways, whatever is, is right."¹⁷ This position is problematic on a number of grounds. First, such a view is self-contradictory in that it grants exceptional, universal validity to its own premises about the desirability of non-interference,¹⁸ without providing any justification for doing so. Second, elementary cultural relativism suggests that the "rightness" or "wrongness" of an action is, at least in part, temporally determined -- that is, an action can be right today, but the same action can be wrong tomorrow. Last, this type of position results in the condemnation of any sort of moral reform, without examining the merits or flaws of the reform itself.

The second sort of cultural relativism is sophisticated cultural relativism, which is based on the belief that when differences emerge between groups in terms of judgments, social norms, or whatever, conflicting principles are equally valid, since it is not possible to

establish any one of them as right or correct. This position is, I think, virtually unassailable on a theoretical level. However, a convincing refutation of sophisticated cultural relativism can be made on the grounds that, in practice, it is both unworkable and non-human. As Lucis notes,

In any practical situation. . . the location of a particular issue on which a sophisticated relativist is willing to take a stand and give reasons should convince him that he does not really accept sophisticated relativism.¹⁹

The third kind of cultural relativism is that of empirical relativism. Empirical relativism is distinct from both elementary and sophisticated cultural relativism in that it is a descriptive, rather than a prescriptive, theoretical position. It should be noted that even if we accept empirical relativism, this in no way entails any prescriptive or prescriptivist position. Empirical relativism, therefore, really offers us no help at all in terms of either social or educational policy.

At this point, we need to begin to formulate a viable and defensible theoretical construction of CP. Indeed, until such a formulation is at least well under way, any talk of "bicultural" or "multicultural" education can result in a little more than empty rhetoric. Although it is not possible to provide a detailed analysis of the concept of CP here, we can nonetheless delineate several of the central concerns of such a theoretical position.

CP in the Anglo-American setting can be both meaningful and operational only if it is basically democratic in character, and only insofar as it is able to successfully ally itself with local communities. Pluralism imposed on local communities from the outside, and by outsiders, will not succeed; in fact, such "controlled ethnicity" is likely to have just the reverse of the desired effect. This is not, of course, to suggest that the State has no role to play in the development of cultural pluralism. Rather, what is being emphasized here is that the manifestation in praxis of CP on the local level must be in accord with the needs and desires of the community, and that the locus of power must be centered in and derived from the local community, to as great an extent as is possible.

Perhaps the most obvious (and necessary) emphasis of any theoretical elaboration of CP is the need for and desirability of diversity. The tolerance for diversity which is fundamental to any conception of CP should be understood to apply not only to cultural and linguistic diversity, but to other sorts of diversity as well — intellectual, artistic, political, ideological, and so on.²⁰ Further, this concern for diversity ought to be conceived of as being marked by a commitment to meaningful diversity rather than to what might be termed "cosmetic diversity." As a colleague of mine recently remarked, "Culture means more than tacos and pinatas."

Just as cultural pluralism must recognize the desirability of diversity, so too must it recognize both the overlap of cultural groups and interests, and the need for parameters which limit diversity. With respect to the first of these issues, it is clear that the objective, material interests of different cultural groups can be expected to be

quite similar, although clearly not identical, on a variety of social, political, and economic topics. For example, in Anglo-American society as it currently exists, the acquisition of English (and Standard English, at that) is in the interests of all cultural and ethnic groups -- though admittedly for markedly different reasons.²¹

It is, as suggested above, also important to realize that CP entails a recognition of the limits of diversity. By definition, CP would reject as untenable a feature of a culture which urged that other cultures ought to be eliminated. Further, there might well be features of a given culture which would pose problems of as serious a nature as a culturally pluralistic social order as to make their mediation or elimination a necessity. The issues of the sort intended here (sexism, racism, etc.) are of an essentially ethical nature, and the process of determining whether or not a particular problematic feature can be so dealt with must be resolved as such (that is, as an ethical issue). One possible method for resolving such a situation would be to employ a concept like that of John Rawls' "original position,"²² which would at least ensure impartiality.

Now that we have outlined (albeit somewhat superficially) CP as a theoretical construct, we are able to begin to discuss some of its pedagogical and more general educational consequences.

III.

Any reference to multicultural education entails a related position vis-a-vis the nature of the society in which it is to take place. By affirming the merit of multicultural education, one also demonstrates support for a pluralistic society. What needs to be recognized, then, is that a commitment to multicultural education logically commits us to a whole range of both educational and social objectives with respect to the question of CP and the nature of the "good society." Further, the parameters and limitations imposed on the social application of cultural pluralism can, and indeed should, be applied to the realization of multicultural education as well. These parameters and limitations, as emphasized earlier, must be decided democratically, and the power to make such decisions should be centered with those individuals or groups most directly affected.

Turning now to the pedagogical issues presented by CP, there are several questions which need to be discussed. First, multicultural education can be envisioned in a variety of ways, with quite distinct objectives and methodologies.²³ A whole continuum of programs can be imagined, ranging from those which concentrate on exposure-oriented cultural education (teaching about a culture), to those concerned with internalization-oriented cultural education (teaching in a culture). Exposure-oriented programs, which would include most of the multicultural education programs currently in operation, have as a major goal the inculcation of tolerance for the cultures of other peoples. Internalization-oriented programs, on the other hand, are interested in producing individuals who are not only tolerant of cultural differences, but who are in fact themselves "bicultural."²⁴

This raises another significant question: For whom are multicultural education programs to be designed and implemented? The response

to this query will, in turn, affect how such programs are to be implemented. If multicultural education is conceived of as desirable for all children in a pluralistic society (the position which appears to be both most desirable and tenable), then such programs ought to be integrated as completely as possible into the regular school curriculum.²⁵ If, instead, multicultural education is seen as being primarily or even exclusively directed at minority-culture children, then pull-out programs and/or special classes can be expected to develop. I would suggest that only the former position adequately reflects the fundamental character and concerns of CP. The latter is little more than a "sop," and is, at heart, based on an essentially assimilatory social theory.

In sum, what has been attempted here is to begin to formulate and lay out some of the conceptual problems surrounding both CP as a social objective, and multicultural education as a pedagogical one. The important lesson to be learned here, I think, is that without a reasonably well developed and articulated theoretical base, educational reform has little hope of either gaining support or of success in any more than a trivial sense.

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Notes

1. We need to distinguish here between this distinction (between social culture and haute culture) and that between two or more co-existent social cultures in a single socio-political entity, as in the United States today. Every social culture is likely to produce an haute culture of sorts -- but such a "culture" is far too narrow in terms of the role it plays not only in representing, but in guiding and explicating, people's lives, for it to be considered a social culture. Subgroups within a society, however, may well produce and maintain not simply variants on the social culture of the surrounding society, but rather, independent social cultures of their own. This is the case in the United States with regard to the various latino groups, the Chinese, the Amerinds, and so on. It should be noted here that the term "social culture" is being used roughly synonymously with the more common (though I believe misleading) term "anthropological culture."
2. Though, of course, the haute culture is one component of the "social culture."
3. Edward B. Tylor, Primitive Cultures (New York: Harpers, 1958, 1971), quoted in James A. Clifton, ed., Introduction to Cultural Anthropology (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1968).
4. See, for example, Basil Bernstein, Class, Codes, and Culture, Vol. 3: Towards a Theory of Educational Transmissions (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975); M. A. Hudson, Sociolinguistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), Peter Trudgill, Sociolinguistics: An Introduction (New York: Penguin, 1974).
5. Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 185. See also Horace B. Davis, Toward a Marxist Theory of Nationalism (London: Monthly Review Press, 1978).
6. For a discussion of both the conflict and the consensus theory of social order, see John Norton, "Order and Conflict Theories of Social Problems as Competing Ideologies." American Journal of Sociology LXXI (May 1966): 701-713. For an excellent analysis of the relationship between theories of social order and bilingual-bicultural education, see Christina Bratt Paulston, "Theoretical Perspectives on Bilingual Education Programs," in James E. Alatis, ed., International Dimensions of Bilingual Education (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1976), pp. 250-267.
7. "False consciousness" is, therefore, simply a "consciousness" or ideological position different from that of the speaker. It cannot, I would suggest, have any intrinsic validity conceptually.
8. For a good discussion of such a phenomenon, see Noelle Bissleret, Education, Class Language, and Ideology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979); Michel Pecheux, Language, Semantics and Ideology (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982).
9. The interaction among ideology, political economy, and schooling has been one of the major emphases of contemporary history of education.

Although this line of research was initiated by Lawrence Cremin's Transformation of the School (New York: Random House, 1961), its best articulation and development can be found, in my opinion, in the more recent Revisionist scholarship represented by such works as Clarence J. Kiser, Shaping the American Educational State: 1900 to the Present (New York: Van Nostrand, 1975); Clarence J. Kiser, et al., State of Origins (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1975); and Paul G. Violas, The Struggle of the Urban Working Class (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1978).

10. See, e.g., Marc Bried, "Education in the Clockwork Social Order," Educational Theory 28, 4 (Fall 1978): 264-278; E. Walter Ott, "The Role of the Fine Arts in the Development of Time Consciousness," Educational Theory 31, 2 (Spring 1981): 125-134.
11. See Michael Gordon, The American Family: Past, Present, and Future (New York: Random House, 1978), pp. 3-25, 125-126.
12. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, immigration came to be seen as a major social problem as the result of two changes which had taken place in the patterns of immigration. The first of these changes was the rapid increase in numbers of immigrants; the second, the shift of point of origin of most of the immigrants (from Northern and Western Europe to Southern and Eastern Europe).
13. One of the principal backers of this perspective was Randolph Bourne.
14. See Isaac B. Berkson, Theories of Americanisation: A Critical Study (New York: Teachers College Press, 1920), p. 89.
15. Of interest here is Richard A. Quants, "Concepts of Relativity in Multicultural and Multiethnic Education," Journal of Thought 19, 1 (Spring 1984): 35-48.
16. Robert H. Ennis, Logic in Teaching (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 412-417.
17. Ennis, Logic in Teaching, p. 415.
18. With respect to this same problem in linguistic relativism, see Joachim Israel, The Language of Dialectics and The Dialectics of Language (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1979), pp. 34-35.
19. Ennis, Logic in Teaching, p. 412.
20. The classic defense for such toleration is John Stuart Mill's On Liberty (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1947). Also of interest here is Wilhelm von Humboldt, Limits of State Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).
21. See Timothy Reagan, "In Defense of Prescriptivism: The Case for 'Linguistic Imperialism' in the Classroom," Journal of Research and Development in Education 17, 3 (Spring 1984): 8-11.
22. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 12.

23. See, e.g., Timothy Reagan, "Multicultural Education and Multiethnic Education: Competing Curricular Proposals," presented at the 1983 Annual Meeting of the American Educational Studies Association in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
24. See, e.g., Nicholas Appleton, Cultural Pluralism in Education: Theoretical Foundations (New York: Longman, 1985); Ricardo L. Garcia, Teaching in a Pluralistic Society (New York: Harper & Row, 1982); Donna M. Collier and Philip G. Caine, Multicultural Education in a Pluralistic Society (St. Louis: C. V. Mosby Co., 1985); Henry F. Frueba and Carol Barnett-Mizrachi, Eds., Bilingual Multicultural Education and the Professional (Rowley, MA: Newbury House, 1979).
25. See Richard Pratte, "Multicultural Education: Four Normative Arguments," Educational Theory 33, 1 (Winter 1983): 21-32.

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YOUNG CHILDREN'S KNOWING AND
THE WESTERN RATIONALITY PARADIGM

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Anyone who has spent a period of committed time in an elementary classroom must have felt the ambivalence of the contemporary educational setting. Our environments, our practices, and our problem-solving behaviors seem, on a broad view, to be stretched thin between a waiter of polarized and conflicting notions and values, an incoherence of world views, among which it is no longer possible to judge authenticity or trace meaningful continuity. We seem to receive no clear sense of underlying patterns of relationship, implicit whole constellations of meaning that guide our practice and inform our notions -- and countless daily decisions reflecting those notions -- freedom and control, emancipation and domination, agency and helplessness, order and chaos, authority and liberty.

This situation would seem to indicate that there isn't a model -- a person at whose formation educators unceasingly, and most successively, work. But I would like to suggest that there is such a person (that, indeed, there is always such a person), and that this person may be characterized most clearly in terms of an ideal of rationality. By rationality I mean that we can know and what we can't, and the goal or uses of that knowledge. I want to argue that the ideal of rationality implicit in our practice is connected with our values-chaos, and that one clue to their connection is in the notions, respectively, of "emancipation" and "autonomy" that permeate our ideal. I will claim -- using an account that is probably familiar to most -- that both these notions imply a paradigm in which effective knowing is seen to consist primarily in an act of appropriation and use, an instrumental episode is a project of increasing personal control, which demands a corresponding ethic of critique toward the traditional, stable, tacit elements of culture, and their modes of transmission. Because it presumes to offer explicit solutions to our values-chaos, I think that it is necessary to show that this rationality paradigm informs or influences not only the educational positivists of our time, but radical and liberal educationalists as well. I then want to point to the objects of our educational machinations -- children themselves -- as preliminary clues in the search for a more universal and integral paradigm.

First I must briefly, and in a highly abbreviated form, sketch an account of the foundations of "technical thinking" in the West. According to Heidegger's analysis, undertaken over many years,¹ the Western tradition is rooted in the notion that theory is the mode of our most fundamental access to reality. Dreyfus, in summarizing Heidegger, gathers up five features of theoretical thinking that he considers characteristic: objectification; the attempt to make everything explicit; decontextualisation; systematisation; and "seeing the world as a picture."² This, according to Barrett, who extends the analysis to the scientific revolution of the 17th century, is the basic formula for a rationality paradigm which is fulfilled in the "broken image," or epistemological dualism of Descartes, centuries later. Behind this paradigm Barrett reads a metaphysics of power, a relation to the object -- the world, nature (physis) -- based on separation, de-identification,

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and manipulation. In order to conquer nature and its secrets, "The will in its freedom chooses to go against nature and natural impulse." Reason becomes instrumental, a tool which, in Kant's words, "... must go before with principles of judgment according to constant laws and constrain nature to reply to its questions, not content merely to follow her leading strings."

The Western ideal of rationality becomes, then, not only an instrumental but an adversarial one. Theory, Barrett claims,

... constructs intellectual models that are contrary to the facts as these disclose themselves to immediate experience. The phenomenological congruence between ourselves and the things of nature is broken. These theories wrench men away from the world in its apparent and immediate simplicity.

The theorist challenges nature, and withdraws from the object all qualities except those relevant to the purposes of the theory. The subject's relation to the object comes to be characterized by mastery and transformation into organized, systematic modes of use.

Finally, in the 19th century the Western mode of rationality found major expression in several doctrines in which current theory, both liberal and radical, still operate. Evolutionary theory, for one, tends to legitimate not only the emphasis on rationality as an instrument of mastery and control ("survival"), but a metaphysics of change for which, on the average, higher forms emerge predictably from lower. And Marx (who offered to dedicate the second volume of Das Kapital to Darwin) -- in the politicalization of Hegel's concept of negation, and in the notion of culture as man's "nature" -- sets the scene for the replication of the antagonistic relationship between theory and the natural world in its social, political, and spiritual dimensions.

How then does this paradigm travel down into our own setting? The influence of this sort of thinking/knowing is so profound and pervasive in typical middle-class discourse that we need not go into it here. On a metastructural level, it informs what I want to call the "liberal" epistemological view. On this account -- for which a biological-evolutionary metaphor is the central theoretical underpinning -- survival (i.e., mastery, control) demands individuation and separation between knower and known as primary adaptive strategies. The healthy organism is the one continually evolving out of an original, "egocentric" identification with the environment, and through this progressive differentiation is capable of increasing control of that environment. This is the basis for the ideal of "autonomy," which has become a sort of shibboleth of liberal thought, and which presents us with the contradiction of a highly individuated, non-determined person who is produced by a highly deterministic, quasi-biological developmental process, for which the behavior of lower organisms is the model.

Given the biological metaphor, all knowing is instrumental for liberal epistemology, and its effectiveness depends on the subject's distanciation from its perceptual grounding in the world of objects. It is through increasing differentiation of the subject-object field that we build a so-called objective picture of the world. Modes or structures of identification, participation, or sympathy between subject and object

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represent, on this account, lower stages of the evolutionary process and, as such, a loss of control. Piaget, for example, characterises objectivity by its realization of

...the countless intrusions of self in everyday thought and the countless illusions which result -- illusions of sense, language, point of view, value, etc. -- the preliminary step to every judgment is the effort to exclude the intrusive self.⁹

Autonomous, objectifying man, then, masters the object by reinterpreting it reflectively. He reinterprets perceptual experience according to superordinate "operations," the harmonization of (necessarily) abstracted perspectives. By implication, we "know" the perceptual event more objectively the further we are removed from it. This is not to deny the universally accepted idea that perception itself involves abstraction -- that, in the words of Hans Jonas, "The element of encounter is balanced by one of abstraction without which sensation would not rise to perception."¹⁰ It is to deny its reification in the socially transmitted rationality paradigm of the West, where the element of encounter, of the basic unity of knower and known in a bipolar field, is dismissed as the source of "countless illusions."

The Piagetian epistemological ideal of objectivity finds its standard of rationality in the notion of formal operations, which is offered as a genetic basis for Kant's universal reason. In classic technocratic terms, it posits an object (which, after Kant, is an abstraction, a harmonization of possible perspectives on an unknowable phenomenon) without a concrete subject (or "intrusive self"). As a consequence of this epistemological set, the role of the self in knowing becomes cryptological, and its interests and concrete intuitions masked, misinterpreted, or ignored.

Piaget's Kantian ideal is replicated in moral theory by Kohlberg, who represents its influence on popular liberal world view. Its moorings in technical rationality are demonstrated by the fact -- which Carol Gilligan's recent analysis points out¹¹ -- that the higher stages in Kohlberg's system are articulated in terms of rights (forms of interdependence, participation, intimacy). The sorts of moral responses that flow out of the perception of a primordial, intersubjective unity, of the interconnectedness of things, are interpreted as evidence of a lower stage of development, a "conventional morality" based on implicit self-interest. The autonomous individual is one in whom the (instrumental) logic of self-interest has evolved into a logic of integrity and social conscience, supported by a hypothetico-deductive form of reasoning which recognises that its own self-interest is best served by recognising the interests of others, and for whom contract has replaced covenant as a political ideal.

In contrast to liberal thinking, the radical neo-Marxist view presumes to begin with a critique of the "culture of positivism." Henry Giroux for example, following Aronowitz, places negative importance on the relationship between "hegemonic rationality" or the "logic of domination," and the domination of nature implicit in Western rationality.¹² He very skillfully critiques not only the liberal form of technical thinking, but shows technical thinking's deep roots in classical Marxism. He offers us, it would appear, a new paradigm in what he calls

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"critical emancipatory rationality."¹³ I would like to suggest, however, that the implicit assumptions of technical thinking are nevertheless still informing the larger modalities of neo-Marxist thought, and that technocratic and emancipatory rationality are at root species of the same genus.

This becomes clear if we examine a more fundamental level of Marxist anthropology than is possible by simply reconsidering classical Marxism's notions of class and history. Landgrebe, in his survey of contemporary European philosophy, locates Marx's most basic assumptions within the technological paradigm; but here, post Enlightenment, man has turned theory not just on nature, but on his own "nature" as well:

While at the beginning of modern times the definition of man as animal rationale was still generally accepted, his ratio, deployed in science, was now understood as the power of gaining mastery of the world. The course of the evolution of the modern mind was thus interpreted as involving the self-realization of man by virtue of the power of his scientific reasoning. This means that man now recognizes himself as a being who is in his freedom capable of making himself 'to be what he is', and who, by virtue of his freedom, impresses his stamp upon the world by means of dominating it technologically. It was in this sense that Karl Marx could demand that man must comprehend himself as a being or essence which has the power of 'making itself'.¹⁴

Following this view, I want to argue — with C. A. Bowers, who has undertaken a rather extensive analysis of the implicit assumptions of neo-Marxist educational thought¹⁵ — that "emancipatory rationality" operates, like the purposive rationality it criticizes, according to a cultural code for which critical reflection is an obsessive implicit command. In the self-conscious will to destroy the past and control the future which it evokes, change is automatically associated with progress, and the rejection of tradition takes on an "ontological necessity." The inevitable ambiguity of the relationship between tradition and change is construed as a stranglehold held by oppressor mystagogues. This being the case, culture itself needs to be politicized — i.e., yield itself, like other elements of nature, to the manipulation and control of theory, for the purposes of the "struggle."

Such faith in the power of theory to guide and transform practice is in itself a telling indication of the presence of technical thinking. When this faith is applied not just to the conquest of the world of materiality but to the world of human relations as well we have, in Bowers' words, a culture working against itself, i.e., in which its own implicit command is to make everything explicit; in which, indeed, the tacit dimensions of culture and their modes of transmission become associated with the possibility of manipulation and oppression. Culture comes, in this narrative, to evoke the dark, ambivalent power of "nature" that has characterized it in Western thought, the nature represented by the tacit dimension itself, and its inevitable hiddenness.

The formula "science vs. common sense" by which the theorist puts nature to the rack, when applied in the cultural world, fosters a critical individualism that contradicts the neo-Marxist's ideal of collective struggle. Change comes to be associated with critique, dis-

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association, discontinuity from accepted norms, and anchored in the prejudice, typical of technical thinking, that (in Giroux's words) "critical thinking represents the ability to step beyond commonplace assumptions."¹⁶ On this account, knowledge works to "strip away unexamined reality," showing what had been interpreted as "fixed consensus. . . invariant structures" to be mystifying "social constructs." Using theory, the neo-Marxist "critically examines the patterns of thinking embedded in the texture of everyday life,"¹⁷ capitalizing, Bowers argues, on the "adversarial relationship between the critically reflective individual and tradition."¹⁸ "The end of this process," Bowers claims, "is the gradual erosion of the cultural base essential to maintaining the authority of knowledge claims, including the knowledge claim made in behalf of critical reflection."¹⁹

The neo-Marxist telos does not examine this contradiction, however, because, with classic technocratic hubris, it presumes to destroy culture's natural forms and modes of transmission -- what furious antagonism to any form of authority at all, for example, unacknowledged in the sweeping goal of the "elimination of all forms of domination?" -- and to create "new forms of social relations" in which we "go beyond created structures in order to create others."²⁰ Culture is made over in the image of theory.

In such a world of discourse, where, according to Giroux, "a new type of historical explanation suggests. . . that the present gives rise to the past,"²¹ the distinction between theory and ideology begins to blur. The "interface between knowledge, power and ideology" renders critical thinking a "fundamental political act."²² That is, theory, when applied to the human world, becomes ideology, and a new logic of power calls for the politicalization (i.e., the conformation to the theory/ideology) of all forms of social life. All knowledge becomes instrumental to the struggle, is claimed by the theory/ideology, which has become "an expression of the group's struggle to constitute its social identity,"²³ as well as a functional instrument for bringing about social change. In such a culture, which glorifies the "principle of reversal" and the "politics of marginality,"²⁴ the ability to see tradition becomes increasingly alienated, and the individual's relationship to cultural continuity increasingly problematic. The question of how culture allows for the reinterpretation of basic patterns through the expression of individuality becomes "narrow and flattened."²⁵

The neo-Marxist project is implicitly nihilistic because it is unclear in its thought whether its notion of critical emancipatory rationality is directed against the culture of positivism or against culture per se. Its critique of classical Marxist thought does nothing to alter its essential tenor, which is based on a metaphysics of transcendence through negation ("the negative as absolute represents the fundamental condition for social transformation"²⁶) and the will to power, in which the revolutionary, "as a being who in his freedom is capable of making himself 'to be what he is,'" "escapes from his own history" using theory/ideology as an instrument of critique of and disassociation from the past.

It has been widely argued that the Western paradigm, in its historical identity as the "end process of rationalization,"²⁷ is one of the major sources of the peril in which the contemporary world is

gripped. The critique of this paradigm is also extensive, and has been around in a variety of forms at least since Romanticism. Thinkers of our century like -- to name only a handful -- Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, Buber, Marcel, Polanyi, Macmurray -- have in all their diversity been attacking the same epistemological roadblock in the Western imagination; and all but the most presumptuous of these recognize that to offer some sort of program or overarching scheme for escape from the paradigm is simply to reinforce it further, and to further trap oneself in what Heidegger called "metaphysical" thinking.

There has also arisen, since the turn of the century, a tradition of examining alternative modes of rationality to the adult Western Enlightenment variety: how "natives" think, or psychotics, or children, or artists. As far as children's thinking/knowing goes, this investigation was actually inaugurated one hundred years before, during the Romantic period, when, as Judith Flots has pointed out, "a vision of the child's unconscious psychic harmony" came to play a major role in the age's developmental ideal.²⁸ We already have, then, a rich hermeneutic of the child in Coleridge and Wordsworth, with clear and powerful formulations of "affective thought" and the "unitary mode of perception," accompanied by remarkably sophisticated thinking about the educational implications that follow from an investigation of children's knowing whose basic hermeneutical prejudice is informed by an ideal of the "retention, the development, the continuity from the childhood to the adult self."²⁹

More recently, this project is implicitly present in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, which is concerned to recover in perception itself a "nascent logos," or pre-reflective, unitary drive for significance. Following Husserl, Merleau-Ponty's concept of intentionality sheds the instinctual, biologicistic cast that characterizes its interpretation as a phenomenon of something like "species survival" or "enhancement of the organism," and assumes the aspect more of a drive for a communicative unity of meaning that transcends organic and utilitarian purpose. His lectures on the psychology of infants and young children³⁰ represent an important phase in a search for a formulation of rationality that includes sympathetic and participative elements, a "variety of comprehension altogether more radical than reflective thought."³¹ He says:

In reality, it must be the case that the child's outlook is in some way vindicated against the adult's and against Piaget, and that the unsophisticated thinking of our earliest years remains as an indispensable acquisition underlying that of maturity. . . .³²

Merleau-Ponty's pursuit of a "primordial cogito"³³ is a philosophy of "incarnation," wherein self and world are inseparably (and ambiguously) given to each other is, certainly, one important element in a more universal rationality paradigm; and it is significant that the young child plays such a key role in its formulation. Merleau-Ponty's work would seem to suggest that our contacts with children can give us important insights into our fundamental knowing-structures, insights that return us to an original understanding of the Greek word *theoria*. Gadamer speaks of "the idea of sacral communion which lies behind the original Greek idea of *theoria*" as a being present to things, a total involvement in what one contemplates to the point of "being outside

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oneself," here taken, rather than as a kind of madness, as "the positive possibility of being wholly with something else."³⁴ This is the root, it has been argued, of the religious element in the Greek idea of reason, and is not to be thought of as a subjectivism, but rather a self-opening to what is truly real, and as such the basis for the Western ideal of objectivity.

Gadamer calls this sort of sacramental knowing "aesthetic experience," and claims that it

represents the essence of experience itself. . . . An aesthetic experience always contains the experience of an infinite whole. Precisely because it does not combine with others to make one open experiential flow, but immediately represents the whole, its significance is infinite.³⁵

The investigations of Piaget, Werner and Bruner into young children's perceptual and ratiocinative modes show them to exemplify aesthetic experience. Werner characterises young children's knowing as "imagistic," "figural," "global," "participative."³⁶ The young child tends to live in the unity of the perceptual world and to grasp, in that unity, a sense of the significance of the whole that critical, instrumental consciousness forfeits; forfeits, to a great extent, because it requires an attitude not of separation and domination but of dependence and belonging, of the sacramental sense of the world as known in its inherent significance through identification and communion, which in turn implies a positive relationship to the tradition -- and I use this word in the rich sense with which Gadamer imbues it -- that mediates our knowing. "True intentionality," Merleau-Ponty says, "belongs to its object rather than posits it."³⁷

A philosophical study of the young child promises to clarify for us that "master light of all our seeing" at the depths of our knowledge of the world, which in its intentional structure is a drive for communion, an intimation of high significance, of a meaning that inheres in perception itself, an apprehension of living unity and interconnection, the Stoic *sympatheia ton holon* which, although we find him everywhere developing out of its dominance, is yet the sign of the young child. In the adult it forms what Bachelard has called the "nucleus of childhood," that "well of being," an unmediated *corito*, a total presentness to the world anterior to reflective consciousness.³⁸

If we accept the presence and the value of this primordial knowledge, and recognize its manifestations and perceptual modalities in the child (the young child especially, but middle and late childhood as well), then we must recognize the extent to which our ideal of rationality -- as profoundly geared as it is towards use, dominance, conflict and negation, and the so called liberation of individuals from cultural formation, i.e., the transcendence of the isolated overcomer who "makes himself" -- contradicts these fundamental aesthetic-epistemological structures. This seems to be true to the point that we have lost contact not only with the physical environment (e.g., pollution, and the profound alienation of public space) and the political environment (the threat of nuclear war), but with the world of children as well, as a rash of recent books points out.³⁹ We must ask whether the ideal of rationality -- and by impli-

cation the person at whose formation we, as educators, labor -- represented by liberal and radical theory is not misguided and incomplete, missing in fact any emphasis on that sacramental sense that lies at the basis of our knowledge of the world and of others, and the reversal of fundamental ontological assumptions that implies. If this is so, then perhaps the first place to look for the knowledge we have excluded is in the child -- and not only the child, but our own childhood. Such a look might help lead us back into a relationship with tradition that will foster rather than destroy our chances for collective survival and enhancement as a civilisation. The Enlightenment quest for "emancipation" from tradition and its correlative ideal, the "autonomous" person, no longer seem to have the power to do that.

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Notes

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2. H. L. Dreyfus, "Knowledge and Human Values: A Genealogy of Nihilism," Teachers College Record, 82:3 (Spring 1981): 510-11.
3. William Barrett, The Illusion of Technique (New York: Doubleday, 1978), p. 128.
4. Quoted in Martin Heidegger, "Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics," in Basic Writings, ed. D. F. Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 265 (translator's note).
5. Barrett, Illusion of Technique, p. 200.
6. See for example George Levine, "Darwin and the Problem of Authority," in Raritan: A Quarterly Review (Winter 1984).
7. See for example Alvin W. Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (New York: Seabury, 1979).
8. A world, however, which is (after Kant) ultimately unknowable "in itself."
9. Jean Piaget, The Child's Conception of the World (London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1929), p. 34.
10. Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 168.
11. Carol Gilligan, "Woman's Place in Man's Life Cycle," Harvard Educational Review, 49:4 (November 1979): 431-446.
12. See, for example, H. Giroux, "Marxism and Schooling: The Limits of Radical Discourse," Educational Theory 34:2 (Spring 1984): 113-136.
13. See H. Giroux, "Critical Theory and Rationality in Citizenship Education," Curriculum Inquiry 10:4 (Winter 1980): 329-366.
14. Ludwig Landgrebe, Major Problems in Contemporary European Philosophy: Dilthey to Heidegger (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1966), p. 191.
15. See C. A. Bowers, "Culture Against Itself: Nihilism as an Element of Recent Educational Thought," unpublished paper, 1984. Also, "Locating the Ideological Foundations of a Radical Pedagogy," Teachers College Record 83:4 (Summer 1982): 529-557; "The Problem of Individualism and Community in Neo-Marxist Educational Thought," Ibid 85:3 (Spring 1983): 365-390; and "Cultural Invasion of Paulo Freire's Pedagogy," Ibid 84:4 (Summer 1983): 935-954.
16. H. Giroux, "Schooling and the Culture of Positivism: Notes on the Death of History," Educational Theory 29:4 (Fall 1979): 282.

17. Bowers, "Culture Against Itself. . .," p. 20.
18. Ibid., p. 22.
19. Bowers, "The Problem of Individualism and Community. . .," p. 388.
20. Giroux, "Marxism and Schooling. . .," p. 130; and "Schooling and the Culture of Positivism. . .," p. 282.
21. Giroux, "Marxism and Schooling. . .," p. 122.
22. Giroux, "Schooling and the Culture of Positivism. . .," p. 282.
23. Giroux, "Marxism and Schooling. . .," p. 129.
24. Ibid., p. 122.
25. Bowers, "Culture Against Itself. . .," p. 19.
26. Giroux, "Marxism and Schooling. . .," p. 119.
27. See Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1976).
28. Judith Plots, "The Perpetua Messiah: Romanticism, Childhood, and the Paradoxes of Human Development, in Regulated Children/Liberated Children, ed. Barbara Finkelstein (New York: Psychohistory Press, 1979).
29. Ibid., p. 81.
30. Only two are currently available in English. See "The Child's Relations with Others," in The Primacy of Perception, ed. J. M. Edie (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964); and Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language, ed. N. Silverman (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973). For the rest, see Bulletin de Psychologie, n. 236, tome XVIII 3-6, Novembre, 1964.
31. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 365.
32. Ibid., p. 355.
33. Merleau-Ponty, Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language, p. 41.
34. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Crossroad, 1975), p. 111.
35. Ibid., p. 63.
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37. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 446.

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38. Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Reverie: Childhood, Language, and the Cosmos (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 98-141.
39. See for example, Neil Postman, The Disappearance of Childhood (New York: Delacorte Press, 1962); John Burt Foster, The Rise and Fall of Childhood (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982); Valerie F. Suransky, The Erosion of Childhood (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); and M. Vior, Children Without Childhood (New York: Pantheon Books, 1961).

ARE DICK & JANE DIFFERENT MORAL BEINGS?:
AN INQUIRY INTO SEX-SPECIFIC MORALITY
AND SOME EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

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Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to raise some educational questions with respect to research in sex differences in moralizing. The paramount educational question is whether significant differences exist between males and females with respect to the way they identify or resolve moral issues. What makes this question educationally relevant is the fact that, if sex differences are identified through research inquiry, then there is clearly a need for the moral education curriculum to reflect these differences.

In order to investigate this issue the paper follows two courses. First, it reviews and critiques research dealing with the question of sex differences in moral reasoning. In particular it looks at work by Carol Gilligan on this issue. Next it draws some conclusions based on these findings with respect to moral education in public schools in order to determine what impact thought and research concerning sex-specific moral reasoning has upon the pedagogy of moral development.

Gilligan's Position

In summarizing the reassessment of the last decade which has occurred both in education and developmental psychology, Gilligan questions the negative consequences which could obtain as a result of the exclusion of women from the research samples:

...if the criteria for development are derived from studies of males, and these criteria are then used to measure the development of females, the question being asked is how much like men do women develop.¹

It was the recognition of this exclusion that prompted Gilligan to, as she puts it "demonstrate how the group left out in the construction of theory calls attention to what is missing in its account."²

As a response to this recognition of difference, Gilligan and her associates began in 1976 to study the way people resolve "real-life" moral dilemmas. Typically, these dilemmas pivot on the antagonism or opposition between notions of care for the self. The responses compiled by Gilligan et al. have lead her to stipulate that there is an orientation of care and responsibility which is not contained in the justice orientations in Kohlberg's standard hypothetical dilemmas. Gilligan (1982) and Lyons (1982) have formulated several general characteristics of moral responsiveness that reflect their observations of sex differences in the way in which men and women "construct the relation between self and others." A synopsis of key features of these follows.

In collecting interview data Gilligan and Lyons began to note a "psychological necessity," which they regarded as related to the

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interests and needs of the other. Further, this necessity was different than moral obligation, but related to it. Specifically, the psychological necessity concerns "the psychological or emotional pressures that an actor may feel in the midst of a moral dilemma."⁴

What Gilligan means by this "other" involves considering the particular context of the dilemma. Here, in whatever fashion, the needs of the "other" are responded to in their own terms. As Gilligan says it, the needs and feelings of the other compel the actor to respond.⁵ It is important to note that a moral judgment as Gilligan conceives it, would involve meeting the other's needs even though they may not be based upon a right or a claim. The important factor in the response to a dilemma, then, is human connectedness. Nona Lyons has elaborated upon this point.⁶ Lyons stressed that the actor may regard human relationships as intrinsically valuable, and that their content is oriented toward consideration of bonds of loyalty, love and trust.

In a similar vein, this caring and responsibility orientation stresses the context-related quality of the response. The actor may begin to think in concrete terms about the dilemma, which could lead them to narratively account the dilemma. In resolving the dilemma in this manner the actor may entertain different approaches, involving elements of compromise and communication. The actor may also react by saying that the dilemma is relative to a particular concrete situation. This will create difficulty in their responding with a prescriptive, or "should," reply. Interviewers, Lyons and Gilligan point out, have often assessed these types of response from females as being highly abstract or nebulous.

Regarding "should" judgments or "would" judgments, Gilligan and Lyons believe that female respondents will often speculate as to what the person(s) in the dilemma actually would do in response to their predicament. They, therefore, tend to view the resolution to the dilemma in terms of rightness questions, and are more impelled by a consideration of psychological necessity than by considerations of moral sufficiency reflected in a "should," or prescriptive response.

This approach's emphasis is upon the actor's awareness of the interwoven networks of community between the characters in the dilemma. As a result, the actor also carries an "existential" awareness of what the protagonist in the dilemma really can do to ameliorate the difficulties in the dilemma. The actor is able to recognize the "necessary limits of universalistic responsibility in a world full of suffering."⁷

The caring orientation, as summarized above, is used more often by females. For example, Lyons cites findings for one study where all females presented considerations of response, with 37% failing to mention considerations involving rights. Interestingly, all of the males displayed rights-type considerations, with 36% of the males totally omitting response-type considerations.⁸ With respect to the two orientations, the Lyons study concludes that, in responding to real-life moral dilemmas "individuals in this sample call upon and think about both care and justice considerations but use predominantly one mode which is related to but not defined to or confined to an individual by virtue of gender."⁹

Authors such as Gertrude Nunner-Winkler, have critiqued Gilligan's postulation of two moralities. I will now consider Nunner-Winkler's position with respect to Gilligan's two approaches to morality.

Nunner-Winkler provides a useful theoretical schema for interpreting Gilligan's suggestion that two moralities (an ethic of justice and an ethic of care) occur in human moralising. Nunner-Winkler's claim is that rather than there being two distinct ethical positions (as Gilligan's work implies), there are two types of ethical duties which can account for both rights and responsibility and justice and care.

Prior to illustrating how these two types of ethical duties may be useful in disavowing the argument for distinctive moralities, I will summarise Nunner-Winkler's adaptation of the two types of ethical duties.

Following a Kantian distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, which was expounded upon by B. Gert (*The Moral Rules*, 1973), Nunner-Winkler proposes that Gilligan's ethic of care (1977) can be viewed as involving imperfect duties, while the ethic of justice essentially involves perfect duties.¹⁰ Before considering the plausibility of Nunner-Winkler's proposal, I will present her conception of perfect and imperfect duties.

Nunner-Winkler quite legitimately takes perfect duties to consist of duties of omission, such as "do not harm others," "do not lie," etc., and imperfect duties to consist of positive duties of commission, such as "help others in need," and so on. In expanding upon the distinction between the two types of ethical duties she notes that:

Perfect duties, because they require only not (author's emphasis) to act, can at least in non-conflictual cases, be followed by everybody at any time and location and with regard to everybody (Gert, 1973). Imperfect duties, on the other hand, can never be observed completely. . . Positive maxims do not define limits of their applications, do not specify which and how many good deeds have to be performed and whom they are to benefit so that the maxim can be said to have been followed.¹¹

Thus, meeting the maxims of imperfect duties entails what Kant called *Urteilkraft*, or a power of judgment, as Nunner-Winkler recognises.

Her central point, however, is that Gilligan's ethic of care arises from a concern with imperfect duties, such as caring for others, feeling for others, and so on. In contrast, the justice ethic can be regarded as orienting toward individual's rights and their protection. Maintaining these rights, which at the level of principled morality are considered to have universal significance (such as the right to life), closely corresponds to obeying perfect duties.

Such a treatment of the two moral orientations hypothesised by Gilligan provides Nunner-Winkler (and those who find her accounts of the two moral orientations to be cogent) with a constructive theoretical schema. It is constructive because it could seal the rift between the characteristic male and female approaches Gilligan has brought to attention. For, if as Nunner-Winkler suggests, females tend to respond

to imperfect duties more than males (who tend to advocate the regarding of perfect duties), then there is no necessary difference of ethical position between the two moral approaches. They can be treated, rather, as variations in moral character and moral action.¹¹

I take Munner-Winkler's argument to be a compelling account of the differences in male and female approaches to issues involving moral conflict. An important payoff for the issue examined in this paper is the assumption that male and female approaches, when seen as a result of following perfect and imperfect duties, do not entail separate ethical orientations. What this implies for moral education is that it may not be necessary to ground pedagogies for males and females upon different ethical theories or systems. It also weakens Gilligan's contention that the ethic of rights excludes contextual or situational specifics that the ethic of care takes into consideration. In fact, obeying perfect duties, especially in cases of conflict with other perfect or imperfect duties, can require the consideration of contextual features of a specific situation. The imperfect duty of protecting another from being injured could cancel out the injunction or perfect duty to be honest in some concrete instance, for example. It seems likely that the need to pay attention to concrete and specific features of moral dilemmas is a requisite for obeying both perfect and imperfect duties.

Thus, rather than suggesting that male and female orientations to moralising or resolving moral conflicts entail use of disparate moral or ethical systems, the above suggests that "typical" male and female approaches to moral issues may be two sides to the same moral coin. The recognition that both orientations need to take into account situational aspects in formulating moral judgments implies that they also share an important feature of moral decision making or judgment.

Moral education needs to be sensitive to these points. If, as stated above, the type of sex-specific differences in moralising do not result from intrinsic differences in ethical orientations or positions, there is support for unitary approaches to moral education. While this line of reasoning indicates that male and female moral reasoning does not require separate, disparate ethical bases, the differences between sexes are nonetheless real and deserve pedagogical recognition. For instance, moral educators should be aware of the characteristic sex-differences in moralising noted in this paper and recognise the moral legitimacy of both approaches. Furthermore, the educator should view both moral orientations as desirable goals for students to reach. That is, the female orientation should no more be "forced" upon female students than the male orientation should be promoted in boys and men.

Rather, it would be prudent for the educator to promote the ethical orientation which best suits the natural proclivities of the particular student, regardless of their sex. It is the case that some males prefer the "female" or caring orientation as their moral imperative and vice versa. In addition to this, moral educators would do well to encourage an integration of the two orientations in individuals in order to maximise their moral development. Gilligan enjoins such an approach in stating that "Development for both sexes would therefore seem to entail an integration of rights and responsibilities through the discovery of the complementarity of these disparate views."¹² It seems that the

best arena for this integration to occur is in coeducational classroom moral education, where students have opportunities to listen to and take the perspectives and views of others.

I have tried in this paper to present findings from recent research into sex-specific differences in moralising and to then determine whether these findings make a case for different approaches to moral education along the lines of sex. The results of the investigation have suggested that while there are different orientations to moral issues by males and females, there is no need to ground a pedagogy of moral education upon two distinct types of normative judgments. Rather, the paper has built a case for complementary orientations toward moral issues and conflicts that emerge from the same normative ethical basis.

Finally, it has proposed that moral education should be informed by this hypothesis and provide pedagogy that takes account of the sex differences in moralising at the same time that it seeks to integrate the two approaches in individuals in order to foster a maximum of moral development.

Afterword

Since moralising is an important human activity outside of schools, the issue of sex-specific differences should be treated there as well. For example, as women increasingly enter traditional male arenas such as politics, there is need to understand what differences and similarities exist between the sexes in terms of approaches to and resolution of moral conflicts and problems. In this area and others, the goal should be to understand that while definite differences occur on the basis of sex, it is necessary to both recognise the contributions of each approach and to realise that they both can be useful in solving shared human problems. Other institutions should aim to foster and benefit to the largest degree possible from the contributions that males and females can make toward solving collective problems.

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Notes

1. Carol Gilligan, "New Maps of Development: New Visions of Maturity," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 52, No. 2 (1982), p. 200.
2. Ibid., pp. 200-201.
3. Ibid., p. 201.
4. Lawrence Kohlberg, Charles Levine, & Alexandra Newer, Moral Stages: The Current Formulation of Kohlberg's Theory and a Response to Critics, Unpubl. Monograph Harvard University, 1983, p. 330.
5. Ibid., pp. 330-331.
6. Cf., Mona Lyons, "Manual for Coding Real-Life Dilemmas," MS. Harvard University, 1981.
7. Lawrence Kohlberg, Charles Levine, & Alexandra Newer, Moral Stages: The Current Formulation of Kohlberg's Theory and a Response to Critics, Unpubl. Monograph Harvard University, 1983, p. 332.
8. Mona Plessner Lyons, "Two Perspectives: On Self, Relationships and Morality," Harvard Educational Review, 53 No. 2 (1983), p. 139.
9. Ibid., p. 139.
10. Gertrude Munner-Winkler, "Two Moralities: A Critical Discussion of an Ethic of Care & Responsibility Versus an Ethic of Rights and Justice," in Morality, Moral Behavior and Moral Development, ed., William Kurtines and Jacob Gewirtz (NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1984), p. 349.
11. Ibid., p. 349.
12. Ibid., p. 350.
13. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 100.

COMPARING FACULTY:
THE CONCEPT OF 'PEER' IN HIGHER EDUCATION

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In Scaling the Ivory Tower Lionel Lewis summarized ten years of research by concluding that a faculty member's ability to get along and not make waves was more important to career advancement than academic performance.¹ An unprecedented interest in faculty evaluation has arisen since Lewis' book was published in 1975.² Prior to this time, and especially during the golden years of the 1960's, finding and keeping faculty was a bigger problem than evaluating them.³ Moreover, due to the security and mobility typical of this period, faculty relegated evaluation to a bothersome but largely unimportant task.⁴ Declining enrollments and financial resources coupled with increasing operational costs during the 1970's changed all this and brought faculty evaluation to the attention of not only the faculty, but also administrators, and even state legislators.⁵ Even if the economic conditions that caused this situation change, it is unlikely that faculty evaluation will return to the neglected status it occupied prior to 1975.⁶ Thus, it is important for faculty, and especially analytic philosophers, to examine some of the basic concepts and arguments in the evaluation process and attempt to make it as clear and rational as possible.

The most common recommendation in the literature on faculty evaluation is that the review process should be criterion rather than norm-based.⁷ That is, writers commonly suggest that faculty should be evaluated on their performance as measured against clear criteria (e.g., the minimum number of refereed publications to qualify for a merit pay increase shall be three per year) as opposed to comparing faculty to each other (e.g., merit pay shall be awarded only to the top 10% of the faculty in each department). However, most universities have designed their evaluation guidelines and criteria to reflect the maximum possible vagueness. For example, the statements below are the official criteria utilized in making tenure decisions at Illinois State University:

1. Consideration for tenure is predicated upon receipt of a terminal degree or its equivalent in the discipline, as determined by the appropriate Department and College, together with other professional qualifications and accomplishments, including teaching competence, in the candidate's field of academic endeavor.
2. There must be evidence of continuing high-quality professional performance during the probationary period with emphasis upon teaching (including student reactions to teaching performance), research, and service as mutually supportive activities. It is also understood that when tenure is awarded, there is an expectation for continued high-quality performance.
3. The candidate's competencies must be in keeping with the long range goals of the Department and the University if tenure is to be recommended.

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4. The candidate must have demonstrated the capability to work responsibly and knowledgeably toward the goals of the Department and the University.

Promotion policies exhibit even greater vagueness; the primary criterion being that "The candidate's professional activities should be significant enough to warrant promotion." Whether such vagueness is desirable or undesirable is a complex issue -- involving questions of due process, professional judgment, academic freedom, and institutional autonomy. However, the issue here is not the desirability but simply the existence of vagueness in faculty evaluation guidelines and criteria. The widespread use of vague policies (Illinois State's are typical) makes criterion-based evaluation virtually impossible. It is impossible to conduct criterion-based evaluation without clear criteria. One reason that criterion-based talk receives so much lip-service is that it serves as a buffer to reduce the inevitable tensions surrounding direct comparison of colleagues. That is, if evaluators talk as if they make criterion-based decisions (even if they are in fact norm-based), then they can avoid direct comparisons and the resulting vitriolic disagreements. In any event, even if no one will admit it, it is likely that because of vague criteria norm-based evaluation is in practice more common -- most evaluators just don't know what else to do. While it may be desirable to strive in the long run for clearer criteria in order to make criterion-based evaluation viable, in the short run faculty evaluation may benefit more from clarifying norm-based concepts. The purpose of this paper is to address the central question in norm-based faculty evaluation: "To whom should professors be compared when they are being evaluated?" or to rephrase this in the language of higher education, "Who are Professor X's peers when he/she is being evaluated?"

In his 1979 OVPES Presidential Address, "Peers, Experts, and Fair Judges: Some Questions about the Evaluation of Professors," Gerald Reagan discusses the question "Who are Professor X's peers?" in the context of "Which professors are qualified to evaluate Professor X?" He identifies five possible answers:

1. The "We're all in this together" answer: All faculty members at Professor X's institution are his peers. A variation of this answer would be a specification of some institution-wide sub-set, e.g., all tenured professors or all full professors or all faculty members holding equal or higher rank.
2. The organisational unit answer: Professor X's peers are the other professors in his department (or division or college or some other academic unit). There could be a number of variations of this answer: i.e., X's peers might be identified as tenured members of the department or members of the department with equal or higher faculty rank, etc.
3. The "shared expertise" answer: Professor X's peers are other professors at her/his institution who share her/his field of subject matter expertise. The academic peers of an astronomy professor are other professors of astronomy. Variations include larger groups (other professors of

science) and smaller groups (other professors of astrophysics).

4. The "working colleague" answer: Professor X's peers are those colleagues with whom X works closely and/or who are in a position which makes them especially knowledgeable about X's work. This group could be the same as that picked out using either the organisational unit criterion or the shared subject matter speciality criterion, but it need not be. The "working colleague" criterion at some institutions might include as X's colleagues those who have worked with him in inter-disciplinary studies or on committees, etc.
5. The "external expert" answer: Professor X's academic peers are those who share or excel in his field of subject matter expertise but who are not necessarily institutional colleagues. Thus it might be claimed that X's academic peers are other professors of astronomy, not necessarily at X's institution but wherever they may be found.¹⁰

While Reagan has at least partially clarified the concept of 'peer' by outlining several possible referent groups for 'peer reviewers' much remains to be said about "peer reviewees." That is, one of the most common sources of confusion in the faculty evaluation process is the identification of the appropriate referent group (i.e., peers) with which to compare the performance of the professor being evaluated.

Let us take the case of a typical assistant professor who is applying for tenure and promotion. Who are the peers to whom the reviewees' credentials are to be compared? The possibilities are quite numerous. For example, our typical reviewees could be compared to any of the groups below:

1. Other assistant professors
2. Other assistant professors eligible for tenure
3. Other assistant professors eligible for promotion
4. Other assistant professors eligible for tenure and promotion
5. Other assistant professors currently applying for tenure
6. Other assistant professors currently applying for promotion
7. Other assistant professors currently applying for tenure and promotion
8. Other recently tenured professors (regardless of rank)
9. Other recently promoted associate professors (regardless of tenure)
10. Other recently tenured and promoted associate professors

11. Other tenured professors (recent or otherwise and regardless of rank)
12. Other associate professors (recent or otherwise and regardless of tenure)
13. Other tenured associate professors
14. Other associate and full professors (those at and above the rank being applied for)
15. Other tenured associate and full professors
16. Other assistant and associate professors (those at and below the rank being applied for)
17. Other professors regardless of rank and tenure in any of the areas below:
 - a. the same subject matter specialty (e.g., astronomy) in the same department
 - b. The same department
 - c. the same college
 - d. the same university
 - e. the same subject matter specialty in comparable departments in comparable universities.
 - f. comparable departments in comparable universities
 - g. comparable colleges in comparable universities
 - h. comparable universities
 - i. the same subject matter specialty in all universities
 - j. comparable departments in all universities
 - k. comparable colleges in all universities
 - l. all universities

The schema above contains 204 (17x12) different comparison groups against which to measure our typical reviewee. This helps explain the confusion and disagreement surrounding many faculty evaluation decisions. The following "discussion" exemplifies this point and should sound familiar to anyone who has served on faculty evaluation committees.

Professor A: This meeting is called to order. Our first order of business is to decide on Professor X who is applying for tenure and promotion to associate professor. Anyone have any reactions?

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Professor B: I'm in favor of both. He's the best young person we've hired lately. (comparison group 1B)

Professor A: (Nods thoughtfully)

Professor C: Even if that were true, which is doubtful, I think we could do better because of the market. Isn't that true, Professor A? (1L)

Professor A: Well, that is quite possibly true. . . .

Professor D: If we don't give X tenure we will be guilty of inconsistency. Look at who we tenured last year. Weren't you on that committee with me, Professor A? (8B)

Professor A: Uh, yes, I was. . . .

Professor E: Professor B is right. Times have changed. We have to forget about last year and look to the future. (1L)

Professor A: (Nods thoughtfully)

Professor B: This is my first year on this committee, so I don't know about last year. But X's credentials are comparable to other people in his field. (17A)

Professor A: (Nods thoughtfully)

Professor C: But that is a notoriously weak field. He wouldn't get tenure if he were in my field. You've been around Professor A. What about other institutions? (17L)

Professor A: Well, he wouldn't get tenure at Harvard but he would at many other places. And he certainly would have gotten tenure here without much trouble ten years ago. (17K, 11H, 8D)

Professor E: Maybe it's time we raised our standards.

Professor A: (Stares blankly at the table)

Professor D: It's easy for you to say that, Professor E, but I notice that X has published more than you and Professor C have in your entire combined careers. (17B)

Professor A: (Frowns at the table)

Professor C: That's irrelevant. Times have changed. I might be in favor of promoting him on those grounds, but not tenure.

Professor A: (Lights his pipe slowly)

Professor D: If we don't give X tenure, we'll have to deny tenure to everyone who's applying this year and probably for the next few years. He is the best of the lot. (LB)

Professor A: (Puffs on his pipe)

Professor B: Maybe we should give him tenure, but not promote him until his credentials are comparable to candidates in stronger fields like Professor C's. Would that satisfy your desire for higher standards, Professor E?

Professor A: (Looking hopefully at Professor E)

Professor E: No, but I'd like to hear what Professor A thinks about that.

Professor A: Well, I believe we've run out of time today. Let's meet again tomorrow at the same time.

What conclusions can be drawn from the "discussion" above? First and most obviously, the fact that there are so many potential referent groups against which to compare a reviewee helps to explain why there is so much confusion in the review process. As the discussion above illustrates, and as anyone who has been involved as a reviewee or a reviewer knows, many committee members operate under different assumptions. Trying to get one's supporters elected to the review committee is probably the most common strategy employed by reviewees. It is no wonder that Lewis found that getting along is more important to career advancement than academic performance.

One possible alternative, then, would be to indicate in advance (preferably at the time of hiring) which comparison group will be used in the review process. This sounds simple enough, but getting university-wide agreement about which is the appropriate group would be difficult. As one campus wag observes, "It is easier to move a graveyard than to move a university senate." This is an even more complex problem at those institutions which have more than one level of review (i.e., department/college/university). In fact, it may make some sense to utilize different comparison groups at different levels. There are institutions, no doubt, which operate in just this manner.

If the problem of identifying an appropriate comparison group is limited to the departmental level, there are still no easy answers. There are good reasons for choosing any of the groups previously outlined, and it seems likely that in practice they are all used at various institutions. Indeed, it is not improbable to suppose that different departments in the same university use different groups just as different individuals in the same department favor different groups. Even the same individual might use different groups at different times (e.g., one could shift because of the prospect of getting a better or less threatening tenured faculty, or because of changes in the percentage of already tenured faculty, etc.)

Whether consistency can or should be achieved across organizational units and levels is an issue which generates many perplexing questions. For example, should a university strive for the same degree of quality control in established vs. developing colleges? Should a college strive for the same standards in all departments? Should a state-wide higher education system strive for similar standards among its constituent institutions? Given a choice, most systems and institutions have chosen diversity over uniformity in the hopes that it will result in increased flexibility. In an age of increasing litigation, however, it is unclear whether there will continue to be a choice. That is, the time may be coming when an unsuccessful reviewee in one department will question, in court, the discrepancies in standards of other departments/colleges/universities. Perhaps the most reasonable position is the one favoring autonomy and diversity. After all, departmental and institutional missions vary and it therefore seems reasonable for standards to vary accordingly.

One facet of the rivalry inherent in the evaluation process bears special examination. In the past it has been common to utilize comparison groups such as LOB in the above schema (i.e., recent precedents in his/her own department) in tenure/promotion decisions. That is, a prospective reviewee would look to recent and not-so-recent precedents in his/her own department. Moreover, since in the past the chances of success were fairly high, there was no great sense of rivalry. Successful reviewees could afford to be charitable to their reviewers and vice versa. Collegial relationships were likely to survive the evaluation process relatively unscathed. Today, it is not uncommon for reviewees to still assume that the appropriate comparison group is LOB. Because of the recent economic and demographic changes in higher education outlined at the beginning of this paper, however, it is more common today for reviewers to utilize LOD (recently tenured associate professors at comparable universities around the country) and to interpret "comparable" in an increasingly inflated manner. Sometimes this line of argument is used to establish an "ideal" peer which makes it virtually impossible for any mere mortal to look good in comparison. Thus, it is all too common for the reviewee to consider the performance of senior departmental colleagues as benchmarks while they will admit nothing of the kind, and in fact point to the tight job market as a reason to raise standards considerably higher than when the reviewers were reviewed. The potential for misunderstanding and conflict is obvious. When the chances for success are extremely limited and the credentials of most of the reviewers are clearly inferior to the credentials of the reviewee, acrimony is likely. Moreover, this is precisely the sort of invidious situation that can affect an entire department. Indeed, much has been written about the current low status of morale throughout higher education due in part to situations like the one just described.¹¹

So far, we have been concerned only with tenure and promotion decisions within the review process. In the past these decisions took up the majority of a review committee's agenda. Today, while tenure/promotion decisions are receiving great scrutiny, salary decisions are becoming a still bigger issue. With faculty at most institutions losing real earning power every year, the scramble for dollars is taken more and more seriously. Moreover, because of reduced mobility and public disclosure of salaries at many institutions, faculty are beginning to

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squabble among themselves whenever a review committee makes salary decisions. (A colleague of mine suggests that professors take this issue so seriously because there is so little at stake.)¹² In any event, just as it is possible to use different comparison groups for promotion (e.g., other professors at the rank being applied for) and tenure (e.g., other tenured professors), it is also possible to use yet another group for salary decisions. For example, it is sometimes argued that when it comes to salary decisions, there is a limited amount in the departmental pot and "we are all in this together." Thus, the argument continues, beginning assistant professors should be competing with everyone else including established full professors for salary raises. Again, one thing that might help is for departments to spell out in advance exactly how decisions are going to be made. If different comparison groups are going to be used for promotion, tenure, and salary decisions, then at least the reviewees should be made aware of this fact. Moreover, the reviewers should at least agree among themselves about which group to use in which situation.

In summary, there is a great deal of confusion surrounding faculty evaluation and much of it is due to the ambiguity inherent in the concept of 'peer.' A first step in remedying this situation is to specify in advance which comparison group(s) will be used during the evaluation. That choice should be guided by 1) organisational mission, 2) decision level (departmental, college, institution), 3) decision context (appointment, promotion, tenure, salary). The end result may be a very complex web of different comparison groups in different situations. But at least the situation is avoided where reviewees and reviewers alike are operating under different assumptions about which comparison group(s) is the appropriate one to utilise.

Notes

1. Lionel S. Lewis, Scaling the Ivory Tower (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1975).
2. There was some interest in faculty evaluation in the 1920's and 1930's and again in the late 1940's and early 1950's but not nearly to the degree exhibited in the 1970's. See Richard I. Miller, Developing Programs for Faculty Evaluation (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974), p. 1.
3. John A. Centra, Determining Faculty Effectiveness (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1979).
4. Sandra Fay Mark, "Faculty Evaluation Systems: A Research Study of Selected Community Colleges in New York State" (New York: Faculty Council of Community Colleges, State University of New York, 1977), p. 23, ED 158 809.
5. Miller, Developing Programs for Faculty Evaluation, p. 3.
6. Neal Whitman and Elaine Weiss, Faculty Evaluation: The Use of Explicit Criteria for Promotion, Retention, and Tenure, AAHE-ERIC/Higher Education Research Report No. 2, 1982 (Washington, D.C.: American Association for Higher Education, 1982), p. 3.
7. See, for example, Centra, Determining Faculty Effectiveness; Miller, Developing Programs for Faculty Evaluation; Peter Seldin, Successful Faculty Evaluation Programs: A Practical Guide to Improve Faculty Performance and Promotion/Tenure Decisions (Crugers, NY: Coventry Press, 1980).
8. Illinois State University Faculty Appointment, Salary, Promotion, and Tenure Policies (Normal, Illinois: Illinois State University, 1984), pp. 11-12.
9. Ibid., p. 9.
10. Gerald M. Reagan, "Peers, Experts, and Fair Judges: Some Questions about the Evaluation of Professors," Philosophical Studies in Education, ed. by J. E. Carter (Bloomington, Indiana: Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society, 1979), pp. 15-16.
11. See, for example, Roger Baldwin, et al., Faculty Careers, New Options: A Guide to Campus Activities (Washington, D. C.: American Association for Higher Education, 1981), and Carol Shulman, Old Expectations, New Realities: The Academic Profession Revisited, AAHE/ERIC Higher Education Research Report No. 2 (Washington, D.C.: American Association for Higher Education, 1979).
12. Appropriate credit is due Professor Thomas W. Nelson, Illinois State University. So in appropriate criticism or benign neglect.

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CAN TEACHERS MOTIVATE STUDENTS?

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I. Introduction

Initially I had thought that in order to save time, effort, and possible confusion, I would simply answer in the affirmative the question posed in the title and then quickly proceed to identify some of the "how to's" which seem to be so popular in teacher education courses. This clever maneuver would have enabled me to avoid the more difficult question of concept.

Individuals involved in all aspects of education exhibit much concern regarding motivation. The school principal frequently worries about motivating his staff, school counselors are often confronted with students who apparently have no motivation to be in school, and teachers within the classroom are forever striving to motivate their students. Implicit in these three examples of usage commonly associated with the word 'motivate' is a notable distinction. Both the principal and the teacher are concerned with doing something, that is with the verb form of the word. On the other hand, the counselor's situation pertains to something that is had (or in this case not had) -- the noun form.

Of what use, then, is this distinction? What is the difference in talking about motivation as something done and motivation as something had? The title of this paper, even though it assumes the verb form, is not quite as misleading as the more frequent question "How can teachers motivate their students?". The question in the form "how can I motivate I" presupposes the possibility of I's being motivated without recognising the verb-noun form distinction. Additionally, it is generally true that this approach relies heavily upon psychological accounts of factors affecting behavior in constructing a list of "how to's" seen to be useful for motivating students in the classroom. Most obvious in psychological accounts are references to needs and interests.¹

Consequently, the intent of this paper is to examine the meaning and use of the word 'motivation,' especially as it applies to education. The purpose in so doing is to delimit the concept in such a way as to suggest that 1) the "doing" sense of motivation is distinct from the "had" sense (the verb-noun form respectively) may involve different teacher activities within the classroom; 2) the two senses may have different goals; and 3) the more difficult goal, but the more desirable, involves the "had" sense.

II. R.S. Peters and the Concept of Motivation

First published in 1958 Peters' work, as a part of a series of studies in philosophical psychology, appears to be the most important and most referenced work in the sparse philosophical literature on motivation.² It is useful to any discussion of motivation to begin with Peters and his book, The Concept of Motivation. This is not to argue that Peters is right on all counts, but only to recognize that what he has to say must be taken into consideration.

Peters begins by pointing out that there are many different sorts of questions which can be asked about human behavior. It is these different sorts of questions which make an all-embracing psychological theory inappropriate, and these differences are especially confused in theories of motivation. It will be helpful to briefly mention these different types of questions regarding human behavior for purposes of helping to clarify what is to follow.

1. "His Reason" Explanations. The question "Why did X do Y?" can be asked and answered a number of different ways according to Peters. In this case we might just as well ask "What was X's reason for doing Y?" If we ask "Why did Harold complete his English grammar assignment?" we are asking for his reason for doing so. The answer will perhaps be something like "To learn to write and speak using correct grammar" or "Because he wants to write and speak correctly." Implicit in this case are norms of efficiency, consistency, and social appropriateness. We assume that doing English grammar assignments is a more efficient way of learning correct grammar usage than, say, trying to learn it informally on your own from everyday speech interactions.
2. "The Reason" Explanations. This simply refers to the fact that X may say that his reason was A, but in actuality the reason was B. For example, Harold said that he completed his English assignment in order that he could learn to write and speak correctly. But it is possible that the reason was that Harold wanted to avoid the wrath of the teacher. Harold is conscious of his reason and may or may not be conscious of the reason. Or of course, his reason and the reason may be one and the same -- the desire to write and speak correctly for example.
3. Causal Explanations. Instead of asking "Why did X do Y?" there are times when we might ask "What made X do Y?" In these instances we are probably concerned with some kind of deviation from the rule-following model. To ask what made Harold crawl around the room is at least to suggest that he had no good reason for doing it. It is, according to Peters, as if Harold is suffering something, that something is happening to him, rather than Harold is doing something. Consequently, causal explanations may be used to explain what happens to X, but are not sufficient, as are "his reason" or "the reason" instances, to explain X's actions.
4. End-State Explanations. This type of functional explanation entails reference to the notion of need which prescribes the norms whose absence is thought to be injurious. When we say that a person needs something, we are often referring to a discrepancy between what he actually is doing and what he ought to be doing. To say that Harold needs work in English grammar only points out what Harold should do; it does not always explain what he is doing. The notion of 'need' in ordinary language is seldom explanatory.

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The point to be sifted out of all of the above is that the concern of this paper is primarily with the first two types of questions, "his reason" and "the reason" types of questions. Motivation has something to do with giving and asking for reasons, not just explanation of behavior. Thus, little if any connection is seen between causal or end-state explanations and motivation. End-state explanations are not really explanations at all, and causal explanations may give necessary but not sufficient conditions for human action.

Having shown the different types of questions one can ask about human behavior, Peters advances some remarks about the concept of 'motive' and offers three characteristics shared by explanations in terms of motives. According to Peters, motives are a particular class of reasons which are distinguished by certain logical properties.⁴ That is, in the ordinary use of the term 'motive,' all motives are reasons but not all reasons are motives. Some reasons can be explained by character traits such as punctuality or consideration. These may be reasons why people act but they are not motives.

There are three main characteristics of 'motive' as an explanatory concept in ordinary language: a) it is used in contexts where conduct is being assessed and not simply explained, where there is a breakdown in conventional expectations; b) it is used to refer to a reason of a directed sort; and c) it must state the reason why a person acts.⁵

Regarding the first characteristic, Peters says that we only ask about X's motive when we want to hold his conduct up for assessment. The word is typically used where actions are to be justified, not just explained. This seems to get at the distinction between explaining behavior and giving reasons for behavior. But one might ask what Peters means by saying that we only ask about X's motive when there is a breakdown of conventional expectations. Peters does say, however, that "a motive is not necessarily a discreditable reason for acting, but it is a reason asked for in a context where there is a suggestion that it might be discreditable."⁶ Whether or not we would agree with Peters that to ask for a motive is to suggest in all cases that one is puzzled by or suspicious of the reason for action is problematic and is reserved for discussion at another time. The point, for present purposes, is that Peters distinguishes between conduct being assessed and conduct being explained and this might be better stated by distinguishing between giving reasons for behavior and explaining behavior.

Peters' second characteristic is that 'motive' is used to refer to a reason of a directed sort and its use indicates the presence of some goal. "If he has a motive he must have a goal of some sort, however weak its influence or however obvious or attainable it may be."⁷

Lastly, Peters says that a motive must state the reason why a person acts. That is, reference to the goal which is given to justify X's action must actually explain what X explains what X has done. The motive is not simply his reason, it must be the reason why X did what he did. In the case of Harold and his English grammar assignment, the possibility was noted that Harold may picture for himself his reason for doing the work, but at the same time the reason was entirely different though Harold was not conscious of it. In this case, Harold's motive would be the reason for his behavior -- to avoid the wrath of

the teacher. As already mentioned, there are different possible combinations of "his reason" and "the reason." So we might say that if his reason and the reason coincide, then Harold is conscious of his motive; if they do not coincide, then Peters would say that Harold is not conscious of his motive. Whether conscious or not though, the point is that Harold's behavior is directed towards a certain goal.

To summarise thus far then, what has been said is that any talk of motives means at least five things:

1. In speaking of motives, we are not interested in entertaining any type of causal explanation. Whatever the right question might be, the wrong question is "What made I do Y?" Causal explanations may be used to explain X's behavior, but are not sufficient for giving reasons for X's behavior. Implicit in this claim is the assumption that it is preferable to connect motivation with the ability to justify choice of goals towards which behavior is to be directed; that is, the ability to give good reasons for one's behavior, not just an explanation.
2. Oftentimes, accepting end-state explanations of behavior entails reference to the notion of need and the resulting belief is that the satisfaction of needs will help to motivate students.
3. To say that all motives are reasons is again to reject causal explanations and to reinforce the oft-cited distinction between explaining behavior and giving reasons for behavior. For clarification, if Harold was to fall out of the second floor window it would make little sense to ask for Harold's motive for doing so, unless of course he was attempting suicide. And herein lies the difference. If Harold intentionally falls or jumps out the window, then by Peters' three characteristics of 'motive' Harold does have a motive. It would be acceptable to ask for reasons for his action, and it would appear that Harold had a goal of some sort. On the other hand, if Harold accidentally falls out the window and hits the pavement below, it would be the cruel, cruel person who would walk up to Harold and ask "What was your reason for doing that?" In this case, Harold did not do anything of a directed nature as much as something happened to him. The appropriate question would be something like "What caused Harold to fall and hit the ground?" The answer might be something like his teacher pushed him out the window and then gravity took over. Referring to this answer explains what happened to Harold and has little to do with the inappropriate request that Harold give reasons for his behavior.
4. Having a motive implies that action is directed and that it is directed towards a goal. While habits can be said to be directed behavior, it is taken to mean that when we speak of motives we are implying that the action is not habitual but that it is directed towards a goal.
5. Motives state the reasons for action. If a motive is uncon-

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scious, X's reason will differ from ~~the~~ reason. What is important is to attempt to develop the situation where the motive is conscious -- where X's reason is the reason for the action.

III. Motives and Motivation

Some teacher education students were asked what they thought was meant by the term 'motivation.' The following is a representative sample of their responses:

- | | |
|---|--|
| -- to instill a desire | -- motivation is a means to an end |
| -- let them do things they like | -- getting students to exert their energies towards something of value to them |
| -- to key in on student's interests | -- getting students interested to the point of being creative |
| -- getting students to desire to learn more | -- directed interests |
| -- a student will be motivated if they are interested | -- try to key into children's interests |
| -- making the subject more appealing to students | -- motivation involves intrinsic or extrinsic rewards |

A quick glance is enough to recognise that seven out of twelve responses refer in some way to developing student interest, by far the most popular type of response. Two responses mention getting students to desire something, one mentions intrinsic-extrinsic rewards, one said that motivation was a means to an end, and one talked about working towards something of value. Using this list as a beginning allows us to make a number of points regarding motives.

First of all, although no one made a direct reference to the satisfaction of needs, I might as well try and eliminate that possibility before someone does. Many educators seem to believe that satisfying or "meeting" students' needs will motivate students to learn. Chambers points out that there is a fallacy of tightly connecting needs satisfaction with motivation.⁸ There are children whose physiological and psychological needs are satisfied and yet who have no interest in learning. Likewise, there are children whose similar needs are not met and still they may exhibit much interest. The first case shows that need fulfillment is not a sufficient condition for motivation. The second illustrates that it is not a necessary condition either.⁹ One of the common uses of the term 'motivation' is in saying that if X is motivated towards Y then X wants or desires Y for some reason(s). According to Komisar, one use of 'need' is to equate it with a motive.¹⁰ Thus, to say that X needs Y often means to many educators that X desires Y. While this may sometimes be true, there is no necessary connection between motivation and "meeting" students' needs.¹¹

Secondly, the majority of responses cited above implied a connection

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between student interest and motivation. As Chambers suggests, it is important to understand two meanings of 'interest.' There is a psychological use and a normative use.¹² The first entails felt interests -- what a person likes to do. In the second use the word means that which is for a person's good. Psychological interests can themselves be divided into occurrent interests and dispositional interests. Occurrent interests are those which a person has at a particular time. Dispositional interests are continual.¹³ A person may have a dispositional interest in the grueling sport of bocci ball, but only an occurrent interest in today's news stories. The students whose response was linked to interest fail to see that while creating or capitalizing on occurrent interest, educators must be able to lead away from total motivational dependence on occurrent interest and into a development of dispositional interest. Furthermore, normative interests may be the most desirable to develop in students and at the same time be the most difficult. As concisely stated by Teal and Reagan, "The educator's task is to make the important interesting, not simply to make the interesting important."¹⁴ Even more, to necessarily connect motivation with what the student is interested in makes the assumption that what the student is interested in necessarily has value. This is plainly false. When saying that X has interest in Y, it must be recognised that the value of Y must be justified separately from the existence of Y as an interest.¹⁵

Additionally, people who associate motivation with getting students to desire or value something approach an important point. To return to the distinction between explaining behavior and giving reasons for behavior, we are reminded that causal explanations have been rejected as motives because they only explain behavior. As Green notes, the concept of explaining behavior is much larger than the concept of giving reasons. That is to say, not everything that people do is subject to reasoning, though we might agree that everything that people do is subject to some explanation.¹⁶

Motives have to do with assessment, according to Peters; and assessment has to do with justification -- giving reasons. For X to act with a motive is for X to have a reason for doing what he does. As Peters has shown, to act with a motive implies action of a directed sort, directed towards some goal. When we have a motive for action, that is, when we want to do something, we are inclined towards that action because we see it or its likely consequences as desirable in some way.

Two statements can be made here. First of all, I have more or less offered a definition of what is meant by 'motive.' To act with a motive means at least three things: a) we want to do something, achieve some goal; b) we have judged that goal to be desirable in some way; and c) because of this judgment we can give reasons for our actions.

Secondly, the goal which has been judged as desirable, the goal towards which X is motivated, does not necessarily fall within accepted social convention. X can want to murder Y and even judge that goal as desirable and therefore be able to give some reason for his action. Or X may want a higher income, see that as a desirable goal, and be motivated to work harder to earn a promotion. Two very different examples, yet both point to the crucial element -- the act of judgment. It is to this notion of judgment that we now turn.

IV. Teachers and Motivation

Student X can have a motive for doing Y, but the question is can the teacher motivate the student to do Y, Z, or anything else. Reference was made earlier to the verb-noun distinction and it is in both senses that we use the concept of motivation. The suggestion in this section is that the frequent vacillation between the verb-noun form is misleading; that is, teachers too often talk of motivating students to do X and then assume that the students ought, therefore, to have motivation to do X. Most commonly, this distinction is thought of in the form extrinsic-intrinsic motivation. An objection should arise to the situation where the student-teacher relationship is permitted, knowingly or unknowingly, to remain at the verb-form stage of motivation throughout the student's entire school career.¹⁷

Considering the question posed in the title of this paper, only in the weaker verb-form sense can it be said that teachers can motivate students. Only in this sense is the teacher motivating the student with the use of rewards, punishments, and occurrent interests. Incentives and sanctions such as these are directed towards controlling and modifying the students' motivation and their resultant behavior, but are unlikely to improve the students' grasp of the necessity of making rational judgments and then acting upon them.

Of the two categories of motives which have been referred to, extrinsic and intrinsic, extrinsic motives often are those that are physical or coercive. Rewards and punishments, positive and negative reinforcements, and the classroom "token economy" are all examples of extrinsic motives. These kinds of things can serve as motives but, again, only in the weakest possibly least effective sense. Students do act on these kinds of motives and extrinsic motives can serve to tilt the motivational scales by directly adding to the attractiveness or unattractiveness of some behavior. The strength, then, of extrinsic motives is that they may succeed in modifying the student's view of a situation so that the student comes to want to do that which he might otherwise not want to do. The weakness, though, is that the student may adopt the disposition of acting only because of the associated incentives and sanctions, and not because he judged the goal and the means of achieving that goal to be desirable or valuable.¹⁸

The problem arises when teachers allow students, as they get older, to continue to act simply because of associated sanctions without ever teaching students the appropriateness of judging the goal to be achieved. It is easier to use rewards and punishments as ways of modifying students to conform to desired behavior than it is to teach students the skills of critical thinking and judgment. It is easier, but it is wrong. Even while using extrinsic motives with younger children, a teacher can reward the student for not hitting the person next to him, thereby helping to establish the habit of respect for others, as long as the teacher recognizes that at the same time he or she should be explaining the reasons for the reward. In this way, the student hopefully will come to see the goal of respect for others as desirable, not just the immediate reward.

Inappropriate uses of the phrase "they're not motivated" are often found in this context. Generally, the phrase is applied to students who

are discipline problems or who are not doing the required classwork. In other words, Harold is acting up because he has no motivation. The use of the phrase in this situation is nothing more than a re-description of the problem. What the teacher really means is that Harold has no motivation to do what the teacher wants him to do and the implication is that he ought to be punished.

The other category of motives, intrinsic, can be divided into two types -- material and symbolic. Material intrinsic motives are things such as salaries, the new car, a high school diploma, college degree, etc. I may judge a high salary to be something desirable and thereby act in such a way that my goal of obtaining a high salary acts as a material motive, and I can give reasons for my behavior by reference to this motive. Oftentimes, material motives serve a utilitarian or instrumental purpose in that they may be associated with other material or even symbolic motives. That is, the high salary as one of my material motives may allow me to purchase that new car.

Symbolic intrinsic motives are normative in nature. Abstract things such as love, esteem, prestige, and acceptance may serve as symbolic motives. Again, what is required on one's part is an act of judgment to view these kinds of things as desirable. My ultimate goal and motive for acting may be prestige, my intermediate goal may be a high salary, and my immediate goal may be a college degree.

To tie up some loose ends, it is the position here that extrinsic are the weakest least desirable types of motives. Unfortunately, it seems as though this is the type that classes in teacher education focus on the most. Through rewards and punishments, teachers attempt to generate occurrent interest or threaten to withdraw the possibility for the student to indulge in his occurrent interests. This may be of short-term use or useful in maintaining classroom discipline. The more valuable motives are those defined as intrinsic. These types of motives are continual, long-term valuations of material or symbolic things which hopefully offer a greater degree of consistent behavior.

Teachers can offer the view that material and symbolic goals have value and teachers often say things like "If you want a good job (which of course has value at least for the teacher) you had better do well in your classes." Or they might say "If you want your parents to be proud of you, you need to finish high school." The question is are the goals stated here really serving as motives for the student? Has the student judged these things to be valuable? The answer is often no and even if the student decides to try and do well in his classes, for example, it is possible that his motive for doing so is extrinsic rather than intrinsic. To tell a student that something is desirable or valuable does not necessarily mean that the student will act with that thing as his motive. It is the teacher's responsibility to help the student develop, over time, the skills necessary in making judgments of this type.

V. Summary

The concept of motivation is a complex yet important one, and discussions about motivation and how to motivate are predominant in many teacher education courses. One of the more important concerns uppermost in the minds of many education students is determining how to go

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about instilling motivation in their future students.

The position of this paper has been that only in the weakest, least desirable way can it be said that teachers are able to motivate students. It was suggested that teachers through the use of tokens, rewards, incentives were involved only with extrinsic motives. While extrinsic motives are of short-term use, the weakness which far outweighs their usefulness is that the student may develop the tendency to act only because of associated sanctions.

Intrinsic motives are more desirable and can be held only as the result of judgment. The student must have the ability to make the judgment for himself. To use Peters' language, it is preferable that a student come to find himself where his reason for acting is the reason -- that is, the student has made his own judgment regarding the goal and is conscious of his motive.

All of this is not to say that only extrinsic motives directly apply to education. Teachers, as examples, have a very large part to play in the development of a student's intrinsic motives. The responsibility of the teacher is to develop a sound, rational judgmental ability within a student. Students ought to be taught to judge a potential goal as desirable or undesirable, and if found to be desirable, students ought to learn that they should desire and be motivated towards that goal. Equally important is learning to judge the appropriateness of possible alternative actions from which to choose for purposes of achieving that goal. Implicit in schooling is the transmission of what is socially acceptable. The student also has to be able to make a judgment regarding acceptable, efficient, and desirable ways of achieving that goal.

Notes

1. See C. N. Gofferr and M. H. Appley, Motivation: Theory and Research (New York: Wiley, 1964) or C. L. Hull, The Principles of Behavior (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1943).
2. R. S. Peters, The Concept of Motivation (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958). See also Ken Green, "Intrinsic Motivation," Journal of Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 6 (1972), pp. 75-96 and William F. Alston, "Motives and Motivation," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), Vol. 5, p. 401.
3. Peters, The Concept of Motivation, p. 18.
4. Ibid., p. 28.
5. Ibid., pp. 29-36.
6. Ibid., p. 31.
7. Ibid., p. 32.
8. John H. Chambers, The Achievement of Education (New York: Harper & Row, 1983), pp. 67-69.
9. Ibid., p. 68.
10. B. Paul Komisar, "'Need' and the Needs-Curriculum," in Language and Concepts in Education, eds. B. Othanel Smith and Robert H. Ennis (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1961), p. 25.
11. For a detailed examination of the motivational, as well as pre-scriptive, uses of 'need' see the reference in note 10.
12. Chambers, The Achievement of Education, p. 71.
13. Ibid.
14. Stanton M. Teal and Gerald M. Reagan, "Educational Goals," in A School for Tomorrow, ed. Jack R. Frymier (Berkeley, Calif.: McCutchan Publishing, 1973), p. 62.
15. Ibid., pp. 62-63.
16. Thomas F. Green, The Activities of Teaching (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), p. 160
17. A pertinent subject requiring additional consideration is the fuller treatment of the notion of the developmental process implied in this paper. Instances of extrinsic motivation may be classified as to types such as goal displacement, where the teacher substitutes the reward for the actual goal, and multiplication of goals, where the teacher engages in activities that serve as a kind of transitional step between goal displacement extrinsic motivation and intrinsic motivation. Included may be activities such as demonstrating,

Justifying, contrasting, defining, appraising, etc.

18. Roger Straughan, Can We Teach Children to be Good? (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp. 93-94.

MORAL IMAGINATION AND PEACE EDUCATION

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During the fall of 1982, Teachers College Record dedicated an entire issue to the subject of peace education. In this issue, the editor, Douglas Sloan, argues that the problem of ineffective pedagogy in peace-making is rooted in the structures of consciousness responsible for the way we think.¹ Specifically, Sloan calls the mode of thinking predominant in education (including peace education) "technical reason."² By this he means a positivist view towards knowledge which claims a quantitative, scientific approach to the world, exclusive of values, imagination and ethical criteria as the sole, valid means for coming to know.

The problem of technical, or calculative thinking honoring only the scientifically verifiable and excluding moral and value considerations is epitomized in the contemporary debate about the nuclear arms race. Questions such as "Who's ahead?" and "By how much?" dominate the educational process. Such thinking further allows considerations such as how many casualties are acceptable in a nuclear war or how much damage can permissibly be inflicted on the environment. Examples of the calculative approach to peace education are readily available in the literature of the League of Women Voters Educational Fund,³ the Harvard Nuclear Study Group's recently published Living With Nuclear Weapons,⁴ and, of course, in the innumerable government publications on the subject.

It is the opinion of Sloan and others that we need to introduce an education of the imagination to overcome the limitations of calculative thinking. In Sloan's terms, what is needed is an "Insight-Imagination" capable of synthesizing the ethical, scientific, and artistic aspects of thinking.⁵ Other labels occurring in Sloan's journal are "ethical imagination,"⁶ "healing imagination,"⁷ or simply imagination⁸ itself. Regardless of their adjectival descriptions, the common ground the authors of these terms share is a concern for the moral aspect of peace education. In the terms of this study, educators are looking to the "moral imagination" as a means to transcend the limits of calculative thought.

The position of this paper is that scholars are indeed correct in their assertions that moral imagination is the epistemological core of pedagogies for peace-making. However, examination of the concept moral imagination in the literature of ethics and moral education shows definitions to represent various, even contradictory, notions of imagination. Moreover, recommended use of imagination in peace education actually ends up accepting the parameters of the nuclear arms debate in much the same way as the calculative approach does. In the end, the arena to which imagination gains entry is not radically different from that entered by the type of thinking described by Martin Heidegger as calculative.

With this in mind, it is the purpose of this paper to demonstrate the limits of accepted understandings of moral imagination and to show how contemporary notions of the term lead to errors in peace education similar to those committed by educators who ignore imagination altogether. In addition, this study will point the direction to a definition of moral

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imagination which moves the study of the nuclear arms race beyond the confines of unimaginative calculative thought. That definition, it will be shown, is located in the pedagogical theory of Brazilian educator Paulo Freire.

Moral Imagination Defined

In the 1980 Report of the Hastings Center Project on the Teaching of Ethics, project director Daniel Callahan stated that the initial stage of the moral process requires employment of the "moral imagination":

A course in ethics can be nothing other than an abstract intellectual exercise, unless a student's feelings and imagination are stimulated. . . . For purposes of teaching, one may think of this as the 'pre-moral' state, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for any serious discourse and reflection at all. But if one sees the moral imagination as the very source of a drive to get straight on ethics, it will continue to have a place even in the most advanced courses in ethics. A lively moral imagination is the only real corrective to the conceptual and logical analysis that is equally necessary for advanced work in ethics; it is as important at one end of the spectrum as it is at the other. Imagination without analysis is blind; analysis without imagination is sterile.⁹

In short, Callahan associates imagination with the emotional side of students. This notion of imagination finds resonance in peace pedagogies which invite students to "imagine the real," in this case the horrific, effects of a nuclear war. This is in fact what Peter Abbs means by ethical imagination. It is also this notion which underlies the term healing imagination in the teaching strategies of the Physicians for Social Responsibility.

A second notion of moral imagination is well articulated by Australian philosopher of education G. Reddiford, who understands moral imagination not as feelings preliminary to moral understanding, but as understanding preliminary to moral feeling.¹⁰ Or to put it another way, whereas Daniel Callahan presents moral imagination as coming into contact with feelings as a preparatory step antecedent to the real work of moral analysis, Reddiford sees moral imagination precisely as initial dis-identification from feelings and prejudicial understandings as a preparatory step prior to the more genuinely moral activity of experiencing sympathy and compassion. Of this Reddiford writes:

The use of 'imagination' that I discuss is 'freedom of description' and I take moral imagining to be the putting to one side of one's own descriptions of the world in order to understand a situation in the terms of another person.¹¹

The point of attempting to achieve this freedom of description is fourfold. First of all, it liberates one from the feelings of want and like, as well as from prejudicial understandings which tend to prevent one from attaining objectivity and from fairly judging the actions of others. In this sense, it is an attempt to suspend judgment before one has walked in another's moccasins. Secondly, use of moral imagination as understood by Reddiford allows one to abstract from one's own present-

situation to anticipate a future state and feelings, imagining how one would like to act then. In this way, the moral imagination allows responsible planning. Thirdly, and more radically, the point of employing moral imagination is to make possible action "from a moral viewpoint." By this Reddiford means adopting a critical stance towards the conventional moral dictates of one's own culture. But this can never be done, he observes, without suspending affirmation of those dictates and affective allegiances. Thus, use of moral imagination is necessary for ethical maturity and independence. Finally, use of the moral imagination is required for the adoption of truly moral principles. These principles, according to Reddiford, must be universalisable. But the presence of universalisability can never be judged unless one is capable of abstracting from his or her own circumstances, understanding, and feelings. In sum, the use of moral imagination is necessary for judging others, for responsible planning of one's own actions, for achieving ethical adulthood, and for the formulation of genuinely moral principles. However, the ultimate purpose of moral imagination's use is to open access to moral feelings, particularly to those of sympathy and compassion. For in Reddiford's schema, these feelings, not abstract analysis, constitute the heart of morality.

It takes no great imaginative insight to perceive how Reddiford's understanding of moral imagination might be directly applicable to peace education. Literature aimed at understanding the arms race from the perspective of the Russians would be an example.¹² Or at the more personal level, another instance of Reddiford's notion would be the peace-making approach of Joanna Macy which strives to evoke the quality of compassion through spiritual exercises of the imagination.¹³

Yet a third understanding of moral imagination in general is enthusiastically advanced by Lipman, Oscanyan, and Sharp in the Philosophy for Children movement.¹⁴ Here too imagination is given a central place. In short, the approach to moral imagination articulated by the Philosophy for Children program involves primarily thinking and planning. Specifically, the authors define the moral imaginative process as: (1) thinking creatively; (2) envisioning the various ways in which an unsatisfactory situation might be transformed; (3) anticipating of goals that a moral individual or moral community might seek (this is facilitated by consideration of fictional models of the ideal community; (4) considering alternative ways to reach each goal; (5) selecting the preferred ways to reach the goals determined; and (6) planning implementation of the objectives.

An example of Lipman, Oscanyan, and Sharp's notion of moral imagination in the peace education context is found in the literature of the National Nuclear Freeze Campaign. Like the Philosophy for Children movement, the Freeze Campaign is concerned with anticipating goals for peace in the larger community and outlining objectives for reaching those selected goals. The planning of the Freeze movement takes shape within the context of the escalating arms race. The moral imaginative method in this case requires continual planning and developing strategies to accomplish several major intermediate measures of de-escalation before the goal of disarmament can be reached.

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A Critique

It is probably evident from the foregoing that the concepts of moral imagination presently under review essentially fragment the imager into a dualistic center of consciousness in which thoughts and feelings are at best only tangentially related to the serious business of morality. The results are conceptualizations of imagination too one-dimensionally weighted either towards the exclusively affective or towards the singularly cognitive. But it is also clear that this fragmentation reaches over into the dimension of temporality. For each of the concepts of imagination just considered emphasizes either present (Callahan and Reddiford), past (Reddiford),¹⁵ or future (Lipman et al.) to the quasi-exclusion of remaining time dimensions. Thus, each of these understandings of moral imagination tends to leave its possessor one-dimensional in psychic attitude, and usually in historical awareness.

It is the lack of historical integration in particular that makes these concepts of moral imagination especially deficient, particularly in the peace education context. That has been pointed out recently by John Broughton and Marta Zahaykevich who criticize the peace movement in general for its ahistoricity.¹⁶ They trace this to the adoption by the peace movement of what they describe as the ideology of positivism. It is basic to the positivist approach that truth can be ascertained by bracketing all subjective elements, including political interests and other biases, and by paying attention to sense data alone. Thus in pursuit of objectivity, positivism separates knowledge from subjectivity, subject from object, and fact from value.

But even more relevant to peace education is their criticism of the dehistoricizing function of positivist thinking. Broughton and Zahaykevich make clear that the calculative approach to the question of nuclear arms fragments history. Typically it focuses on an isolated moment in space and time, most often on "Ground Zero" just after the initiation of nuclear hostilities. Thus, energy is directed towards understanding the horrific details of the holocaust, and towards immediate strategies for averting such a disaster. However, what is lost is an understanding of the political history and of the modern social relationships which make the event possible and even, from some points of view, necessary. Put another way, the positivist approach makes no provisions for enabling students to understand and to critically interpret the mushroom cloud. There is little possibility of comprehending why it might have happened.

Broughton and Zahaykevich's criticism of positivism can be brought to bear on Callahan's approach to moral imagination. The separation of subject and object is most clear in his near identification of the imaginal faculty with feelings. Thus, having noted the importance of "imagination and feelings," Callahan shows himself most anxious to leave them aside in pursuit of the truth found in more objective "straight on" analysis. Peace education materials which evoke feelings of fear and anxiety under the guise of moral imagination commit this same error. That is, having aroused the feelings, they quickly get on to the more serious business of straight on calculation which is the mirror image of the process used by their adversaries in debate.¹⁷ For example, the function of moral imagination in Robert Lifton's schema seems to be a simple introduction into a calculative debate about the nuclear arms race

on the side of the Freeze option, for use of imagination defined by Lifton is to accept the "facts" that there are already enough nuclear arms to do what they are intended to do, namely to deter their use. The implication here is that the doctrine of deterrence is acceptable. Nowhere does the argument leave room for a critical analysis of the historical structures underlying the policy of deterrence or for any thinking beyond the limits defined by deterrence strategy. In other words, moral imagination defined as feelings is committed to the present, *vis.*, the *status quo*, and excludes both consideration of the past and reflection on the future.

Similarly, Lipman and his co-authors exemplify a problem-solving approach to issues. But unlike the method of the positivists, theirs does not move directly from sense data to calculation, to formulation of goals and objectives, and finally to decisions. Instead, it moves from sense data once removed (*vis.*, those of fictional characters who embody the values and functioning of an ideal community) to critical discussion of that data, to formulation of goals and objectives, and finally to decisions. Thus, the Philosophy for Children approach to imagination introduces valuable antipositivist elements of idealism and of dialectical criticism. However, its approach remains at the ahistorical level of positivism or calculation in that its starting point is intentionally fictional, that is, ahistorical or other-worldly. This characteristic, coupled with the future-orientation of its understanding of imagination as anticipatory planning, demonstrates the tendency of the Philosophy for Children approach to neglect critical understanding of the present, and especially of the past.

As noted earlier, the anticipatory planning approach to imagination is probably best represented by the Nuclear Freeze movement. But its advocates too fall into a kind of fictional ahistoricity, simply accepting the *status quo* question, *vis.*, the framework of deterrence, as given, and going on from there to plan remedial action -- again usually not different in kind from that proposed by their opposite numbers. Thus, imagination which is simply problem-solving finds itself unable to reframe the question itself (e.g., from that of controlling the arms race to the problem of the nation-state itself which the race assumes).

Ironically, in spite of G. Reddiford's understanding of moral imagination as objectivity and abstraction from one's own subjective feelings and understandings, his approach is least positivistic. For the purpose of his striving for objectivity is precisely to enter more authentically into the subjectivity of others and to gain access to those structures of character in oneself which would be anathema to the positivists, *vis.*, sympathy and compassion. It is from these, Reddiford argues, that moral principles in their essential universalisability arise. Reddiford also emphasizes the importance of understanding the past of others, so that their present feelings and understandings might be better appreciated. However, his location of morality's basis in subjective sympathy and compassion takes part in its own way in positivism's essential dualism. For it seems to neglect the undeniably objective aspects of ethical thought. Moreover, it is difficult to see where in Reddiford's approach to moral imagination there is room for the moral subject to critically analyze his or her own understanding and feelings in historico-critical perspective. Thus, his approach to moral imagination also participates in a kind of ahistoricity.

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As already noted, Reddiford's approach to morality is probably best reflected in peace efforts such as Joanna Macy's attempt to educate potential victims of nuclear holocaust to compassion. However, even Macy's essentially anti-positivist efforts at evoking compassion seem doomed to failure since they are unlikely in themselves to arouse students from characteristic trust in and complacency with quantitative approaches to arms control. This is so because typically they have been schooled in the positivist tradition which leads students to dis-value the effective, i.e., the moral feelings of love and compassion.

Even addition of Reddiford's concept of moral imagination to Macy's exercise in compassion might not help much. For moral imagination which escapes from the dominant calculative order and from the consciousness which springs from it, by provisionally bracketing it altogether, is unlikely ever to be critical of that order and of its shortcomings.

In summary, then, it is the position of this study that proponents of moral imagination, as a way out of the desert of calculative thinking both in general and in the context of peace education, are basically correct in their fundamental intuitions. Their error, however, which leads to the contradictions and obscurities just described, lies in their ahistorical understanding of what imagination is, and consequently of what its function is in the precisely moral enterprise.

Moral Imagination as Critical Thinking

A definition of moral imagination which avoids the pitfalls of dualism and ahistoricity characteristic of calculative thinking emerges in the pedagogical theory of Brazilian educator Paulo Freire. His implicit notion of moral imagination surfaces in Freire's discussion of conscientizacao, or critical thinking:

... in the act of critical perception, men discover their own temporality. Transcending a single dimension, they reach back to yesterday, recognise today and come upon tomorrow. The dimension of time is one of the fundamental discoveries in human culture.¹⁸

Freire's perception that the act of cognition involves apprehension of objective data and of the links between that data in a temporal, historical framework finds resonance in the seminal theory of imagination articulated by Immanuel Kant. It was Kant's discovery that imagination is the temporal root of human knowledge.¹⁹ That is to say, the acts of thinking and feeling issue from a ground laid by imagination itself. Following Kant, Martin Heidegger further established that imagination is not only the temporal ground of cognition, but also of the moral life.²⁰

The Freirean emphasis on the tri-dimensionality of time is illustrated in his pedagogical technique of codification. This is a simple, yet profound strategy which presents (i.e., makes present for analysis) to students a situation which replicates their own pre-reflective consciousness of the world. Typically, the "teacher" presents a photograph or simple image which invites students to "decode" or analyse this representation of their reality. Freire describes the temporal function of imagination in the following way:

In the process of decoding, the participants externalize their thematics and thereby make explicit their 'real consciousness' of the world. As they do this, they begin to see how they themselves acted while actually experiencing the situation they are now analysing, and thus reach a 'perception' of their previous perception. By achieving this awareness, they come to perceive reality differently; by broadening the horizon of their perception, they discover more easily in their 'background awareness' the dialectical relations between the two dimensions of reality.²¹

This passage makes it clear that Freire understands awareness of the present to contain within it (though often in unnoticed form) elements of the past. But future elements are also embedded in present experience, as Freire goes on to explain:

By stimulating 'perception of the previous perception' and 'knowledge of the previous knowledge,' decoding stimulates the appearance of a new perception and the development of new knowledge. The new perception and knowledge are systematically continued with the inauguration of the educational plan, which transforms the untested feasibility into testing action, as potential consciousness supercedes real consciousness.²²

Admittedly, Freire's language is confusing and contains specifically Freirean terminology. However, the singular, most important point that Freire makes is that knowledge is essentially temporal, and the key to the historical integration of ideas is critical thinking. A Freirean approach to education, and to peace education in particular, insists on the historical nature of structures and upon the importance of examining them in a critical, totalising light. That is, for Freire there are no self-standing, unrelated data of experience. Everything is part of a whole, contributing to the whole in either a coherent or contradictory way. Similarly, there are for him no structures, ideas, or human experiences which are untouched by the historical process. Everything, then, is subject to the relativising function of temporal awareness, specifically including knowledge, power, and economic, social and political frameworks of power. This means that the pedagogical employment of moral imagination must penetrate below the superficial level of "data" and "information" to the infrastructures of that data, and to the establishment of whole-forming relationships between individual data, the underlying structures, and (most importantly) the knowing subject.

In the context of peace education, moral imagination in Freire's sense uncovers the dehistoricizing and thus dehumanizing effect of the nuclear arms debate. For a structural critique of the arms race shows that nuclear weapons are used by superpowers to freeze the world in its present state of stability. Their net effect is to immobilize the majority of humankind now living in the underdeveloped world in its current state of dependence and objectivity so devastatingly described in the Global 2000 Report.²³ The effect of nuclear weapons, in other words, is to prevent Third World people from becoming subjects in control of their own destinies. It is to bring their histories to a grinding halt. That this is indeed the history-arresting effect of such weaponry has been alleged recently by Charles Kinzie. He writes:

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The Soviet Union is not our primary enemy. What we euphemistically term our policy of containment against the Soviet Union is the ideological cover under which we wage a war of counterrevolution against every form of development in the so-called Third World that we deem to be inimical to our interests. Our counterrevolutionary policy prefers the absence of development to any revolutionary development which would jeopardise our place in the sun.²⁴

Whether or not one regards Kinsie's analysis as accurate, it does succeed in reframing the structure of thinking about peace education. For the usual questions of "Who's ahead?" and "By how much?" give way to more probing moral questions such as "Are Americans as 6% of the world's population consuming 40% of its products actually in need of nuclear weapons to insure our present rate of consumption?" This critical line of questioning is essential according to Broughton and Zahaykevich. For without a historicising approach, peace education can have the end result of mobilising middle and upper class people for nuclear disarmament simply as a way of preventing the destruction of their comfortable lifestyles.²⁵

Freire recognises that peace education efforts directed towards the middle class are problematic. This is so because the middle class, for the most part, profits from the stability insured by nuclear weapons. In Freire's analysis, the task of moving history into a qualitatively different dimension -- changing the structures of consciousness -- belongs to the marginalised classes which have reached the stage of critical thinking. By "marginalised" classes in this context, Freire refers to groups of people whose experience is not taken into account by the prevailing power structures, and which are therefore ignored by those structures or are manipulated by them as objects.²⁶ Here Freire has in mind the entire Third World whose people for the most part are viewed as a pool of inexpensive manual labor by international capitalism, and whose resources are rationalised at present largely for exploitation by the First World. But more particularly, Freire finds the marginalised among the non-decision-makers whether located in the Third World or in the industrialised countries, i.e., among women, racial minorities, and especially among students.

These groups, according to Freire, have very little or nothing to lose by radical change in the prevailing system. Their protests amount to denunciation of a system which denies them participation in the life which its own ideology proclaims as essential. They also amount to a utopian announcement of a future which includes them and their reality in themselves, and not simply as functions of the ruling class.

Because of their connection with the future, the marginalised classes have a prophetic function vis-a-vis the ruling class. That is, they alone are capable of bringing about a new future from which all will benefit since they most prominently suffer from the power structure. In other words, the consciousness of the marginalised is the vehicle through which moral imagination finds its expression.

In summary, contemporary notions of moral imagination juxtaposed with a more radical concept located in the pedagogy of Paulo Freire illustrate that our commonly accepted idea of moral imagination is not the motor force for changing the structures of the way we think.

Instead, it leads us to accept the very problem we seek to avoid - calculative thinking. Freire's temporal notion of moral imagination challenges us to approach questions of peace education from a critical, historical perspective which opens the nuclear arms debate to the dimensions of past, present, and future. And in that process, an often overlooked raison d'être of the arms race itself stands revealed.

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Notes

1. Douglas Sloan, "Toward a Living World," Teachers College Record 84, no. 1 (Fall 1982): 9.
2. This study prefers the Heideggerian classification -- "calculative thinking." See Martin Heidegger, "Memorial Address," Discourse on Thinking, trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund, (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 46.
3. See Alice Hughey, "Providing for the Common Defense: A Military Policy Reader," (Washington, D. C.: League of Women Voters Educational Fund, 1983), Pub. No. 531. By the same author, "The Quest for Arms Control: Why and How," (Washington, D. C.: League of Women Voters Educational Fund, 1983), Pub. 530.
4. See Harvard Nuclear Study Group, Living With Nuclear Weapons (New York: Bantam Books, 1983).
5. Sloan, p. 13.
6. Peter Abbs, "Teachers, Ethical Imagination and Disarmament," Teachers College Record 84, no. 1 (Fall 1982): 178.
7. Robert Jay Lifton, "Beyond Nuclear Numbing," Teachers College Record 84, no. 1 (Fall 1982): 134.
8. Maxine Greene, "Education and Disarmament," Teachers College Record 84, no. 1 (Fall 1982): 134.
9. Daniel Callahan and Sisela Bok, Ethics Teaching in Higher Education (New York: Plenum Press, 1980), pp. 64-65.
10. G. Reddiford, "Moral Imagination and Children," Journal of Moral Education 10, no. 2 (Jan. 1981): 75-90.
11. Ibid.
12. See Earl A. Molander and Roger C. Molander, What About the Russians -- and Nuclear War (New York: Pocket Books, 1983).
13. See Joanna Macy, "Taking Heart -- Spiritual Exercises for Social Activists," Fellowship 42, nos. 7-8 (July/August 1982): 3-6.
14. Matthew Lipman, Ann Sharp, Frederick S. Oscanyan, Philosophy in the Classroom, Second Edition (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980), pp. 166-171.
15. Here the reference is to Reddiford's insistence that the understanding of history and culture is essential for entering into awareness of the cultural and other societal pressures experienced by others. See Reddiford, p. 81.
16. John B. Broughton and Marta K. Sahaykevich, "The Peace Movement Threat," Teachers College Record 84, no. 1 (Fall 1982): 152-173.

17. This is illustrated in the nuclear arms debate when both sides appeal to the same emotion -- fear. This feeling is evoked by the proponents of "peace through strength" by visions of Russians invading a disarmed American homeland. It is also elicited by advocates of nuclear disarmament by images of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki holocausts raised to the nth power.
18. Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), p. 3.
19. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), esp. A edition of the Transcendental Deduction.
20. See Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962).
21. Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (London: Sheed and Ward, 1972), p. 108.
22. Ibid.
23. See The Global 2000 Report to the President, Gerald O. Barney, Director (Washington, D. C.: The Government Printing Office, 1980).
24. Charles E. Kinzie, "Weapons Artifacts of Our Religion," National Catholic Reporter, 1 April 1983, p. 15.
25. Broughton and Zahaykevich, p. 167.
26. In the context of this study, it is significant to point out that the political and social realities of the Third World countries are routinely ignored in the rhetoric of the arms race, as well as in educational material on the subject. Because of this, conflicts in Central America, for example, are viewed almost exclusively in terms of East-West struggle, as if the region itself had no historical, social, economic, or political reality except as an appendage of the First World.

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PRO BONO PUBLICO: EDUCATIONAL
REFORM AND THE HISTORICAL ACTOR(S)

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Much of the contemporary literature in American education is written by persons who appear to believe that the important issues in the field are primarily technical, non-political, and certainly beyond ideology. While it is true that technical and specialized issues do exist in any field of study, and/or practice, it can be argued that an examination of educational issues outside of political, philosophical, historical, sociological, and ideological contexts is simplistic and misleading. When one hears, or reads, the many plans and descriptions of so-called educational reforms and innovations, it becomes necessary for the critical observer to ask: Who is most likely to benefit from these proposed reforms? For example, who were the main beneficiaries of the simulations and games that are used within schools? Whose axes are being ground, and conversely, whose oxen are being goaded, by the recent rush toward the widespread use of computers within the schools?

Many well-known writers in education seem to operate from a paradigm which allows them to assume that progress is assured whenever "kids learn more," and learn more about things while in school. This paradigm allows the possibility for a belief in upward mobility through excellent school performance. Therefore, whatever helps kids learn, and to be successful, in school is deemed a progressive phenomenon. The use of this liberal paradigm often fails to include political, historical, and ideological contexts in its discussion of education; moreover, it excludes the fact of social class. When one is confronted by superficial claims in the field of education, especially when one is being asked to support yet another "reform" or "innovation," it becomes necessary to point out that many changes in American education were designed to give the children of those who wield power advantages in their attempt to match their parents' position during adulthood. If the educational reforms and innovations were universally good, as is often claimed, instead of characteristics within a hegemonic relation where a dominant class(es) exercises power over subaltern groups and classes, then it would not be so crucial to decide in whose interest the changes promoted by technically-oriented educational reformers are really aimed. How is a thoughtful and honest student of education to decide which proposed innovations and reforms in education will ultimately benefit all of the deserving persons within the society -- including the yet to be born?

It is well known that the Marxists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries believed that the interests of the proletariat were, in fact, representative of the long-term best interests of all. Partly because Marxists, as well as others, have had an increasingly difficult time defining who comprises the proletariat within advanced western societies, it becomes problematic to see the proletariat, and its interests, as a litmus test for discerning what is authentically good, progressive, and in the interest of all. The problem of the "least proletariat," within the advanced societies, is a serious one for writers, thinkers, and activists in education (as well as for other areas which comprise the superstructure of society), because those who attempt to go beyond seemingly non-ideological technical educational analyses

must decide in whose interest educational change should occur. If there is no easily identifiable proletariat within advanced capitalist societies, or if there is no similarity between the interests of the proletariat and that of the overwhelming majority of the population, then honest and authentic critics/reformers must make either universal or piecemeal claims. A universal claim which is not anchored to a specific group's interests can be foolishly utopian and harmlessly airy. If ungrounded, and non-specific, universal claims are untenable for authentic and radical reformers; it is equally true that piecemeal improvement in education, or within broader social, economic, and political areas, is unacceptable. Radicals have long criticized liberals for not studying the underlying causes of society's problems, and because they naively (or treacherously) propose piecemeal, fix-it-up "reforms."

Professor Harold Entwistle has written an important book which explains the educational views of the late Italian Marxist theoretician, Antonio Gramsci.¹ Gramsci has wrestled with the complex question of what is progressive within educational theory and practice; in spite of his deeply held Marxist convictions, his ideas about education have relevance for non-Marxist students of education. Entwistle's Gramsci appears to approve of rigorous education that allows students of all social classes to become conversant with the great issues which characterize the civilisation of which they are a part. According to Harold Entwistle, Gramsci approved of many of the stated goals comprising the Italian schools of the post-Risorgimento liberal period, viz. 1870-1922. Gramsci's fundamental criticism of the Italian school system was focused upon the exclusion of the children of workers and peasants. The sons and daughters of the Italian poor were prevented, for the most part, from learning about the great issues of Italian and European civilisation because of their exclusion from school. Consequently, they were imprisoned within their own parochialism, provincialism, and dialects. Entwistle writes:

...the crucial school reform was not curricular but structural in the direction of the replacement of segregated secondary schools by schools comprehensive of different social and occupational strata. What he (Gramsci) wanted was not destruction of the traditional secondary school, but that it should be made universally available.²

One might argue today, in agreement with Gramsci and other European Marxists, including social democrats, that the democratization of access to the excellence of *haute* bourgeois education is what is authentically progressive, and to be valued. Granted that Marx wrote favorably concerning polytechnical education, there remains an important European leftist commitment to liberal arts education for all.

This tradition, which is committed to liberal arts education for all, could be called essentialist, in the sense that it believes that there exists certain crucially important insights that describe our civilisation, and that an authentic democracy would allow all of a society's youth to learn these insights.³ These insights and/or truths are believed to be "out there," and independent of the knower's study of them. Essentialists typically believe that most children of normal intelligence can learn about the great questions and truths of their culture and civilisation. Marxists do not believe in the spectator theory of

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knowledge, so the essentialist temptation in Entwistle's Gramsci, and other Marxists, must be resisted.

It is an historical fact that Gramsci opposed the Fascist educational "reforms," especially the Gentile reform of 1922, because he believed the curriculum would be trivialized. Those who are aware of what misunderstood, and bastardized, Deweyism has come to be, will know what Gramsci's fears were. Gramsci wrote in his Prison Notebooks (Quaderni del Carcere) that the old school, before the Fascist reforms

...taught a more modern outlook based essentially on the...fundamental fact that there exists objective, intractable natural laws to which man must adapt if he is to master them...⁴

Gramsci could afford to insist that the schools stick to the business of teaching the youth about the high culture of the West because he was convinced that it is the whole experience of the person within the society which influences what s/he will do or become. The city of Turin, and the province of Piedmont, were, during Gramsci's public life, culturally homogeneous, and many of its people were politically aware, if not radical. Gramsci could trust this culture, as an ancient Athenian trusted Athens, "to make the man"; whereas, this may not be possible within the one-dimensional societies in the West during this contemporary period of monopoly capitalism's almost total victory within a decadent liberal order. Gramsci believed that schooling provided certain kinds of knowledge and skills which are crucial to eventual political commitment. However, it was his position that where one stands ultimately depends upon extra-school factors. The Italian Marxist held that it was futile to attempt the radicalization of persons outside of the proper work context. One might argue, as many do today, that the school itself has become the place of work for almost all of the youth in the advanced industrial nations. Would Gramsci's views be significantly altered considering the radically different conditions under which schooling takes place today?

Gramsci belonged to an intellectual and political tradition which allowed him to make consistent value judgements upon issues; specifically he could, and did, decide which theories and practices in education were good, and which were bad. He lived in a nation where other powerful philosophical, political, and educational positions existed. One need only study about the great struggle that occurred between Mussolini's Fascist regime and the Roman Catholic Church during the 1922-23 period to learn that persons operating within those different systems of belief had little trouble deciding upon what kind of educational philosophy, practice, and reforms are good, useful, progressive, etc.⁵ The putative non-ideological and technical character of American education makes such value judgements difficult to make.

Professor Entwistle's work teaches us that Gramsci believed in rigorous, theoretical, and broad education for radical intellectuals and leaders. Gramsci had a specific reason for insisting upon such an educational experience: he knew that it was necessary to analyze every facet, complexity, and contradiction of the status quo in order to develop a praxis which could be useful in transforming and overcoming it. Entwistle tells us that,

In Gramsci's analysis, it is those educationalists believing the mainstream of Western culture to be irrelevant for working-class children, whose educational theory and practice would confirm the school as hegemonic in support of the status quo.⁶

Gramsci believed that if the sons and daughters of those who work at lower and middle-level jobs (the proletariat, and subaltern classes) are to become authentically educated in the *liceo* (secondary school), or university, in a way that they do not become unwitting accomplices of a status quo which neither they nor their parents had a voice in establishing, then they must be made to see that intellectual standards should remain high. Gramsci was committed to an educational experience that allowed students to understand the very underpinnings upon which the culture was supported. When one attempts to define intellectual standards which are to be upheld within the liberal arts tradition in contemporary America, the problem becomes how to explain why this tradition is useful, relevant, or good per se. Gramsci could make a commitment to learning about the high culture of Western civilization because he believed that the collective historical task was to make the humanizing power of that culture available to the proletariat, i.e., to the vast majority.

As was said earlier in this work, Entwistle's Gramsci sometimes appears to be an essentialist; however, in spite of the Italian's commitment to learning about the high culture of the West, he was not an essentialist. The mainstream of Marxist thought is dialectical (Hegelian), with regards to its insistence that there is no "out there" reality which remains unaffected by man's historical attempt to understand and master the world. Marxists, as well as Dewey, have maintained that there is no reality which is antecedent to the search for it. The relationship between man-the-actor and that which is acted upon is a dialectical one for Marxists. Gramsci is no exception.

Even if there is no culturally homogeneous Piedmontese proletariat in America, nor any other group which could play its part, still contemporary American educational and political theory can be enriched by studying Gramsci's emancipatory and democratic emphasis. Gramsci's intellectual contributions cannot be understood independently of his commitment to political action. As has been stated earlier, for Marxists, knowing is never merely passive reflection. Instead, it is an act that can change the given. Gramsci is in agreement with Herbert Marcuse and other members of the Frankfurt School⁷ concerning the idea of praxis. Moreover, these anti-determinist views are consistent with the early writings of the "young" Marx.⁸ Antonio Gramsci agreed with Giambattista Vico's belief that individual, and collective, actors can, and do, make their own histories, albeit, not under conditions of their own choosing. If one's view of the nature of man holds that he is capable of being good, then teaching ordinary persons how to make their own history may be the authentically moral and progressive thing to emphasize within the schools, and the larger society.

In addition to Gramsci's debt to Vico and Marx, his training in idealist philosophy -- including a mastery of Benedetto Croce -- caused him to believe in the tenacious will of man. As I have written in another place,

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Idealist philosophy had taught Gramsci that seemingly utopian hopes could be converted into reality, i.e., the discrepancy between painful necessity (is), and a normative (ought), could be bridged. As a Marxist, Gramsci went beyond idealism. Moreover, in his role of a political activist and leader he sought to give his philosophical insight political body.⁹

If the United States is not an authentic democracy, and if powerful men who control corporate and governmental institutions are the ones who set priorities down within which a badly informed population (mass?) chooses, in plebiscitary, or consumer choice fashion, then Gramsci's political/educational theory takes on extra-Italian, extra-Marxist, and contemporary importance and value. Perhaps the real goal of education within contemporary America, and elsewhere, should be to help make democratic participation a possibility, and eventually, a reality. This writer has no illusions about how difficult such a goal would be to implement; however, this analysis is concerned with ways to evaluate what kind of education is good, progressive, etc. The question concerning "what is to be done" admittedly is of great importance, but beyond the province of this essay.

Gramsci's originality as a Marxist lies in his conception of bourgeois rule in which the real strength is not (usually) to be found in violence, nor in naked coerciveness by the state machinery, but in the acceptance, by the ruled subaltern groups and classes, of a system of meanings and habits which serves the interests of a powerful class. Bourgeois hegemony meant, for Gramsci, that a class, or classes, could rule a highly developed society without the flagrant, or regular, use of naked force. Furthermore, hegemony is comprised of more than economic control. Gramsci has taught us that egemonia consists of a group, or class, creating a state of affairs in which their leadership and privileged positions seem natural.

Gramsci sought to understand how the rulers accomplished this feat: how they made their domination seem commonsensical, and seemingly anchored to a preordained universal nature of things. He also wished to learn how historical actors, in this case the proletariat, could come to recognize this hegemony, resist it, defeat it, and then build a just social order comprising of a: new world view, lingua franca, collective symbols, and common meanings.¹⁰

It could be said that Antonio Gramsci viewed Marxism as the most recent synthesis of the Western tradition. His goal can be described as securing the consummation of what this tradition has been historically seeking to achieve, viz., a free social person who was described by Marx, and who can be traced back through the best of Judea-Christian and Greco-Roman civilizations. According to Gramsci, the realization of the promise of Western civilization would occur as a result of the abolition of class divisions which were based upon greatly unequal wealth and power -- divisions that have prevented men and women from becoming human beings in the fullest and richest sense of the term.

This paper began with an assertion that much of the contemporary work done in American education is being written and implemented by

those who appear to believe that the important issues in the field are mostly technical, non-political, and beyond ideology. It was further argued that such an emphasis is simplistic, if not misleading. It was suggested that one must ask: who is most likely to benefit from education/schooling as it exists, or from proposed innovations and reforms? The question was raised with regards to what kind of criteria can be used by critical and thoughtful educators. Much of the first part of this paper describes how Marxists, and Gramsci specifically, have historically believed that they knew what was in the best interest of the majority, if not for everyone, during a particular period. We have seen how Entwistle's interpretation of Gramsci was that of conservative education for radical politics. Some contemporary Western Marxists are convinced that Entwistle's version of Gramsci is not accurate, because Marx's, and Gramsci's, epistemology are Hegelian, vis., the central Marxist tradition eschews the spectator theory of knowledge. Entwistle is criticized for supposedly not being able to get Gramsci from conservative schooling to radical politics and praxis. It now becomes imperative to analyze the probable necessity of a radical pedagogy for radical politics.

In this second section of the paper we shall sketch out the possibilities for a radical pedagogy for radical politics, and pro bono publico. These possibilities are dependent upon the viability of human agency within Marxist thought. Marx's historical actor(s) must be capable of waging anti-hegemonic battles, instead of being dependent upon iron laws of historical development, or getting right with some transcendental forms which exist independently, and are antecedent to the search for them. This attempt to sketch possibilities for radical pedagogy was adumbrated in part one when the thrust of Gramsci's thought was described.

Henry A. Giroux, in his book Ideology, Culture, and the Process of Schooling, has insisted upon a radical interpretation which features the individual, and collective, actor as at the center of Marxism, and history. Giroux sees Marxism's dynamism in its conviction that subject and object interact dialectically. When one brings such a perspective to bear upon the school there is, at least, a theoretical hope for change, and for radical pedagogy. According to Giroux,

Radical pedagogy must seize the positive moment amidst the cracks and disjunctions created by oppositional forces within the school. This is a critical step in translating political understanding into. . . political struggle that might challenge not only the school's hegemonic practices, but could trace their sources to broader social and political determinants.¹¹

Most Western Marxists have believed that a long historical struggle will be necessary in order to change, what they consider to be, a system dominated by decadent liberalism and monopoly capitalism, into a democratic community which is just and humane. Men and women (producers and workers, but not in the older classic Marxist tradition of industrial proletariat) armed by theory, and a great deal of bravery will be needed to resolve the present Western crisis. If present capitalist societies, like the United States, are going to feature historical actors who struggle against capitalist hegemony and ". . . seize the positive moment

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amidst the cracks and disjunctions. . ." within the school, and elsewhere within the superstructure, then the question remains, vis., where are the organisation, and the leadership, to come from.

Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis conclude their landmark Schooling in Capitalist America with a reminder that spontaneous individual efforts are not enough. Persons and groups working in isolation will not succeed in developing an effective radical pedagogy or politics. As we know, Bowles and Gintis call for the establishment of a mass based party comprised of those who work and who must gain control over their respective workplaces. Michael W. Apple has written, ". . . our very commitment to rationality in the widest sense of the term requires us to begin the dialectic of critical understanding that will be part of political praxis."¹² If there is to be a radical pedagogy and a radical politics which are based upon human agency, upon the belief, or fact, of man's being able to make his own, and collective, history (albeit not under conditions of his own choosing), then a link must be found between the desire, and the power, to make one's own history. The question of power, and/or the lack of it, looms behind the work before you. An in-depth discussion of power which could change the economic, political, social, and educational status quo is beyond the scope of this particular essay, but the importance of power has not been naively dismissed.

We shall turn to the work of Paulo Freire for a model of radical pedagogy -- a pedagogy that allows for the possibility of authentic educational reform, a crucial role for the historical actor(s), and which is pro bono publico. Giroux tells us that for Freire:

. . . all pedagogy. . . is essentially a political issue and all educational theories are political theories. Inherent in any educational design are value assumptions and choices about the nature of humankind, the use of authority, the value of specific forms of knowledge, and, finally a vision of what constitutes the good life. Freire's work represents a critical attempt to illustrate how ideologies of various means and persuasions reflect, distort, and prevent men and women from becoming socio-political actors in the struggle against an oppressive society. Thus to understand his pedagogy one must begin with a recognition that it is a call for liberation and an on-going process of radical reconstruction.¹³

The best criteria for good progressive education may well be that kind of education which allows ordinary (honorific connotation) men and women to come to believe in their own right and power to have an increasingly greater say over what kind of society they must work and live in. Our suggested criterion is based upon whether or not school experiences maximize the students' potential to help build a participatory democracy -- including the democratization of the workplace. Furthermore, the student must come to see that the great heritage of cultural accomplishment can serve as a framework within which to guide democratic decision-making. The students must have a chance to find out for themselves, as active learners, that democratic participation, within a community of shared values, and economic fairness, should be honored as the highest public good(s).

Giroux has warned us that:

On the one hand, radical educators treat us to a potpourri of encounter group happenings and process-based interpersonal activities designed to enrich our existential selves. . . . On the other hand stand those radical educators who are staunch defenders of. . . 'liberating' content.¹⁴

The radical pedagogy being outlined herein must be more than just humanistic process without content, and more than insightful content being transmitted, in essentialist fashion, to docile students. Giroux believes that Freire's work suggests an exit, enabling us to go beyond the dichotomy of process versus content.

Freire seeks to demonstrate how explicit, and implicit, ideologies, in addition to brute force, prevent men and women from becoming sociopolitical actors. Freire's actors are to be taught how to create their own meanings, definitions, and lenses with which to see things more accurately. One is reminded of Max Horkheimer's statement concerning philosophy's conscious effort to create a linguistic structure in which things are called by their right names. These new lenses, and correct name-giving, which provide for seeing things clearly, are necessary prerequisites to action. It might be more accurate to say that the acquisition of new liberating knowledge is the result of human activity in its struggle with the problematic. Freire's pedagogy is not unrelated to Dewey's insights into the arts of learning and teaching. Freire is convinced that human activity devoted to calling things by their right names is conducted by persons with specific values and interests -- activity does not occur in a valueless context. Knowledge becomes a springboard for praxis. Freire writes:

To exist humanly, is to name the world, to change it. . . . Men are not built in silence, but in word, in work, in action reflection. . . saying that word is not the privilege of some men but the right of every man. Consequently, no one can say a true word alone -- nor can he say it for another. . . . Dialogue is the encounter between men, mediated by the world, in order to name it.¹⁵

Giroux tells us that Freire urges teachers to present knowledge as problematic. The educational experience should ". . . begin with questions concerning the meaning and nature of knowledge itself."¹⁶ Students and citizens must learn to question in terms of whose reality is being legitimated, or, whose interests are being served by specific forms of knowledge. The men and women of any society must be able to distinguish between false and true knowledge claims. Richard Shaull, in the introduction to Pedagogy of the Oppressed, has said of Freire's basic assumptions:

. . . that man's ontological vocation. . . is to be a subject who acts upon and transforms his world. . . . This world to which he relates is not a static and closed order, a given reality which man must accept and to which he must adjust; rather it is a problem to be worked on and solved.¹⁷

Shaull speaks to our original point in this essay concerning the domi-

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nance exercised by writers who view the field of education as technical, non-political, and beyond ideology. According to Shaul's interpretation of Freire, education either functions as an instrument which integrates the young into the present system, or it "... becomes 'the practice of freedom,' the means by which men and women deal critically with reality and discover how to participate in the transformation of their world."¹⁸

Denis Goulet has written in the introduction to Freire's Education for Critical Consciousness, that "problematizing" is the antithesis of the technocrats' "problem-solving." The problem-solver stands coldly distant from the problem (who could be a suffering person), and analyses it into component parts, etc. "Such problem-solving, according to Freire, distorts the totality of human experience by reducing it to those dimensions which are amenable to treatment. . . ."¹⁹ To problematize is to encourage, and to teach, everyone to codify reality in a way that leads to critical consciousness -- finally empowering people to change their former relations vis-a-vis natural and social forces. All of the participants enter into dialogue with each other, and their "vocation" is to act as transforming agents of their reality. "Only thus do people become subjects, instead of objects, of their own history."²⁰

Although Freire writes about the Third World, it is nevertheless clear that millions of people in Europe, North America, and other parts of the "developed" world are not historical actors. Neither Freire, nor Marx, can liberate the men and women of the developed, or underdeveloped, countries; in fact, the essence of their work, as well as Gramsci's, is that ordinary men and women must liberate themselves. According to Goulet,

Only those who are historically 'immersed' in the complex forms of oppression. . . in the United States (or anywhere) can identify the special garb worn by 'cultural silence' in this society.²¹

Conclusion

We have begun this essay with a question concerning establishing useful criteria with which to evaluate educational ideas, practice, and reform. The analysis has taken us to the work of Antonio Gramsci, Harold Entwistle, Henry Giroux, Michael Apple, the Frankfurt School, Paulo Freire, etc. The thesis of the essay has been that there exists a tradition which speaks of men and women as persons who can act individually, and collectively, within the historical situation into which they are born. In this historical period, good and progressive education must be of the kind that allows young people to begin learning how to maximize their abilities to live as historical actors. Radical pedagogy must support, and be supported by, radical politics, because there must occur a massive democratic struggle against hegemony. The contemporary struggle against hegemony seeks to overcome a status quo wherein which the vast majority of men and women are not historical subjects, capable of dialectically acting upon social and physical reality, but are instead subject-directed predicates. It has been suggested in this essay that a narrow technical definition of education cannot enable us to distinguish authentically good and progressive educational theory and practice from that which is beneficial only to a few, instead of pro bono publico.

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Notes

1. Harold Entwistle, Antonio Gramsci: Conservative Schooling for Radical Politics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979).
2. Ibid., pp. 29-30.
3. Essentialism can be described as a philosophy of education which believes that an essential body of wisdom and truth exist which allows one to understand the rational cosmos created by a Supreme Being. Many philosophers of education believe that philosophical idealism best anchors the essentialist doctrine, although some have argued that philosophical realism has come to be essentialism's anchor.
4. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (editors and translators), Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 34.
5. Richard J. Wolff, "Catholicism, Fascism and Italian Education from the Riforma Gentile to the Carta Della Scuola 1922-39," History of Education Quarterly, Spring 1980, Vol. XX, No. 1, pp. 3-26, passim.
6. Harold Entwistle, "Antonio Gramsci and the School as Hegemonic," Educational Theory 28, 1 (Winter 1978): 33.
7. Richard A. Brosio, The Frankfurt School: An Analysis of the Contradictions and Crises of Liberal Capitalist Societies (Muncie, Indiana: Ball State Monograph Number Twenty-nine, 1960), passim.
8. See Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, 1844, and the General Introduction Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy, 1857-58, usually called the Grundrisse.
9. Richard A. Brosio, essay on Antonio Gramsci, in Twentieth Century Thinkers, St. James Press, in press.
10. Ibid.
11. Henry A. Giroux, Review of: Harold Entwistle's Antonio Gramsci: Conservative Schooling for Radical Politics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), in Telos, Fall 1980, No. 45, p. 224.
12. Michael W. Apple, Ideology and Curriculum (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 166.
13. Henry A. Giroux, Ideology, Culture and the Process of Schooling (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981), p. 129.
14. Giroux, Ideology Culture, p. 127.
15. Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), p. 76.
16. Giroux, Ideology Culture, p. 132.

17. Greire, Pedagogy, p. 13.
18. Ibid., p. 15.
19. Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), p. IX.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. X.

BUSINESS MEETING
OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY
Room A, Terrace Hilton Hotel, Cincinnati, Ohio
November 10, 1964

1. Minutes of the previous meeting were approved.
2. A financial report was given and discussed. Mr. McKenney, Secretary/Treasurer, reported that the dues are inadequate to meet the expenses of the Society. We are presently solvent due to two \$400 gifts from Bowling Green University and the University of Louisville. The newly created institutional membership has produced only \$100. (University of Dayton and Eastern Kentucky University)
3. It was moved by Dick La Brecque that the President and the Executive Committee study the problem of fund raising along with dues collection and decide what the rate of dues should be and what additional steps should be undertaken for raising funds.

A discussion of the financial situation followed: It was suggested by Phil Smith that a small endowment fund be developed. It was suggested that the first dues notice come out in January. A motion to increase dues to \$15 was made by Dennis Senechuk and then withdrawn.

Mr. La Brecques' motion was passed.

4. Dick La Brecque moved and it was seconded that the Ohio Valley P.E.S. meet concurrently with the A.E.S.A. in Pittsburgh in 1966. A discussion followed: Would there be a saving? Only in travel. Would the connection benefit the Society? David Denton pointed out that it effects the Society when the meetings come on the same date. Some discussion indicated that there were apprehensions about the effect of meeting concurrently. Our small group might get lost. An attempt would have to be made to coordinate the two.

David Denton spoke in favor of the motion. Clinton Collins said that there is a need for the President-elect to coordinate the meeting.

David Denton observed that the President-elect could pick his program committee and initiate the activity much earlier than usual. Bob Skovira pointed out that he is ex-officio a member of the program committee and also a friend of Dick Altenbaugh which makes him ideally situated to deal with the mechanics of the program.

The motion passed.

5. A letter of appreciation from Harry Broudy was read and accepted.
6. The Nominating Committee, John Carter, Chair, Bonnie Hume, and Richard La Brecque, made the following report:

Jack Willers, President-Elect
William McKenney, Secretary-Treasurer
Jo Ann Freiberg Reagan, Executive Committee, 65-66

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Mary Yeasell, Executive Committee, 85-87
(To complete the term of Jack Willers)
Editor of Proceedings, Robert Skovira
Associate Editor, Richard Quants

The recommendations of the Nominating Committee were accepted and passed unanimously.

7. Robert Skovira asked about the problem of the person who failed to appear to read his paper. Clinton Collins said that he believed that the paper should be excluded. David Denton suggested that the Program Committee has a dual role which makes the possibility of a conflict. The committee serves both as a referee and as a Program Committee. The Proceedings should be a record of the meeting. Dennis Senchuk pointed out that there could be extenuating circumstances. Everett Jarboe suggested that the paper might be read at next year's meeting.

Suggestions for future meetings were made: The paper should be resubmitted. If the author is not present, the paper should be read by someone else. Submission of a paper should carry with it the promise to appear at the meeting, particularly for a first time person.

There was a discussion of the copyright. There is the implication that papers submitted to O.V.P.E.S. are "first-time" papers. Copyright is secured to protect the authors. Dennis Senchuk said that he believes that publication should be a pre-condition for accepting a paper for the Program.

8. The gavel was turned over to the new President, Dennis Senchuk. He thanked all who had participated in the Program.
9. The meeting adjourned at 12:30 p.m.

William McKenney, Secretary/Treasurer

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OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

Treasurer's Final Report for 1985

BALANCE: January 5, 1984 \$1,576.11

Income:

University of Louisville	400.00
Bowling Green University	400.00
Convention Income	579.00
Memberships and Subscriptions	<u>732.10</u>

Total 2,111.10

Interest: 87.48

TOTAL INCOME: 3,774.69

Disbursements:

Duplicating	8.09
Postage	33.60
Supplies	5.00
Postage	37.40
Printing	1,350.00
Postage	38.00
Convention	226.82
Advertising	20.00
Supplies	10.00
Printing	<u>1,261.42</u>

TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS: 2,990.33

NET BALANCE: January 5, 1985 \$ 784.36

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